Monday Briefing: Efforts toward a deal on Gaza provide daily twists in the plot, while the price of failure continues to rise
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
In early April, a highly publicized trilateral meeting involving the United States, the European Union, and Armenia was widely believed to mark a turning point in Yerevan’s relationship with the West. If it comes to pass, it will present Baku with its own critical decision: whether to abandon multi-vectorism and more fully align with Russia or the West.
March 26, 2024, marked the 45th anniversary of the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. Over the years, this bilateral settlement has proven its stability and resilience, despite a series of crucial challenges. Yet the Begin-Sadat legacy, and the benefits it brings, is now in jeopardy.
It was no surprise to see Pakistan’s new prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, choose Saudi Arabia as the destination of his first official visit. What was more surprising, however, was the joint announcement that emerged from the trip, which called on Pakistan and India to resolve their outstanding disputes, especially the Jammu and Kashmir problem. There are several factors that have impelled Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to take on the tricky task of mediating the protracted rivalry between the two key South Asian states.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
A version of this article first appeared as part of an Expert Views special feature on the new rules of the game in the Iranian-Israeli conflict.
شهد شهر أبريل سلسلة من التصعيدات غير المسبوقة في الصراع الإيراني-الإسرائيلي الذي طال أمده، حيث شن كلا البلدين هجمات صاروخية وطائرات مسيرة على أراضي بعضهما البعض لأول مرة في التاريخ.
في أعقاب هذه الضربات، ماذا سيكون تأثيرها على الأمن الإقليمي والبيئة السياسية في المستقبل، وما هو المطلوب لتثبيت قواعد اللعبة الجديدة، وكيف يمكن للدبلوماسية الأمريكية أن تساعد في تسهيل هذه العملية؟ طلب معهد الشرق الأوسط (MEI) من خبرائه إبداء آرائهم في هذا الشأن.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip. Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other.
A version of this article was originally published on the Substack “Thinking Middle East.”
The Iranian strike against Israel was a first of its kind. Its mere occurrence sets a precedent that will have a long-term impact and require Israel to weigh new considerations when planning future military operations against Iranian assets.
Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.
Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.
Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?