Are Tehran’s Overtures to Riyadh Serious?
In an interview with an Arab television station, the former Iranian foreign minister and the present head
In an interview with an Arab television station, the former Iranian foreign minister and the present head
Tehran’s fears of losing out influence during the ongoing peace talks on Syria in Astana were evident even in the makeup of the Iranian delegation. According to Iranian sources, Tehran had been compelled to dispatch a top military figure with extensive experience in Syria in order not to be eclipsed by Russian and Turkish militaries.
Iran, Russia and Turkey agreed earlier today to establish a trilateral mechanism to enforce the fragile cessation of hostilities in Syria. After a two-day meeting in Kazakhstan sponsored by Moscow, the trio issued a joint statement that called for “a political process based on the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 2254” to end the Syrian civil war.
In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Gerald Feierstein, and Charles Lister provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including U.S.-Middle East relations in the new Trump administration, the view of Trump’s inauguration from Tehran, the Gulf’s ‘wait and see’ approach to the new administration, and Russia’s public position on Syria talks at the outset of talks in Astana.
Iran will build a mobile phone network in Syria under an agreement signed by the two countries’ ministries of information and communications technology, Iranian media reports.
While much ink has been spilled about how Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war has fueled sectarianism and instability in the Arab world, the implications of Iran’s increasing recruitment of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites on security and stability in South Asia have largely been overlooked. Over the past five years, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has recruited, indoctrinated, trained and deployed thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites to fight under its command against Sunni rebel groups across Syria.
In this week’s briefing, MEI experts Gerald Feierstein, Robert S. Ford, Yousef Munayyer, Eran Etzion, and Ruba Husari provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including the ongoing confirmation hearings for key members of the incoming administration’s foreign policy team, the upcoming Syria talks, the recently convened Paris talks on Israel and Palestine, and OPEC’s assessment of its agreement to cap oil output.
As Russia and Turkey are trying to broaden the scope of the upcoming peace talks on Syria, Tehran says it opposes the inclusion of the United States in the meeting scheduled for next week in Kazakhstan.
In the latest example of Iranian interference in Iraq, a top Iranian general has said that the presence of the Saudi consulate in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region, is not “just
At a press conference on January 17, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that “Iran would welcome working with Saudi Arabia to bring about a more stable Middle East.” He urged for “moderation” and “respect.” This message from the Iranian president is positive and should be applauded. However, the question in so many capitals around the Middle East is whether Rouhani’s posture and message of “moderation” has any bearing on the actual policies that Tehran is presently pursuing in the region.
The recent announcement by Saudi Arabia that the retired Pakistani General Raheel Sharif will head a 39-member anti-terrorism coalition made of Muslim states is a matter of much concern in Tehran. Iran, which was not invited to join the coalition, regards the Saudi initiative as a regional project aimed to contain its influence.
The representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader on Hajj [pilgrimage] affairs has announced that Tehran will shortly dispatch a delegation to Saudi Arabia. This latest development has come about following Iran’s decision not send any pilgrims to Saudi Arabia in 2016. Riyadh had earlier sent an invitation to Iran for talks to be held to resolve differences that exist in this context.
Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) approaches the question of refugees much differently than its European counterparts. The latter’s pushing back against burden-sharing measures has led to what can be described as burden-shifting. In contrast, the AKP’s view of Syrian refugees in Turkey is that they are more of a boon than a burden. This essay explores the thinking and the tactics behind Turkey’s approach to dealing with the Syrian refugees challenge.
Notwithstanding Egypt’s political and judicial contretemps, the Egyptian parliament is expected to vote soon in favor of the return of Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia. The decision, after months of controversy in Egypt, will fulfill the April 2016 agreement reached between Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al Sisi and Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud that formally acknowledged Saudi sovereignty over the two small islands and provided for their return to Riyadh’s control.
The current Syrian ceasefire effort of Russia and Turkey is a Russian attempt to impose a final political defeat on the rebels and a Turkish attempt to focus on eliminating the Kurds in Syria militarily and politically. Turkey is also intensely lobbying the new U.S. administration for help. The ceasefire deal rests on the barbarism of Russia and the Assad regime and the feckless response of the West. This is the peace Rome imposed on the prostrate Carthage. The unanimous UNSC vote endorsing the Russian/Turkish proposal enshrines one side’s brutality and the other’s moral vacuum.