Amidst the historic turmoil sweeping across the Arab world, in the March 2011 Bulletin, MEJ editor Michael Dunn addresses political empowerment through social media, scholar Wayne White is interviewed on recent political developments, and Joshua Stacher previews his forthcoming article on authoritarian politics and hereditary succession in Syria.
In the wake of the August 31 drawdown of US forces and the formation of a fragile unity government after months of negotiations, the December 2010 Bulletin features an argument from Ambassador David Mack for sustained US assistance to the Iraqi government, interviews with MEI Scholar Charles Dunne the political situation in Iraq and with Katherine Blue Carroll on her forthcoming MEJ article, and a summary of MEI’s 64th Annual Conference.
Women, Shari‘a, and Personal Status Law Reform in Egypt after the Revolution
Like almost everything else during the uncertain period of the transitional government, the future of personal status law reform is at a crossroads in Egypt. The new constitution (assuming one will exist)[1] may technically have little direct impact on how the country’s laws affect women’s lives, but the legislative process that emerges thereafter most certainly will.
The Iraq-SAMHSA Partnership to Strengthen Behavioral Health Studies
Originally posted September, 2011
For nearly eight years — since May 2004 — the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has partnered with the Iraqi Ministry of Health to help Iraq re-establish its behavioral health service system. HHS and SAMHSA have learned much from this effort about improving behavioral health services in the US, particularly for Muslim populations and for persons experiencing extended trauma.
Implications of the Iraq-SAMHSA Initiative for the Delivery of Behavioral Health Services in the United States
Through the collaboration between Iraq and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), US providers have learned a great deal about improving behavioral health services, including trauma services, from their Iraqi colleagues since 2004.[1] Two of the many implications for US behavioral health services resulting from this partnership are directly relevant to shaping services for both returning veterans, and refugees and immigrants from the Middle East:
Governments in the Middle East and North Africa have long relied on repression to intimidate, harass, and punish political opponents. During the Arab uprisings, dictators under threat have all ordered and used violence against peaceful protestors as a way to maintain power. But this repression has had widely divergent effects on the course of the different conflicts.
Building an Addiction Workforce in the Middle East: A Counselor Training Program Partnership Between Kasr Al-Ainy and UCLA
Drug and alcohol problems know no borders. Annually, the United Nations World Drug Report documents that heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, alcohol, and prescription drugs negatively impact public health, public safety, and social institutions in countries around the world.[1] In many parts of the Middle East, there is limited data on the nature and extent of alcohol and drug problems.
F. Stephen Larrabee, Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, and Gonul Tol, Executive Director of the Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies, highlight the importance of drafting a new civilian constitution to solve Turkey’s Kurdish issue.
Supporting Democratic Movements in the Arab World: An Economist's Perspective
The global community was surprised by the suddenness and intensity of democratic movements in the Arab countries. While universally welcomed, the global response in support of these movements has so far been reactive, uncertain, and slow to build up. The only coherent rendering of such an initiative is the declaration of Deauville Partnership by the Group of 8 countries on May26-27, 2011.
Egypt's Revolutionary Elite and the Silent Majority
It was a small group that set out on January 25, marching on National Police Day to decry the quotidian indignities they suffered at the hands of Husni Mubarak’s abusive police. Public protest in Egypt had long been a minority practice, rarely mustering more than a few hundred, or at best a few thousand, core movement activists. The organizers of the January 25 march expected the same base of dedicated demonstrators, and were shocked when the crowd swelled to more than 10,000.
Looking across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), there is a real fear that both reform movements and revolutions risk snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. The momentum that made so many inspirational gains a few months ago is slowing, and the forces of conservatism remain in control. The only hope is that stamina, vigilance, and strategy will lead to a complete transition to democracy in at least one of the region’s countries. Not one revolution has yet been completed. If such a success is to happen soon, I hope it will be in Egypt.
Two big misconceptions have been circulated about the Egyptian revolution in January 2011: first in the international media, research, and policy circles, and second inside Egypt itself through the Egyptian media. In the international sphere, the misconception was that the Egyptian revolution was a “cute” Facebook, social media, social network, or internet revolution (in which scrappy youths banded together over the internet to create change). Inside Egypt, the second misconception is that it was a pre-planned, organized, orchestrated, well-led revolution.
