Research & Commentary Results

A major political row between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and preacher Fethullah Gulen’s Islamic movement has been simmering in Turkey. The clash between the two former allies will have important implications at a time when Turkey appears increasingly vulnerable, with a war raging in Syria and the government facing fierce challenges from within. The rift will have an effect on a gamut of issues, from the “Kurdish opening” to upcoming local and presidential elections.

This report was co-authored by Ömer Taşpınar and was published by the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution on Jan. 22, 2014. Click here to download the full report as a PDF.

Introduction

The de-Ba`thification process in Iraq has fallen profoundly short as a transitional justice mechanism over the past decade. Poorly conceived, badly implemented, and controlled by hard-liners, the process has been so highly politicized that it has eroded the rule of law and intensified the sectarian tensions that are at the heart of the violence haunting Iraq.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in Tehran January 28 and 29 for his first meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, and Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci are accompanying him. MEI spoke to Gonul Tol, Director of the Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies, about the meeting.

What is the reason for this high-level visit?

This essay is part of the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) series on “Harvesting Water and Harnessing Cooperation: Qanat Systems in the Middle East and Asia.” 

Since the departure of U.S. ground forces from Iraq in 2011 in the wake of failed negotiations to extend the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement, the security situation in Iraq has steadily declined. To many, the situation was predictable, as the absence of a residual U.S. force to mature the Iraqi security forces and moderate long-standing political tensions among the sects led to a security vacuum filled by extremists and terrorists. To others, 10 years of investment and over 4,000 troops lost was enough, and it was time for the Iraqis to resolve their own internal conflicts.

This article was first published on Al Jazeera on December 24, 2013.

The downfall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has put political Islam at a crossroads. Not only has it shown that ideology per se is not a guarantor of political success, but also that Islamists need to rethink their strategy and tactics in order to deal with the new environment following the Arab Spring.

The following is an excerpt from “Iraq’s Tangled Foreign Interests and Relations,” written by MEI Vice President Paul Salem and published by the Carnegie Middle East Center on December 24, 2013.  Click here to view the full report.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit to Washington, D.C. last week came on the heels of a year of soul searching for Turkish foreign policy. After the Arab uprisings shook Turkey’s guiding principle of “zero problems with neighbors,” the country now seems intent on resuming the leadership role it enjoyed in the pre-Arab Spring Middle East.

The initial impulse for Pakistan and Turkey to pursue security cooperation stemmed from their common opposition to Communism in the 1950s. Over the past decade, Pakistan and Turkey have once again sought to cooperate in the security sphere, this time in countering terrorism and ensuring stability in Afghanistan.

Earlier today, double explosions near the Iranian embassy in Beirut killed at least 23, including an Iranian diplomat. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an Islamist group with links to al-Qa`ida, took responsibility for the attack. MEI sat down with its Vice President for Policy and Research, Paul Salem, to discuss the significance of the bombings in Lebanon as well as their regional and global implications.

Tell us about the bombing and the group that claimed responsibility for it.  

Malaysia and Turkey lie nearly 5,000 miles and seven time zones apart. They have different historical experiences and state structures. The role that religion plays in their public life also differs markedly. Yet Malaysia and Turkey have more in common than is widely acknowledged. Both are newly industrialized, middle-income, predominantly Muslim countries and mid-sized powers in their respective regions. Both are also expected to assume a greater regional and global role in the coming years.

The Philippines and Turkey have not fully capitalized on their human resources and strategic assets in order to expand commercial ties and boost cultural exchanges. However, thanks largely to the efforts of a critical mass of Turkish nationals who have formed the backbone of a “constituency” for advancing Philippine-Turkey relations, the tide may be turning. Three recent developments indicate that the groundwork is being laid to pursue a more robust bilateral relationship: 1) the opening of Turkish-owned schools operating both in Manila and in Zamboanga City (southern Philippines); 2) the creation of the Pacific Dialogue Foundation in the Philippines; and 3) the establishment of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines.

Middle power is an opaque term that involves multiple concepts. Through different conceptualizations of the term, Turkey and Japan are both middle powers. Indeed, widely read textbooks about Turkish foreign policy published around 2000 regard Turkey as a middle power. In the Japanese context, several scholars, including Yonosuke Nagai, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Nobuya Banba, and Mitsuru Yamamoto, have evaluated the foreign policy of their own country as middle power diplomacy since the late 1970s. Recently, Yoshihide Soeya comprehensively summed up Japanese middle power diplomacy after the 1970s.