After Gaza: Getting Back to the Peace Process
2014 Annual Conference: Banquet | Conference | Luncheon
2014 Annual Conference: Banquet | Conference | Luncheon
In the past, the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) inability to confront or deter Israel was reflected as political weakness for the Lebanese government vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 heralded a growing political role for Hezbollah. This role was further enhanced by the 2006 war with Israel, with Hezbollah claiming victory and consolidating its influence within the LAF and the government.
As Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gazes across Damascus from his palace on Mount Qasioun, he can be grateful to his Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah allies that he is still in a position to enjoy such a view.
This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gone through a number of different phases in its long history. It is possible—though only time will tell—that a new phase is beginning now, but not a particularly hopeful one.[1]
Historians and anthropologists have focused on Muslim networks of scholars, merchants, and pilgrims that connect the Middle East with Southeast Asia. Especially with respect to the study of Islam in Indonesia, where political scientists and anthropologists approach Islam largely in terms of national politics and local cultures, this burgeoning body of literature on global Muslim networks offers both ethnographic insights into actual practices and an historical appreciation for the longue durée. The importance of this scholarship notwithstanding, much of this work focuses on formal networks of migration, trade, learning, and pilgrimage. In this respect, the cultural and political work of Islam has been largely confined to the study of either Muslim scholars or lay Muslims who participate in trade, travel, study, and migration. Here I shift the focus to a religious diplomacy tour that connected Muslims with states, citizen-believers, and global politics.
This summer’s war between Israel and Hamas, like the previous rounds — Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 and Operation Pillar of Cloud in 2012 — exacted a terrible cost not only in human lives (more than 2,100 Palestinians and 73 Israelis[1]) but also in the wholesale destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure. The Palestinian Authority estimates reconstruction and rehabilitation costs of the recent conflict to exceed $4 billion, more than two times Gaza’s GNP.[2]
The forces of globalization have not erased national boundaries. Nor have they shortened the physical distances between countries. Tel Aviv and Tokyo still lie more than 9,000 kilometers apart. The direct flight time between Ben Gurion Airport and Beijing Capital Airport remains just over nine hours.
Israel and Indonesia are two nations whose relations―due to political circumstances―have yet to fulfill their enormous potential. Were there to be progress in peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, a window of opportunity could open for Indonesia’s new president to take practical steps that would begin to unlock this potential.
Read full article at The Washington Post.
The presidential vacuum in Lebanon since May 24, when president Michel Sleiman’s term ended without the Lebanese parliament having elected a successor, is likely to continue until an electable candidate is found who respects Hezbollah’s military autonomy and does not challenge its Syria policy.
Free media in a democratic society allows people to evaluate and challenge, to scrutinize honestly and debate accurately. But what happens when mainstream media unknowingly fails the public? Marda Dunsky argues that, when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a decade-old conflict at the center of U.S. interests in the Middle East, the American mainstream media has failed the public and even perpetuated violence.
The terrible war in Gaza, the third and worst of its kind in the last decade, is a product of Palestinian political disarray, Arab disunity, and division in Israel. Washington’s policy of “no direct talks” with Hamas and bitter partisanship between the White House and Congress have also limited effective U.S. intervention. As such, this latest tragedy is yet another symptom of decades of failure to resolve the larger Israel-Palestine conflict, which, without major policy changes, will surely drag on regardless of the latest cease-fire.
A proposed deal to export Israeli natural gas through Egypt has the potential to enable Israel’s entry into its first major export markets, help Egypt escape a deepening energy crisis, and welcome the first European players into Israel’s natural gas industry. However, the deal is complicated by political realities and a history of deeply rooted grievances between the two countries, made worse by the recent violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
Amb. Philip Wilcox, MEI scholar and president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, discusses the motivations that led to the current escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas, and why Israel decided to pursue a ground assault in Gaza.
Israel’s ground assault continues an historical pattern of dealing with threats from adversaries. How well has this strategy worked before?