Saudi Arabia & the Arab Gulf’s Disappointment with U.S. Policy

Whether Saudi Arabia takes a seat on the United Nations Security Council or not, the initial snub is aimed primarily at the United States. In particular, U.S.-Saudi relations are in for an exceptionally difficult period—perhaps a return to the policies of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz. It appears that Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf now share the view of Sir Charles Johnston, a British diplomat in the 1960s, who offered the following assessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East: “With all respect I think that the Americans’ policy…is a menace both to our interests and their own.” Why might the United States’s Arab allies in the Gulf believe that Washington has proven itself to be an irresolute, unpredictable, and often naïve ally?

Policy disagreements happen. In the case of Saudi Arabia, periodic disillusionment with U.S. policies dates back to the 1950s for such matters as a lack of support in border and oil disputes, attempts to placate Nasser, and a preference for Pahlavi Iran. In the last two decades, at considerable political cost, the Saudis supported various Arab-Israeli peace initiatives before concluding that the U.S. government is incapable of acting as an honest broker. Saudi disappointment deepened in 1991, when the abrupt end to Desert Storm resulted in the U.S. failure to replace Saddam with an “acceptable” set of Sunni rulers, which raised Gulf Arab suspicions that Washington saw Saddam as a useful lever on the region.

In 1994, the Saudi government opposed U.S. support for then Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s conquest of South Yemen. The Saudis argued that the forced unification of Yemen would create more instability and a rallying point for groups opposed to rule from Sana. (In 2013, the United States appears to believe that “automony” for the south is the way to go.) Then, in the aftermath of 9/11, vitriolic U.S. media and, in some quarters, political accusations concerning Saudi responsibility in the attacks stung in light of pre-9/11 Saudi cooperation in attempts to neutralize Osama bin Laden as well as post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts.

It would be difficult to overstate the Arab Gulf’s and Riyadh’s dismay at the lack of strategic understanding, much less planning, associated with the American adventure in Iraq—the destruction of the Sunni Iraqi state and the creation of a Shi`a-dominated state allied with Iran. In Iraq, the United States did in six weeks what Iran could not do in eight years of war by eliminating the 350-year old Sunni buffer against Persian/Iran expansion. From a Gulf Arab perspective, U.S. policy in Afghanistan enabled further expansion of Iranian influence. At the same time, the Saudi alliance with the West fueled jihadi attempts to undermine the Kingdom. Disappointment with U.S. policies extended further in 2006, when, despite regional concerns, the United States insisted on elections in the Palestinian territories that resulted in a Hamas victory, much to Saudi dismay. And, on the Saudi-Yemeni border, until confronted with absolute proof of Iranian involvement with the northern Zaydi tribes, the United States refused to acknowledge Tehran’s involvement.

Then came the “Arab Spring.” In the Saudi view, the United States precipitously abandoned long-time ally Hosni Mubarak, enabled the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, of whom the Saudis are deeply suspicious, and then failed to support the Egyptian army’s ouster of the Morsi government. Washington criticized, albeit in muted tones, Saudi and GCC intervention in support of the government of Bahrain despite the security implications for the Eastern Province associated with the rise of any Shi`i-led government there. In addition, there is the conviction that the United States would not intervene directly to counter a large-scale indigenous revolt against the Saudis or any other Gulf state but would likely call for “compromise” and “negotiations” while sitting on the sidelines awaiting the outcome.

Even when its interests appear to coincide with its “democratic” ideals as in Syria, the United States is seen by the Kingdom to have maneuvered to avoid involvement. Despite the slaughter, Syria’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, and the fact that a real “democratic” state would be anything but Alawite-led, Washington has hidden first behind “red lines,” then the U.S. Congress, and, finally in desperation, a Russian solution beneficial to Iran, the Alawites, and Hezbollah. One might excuse Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf for believing that the Russians and the Iranians have proven to be far more steadfast in support of their allies than has the United States.

Now Riyadh sees the United States apparently ready to embrace improved relations with Tehran, its regional rival, and suspects that the real trajectory of U.S. policy is toward containment of a nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to the stated “red line” that Iran will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Iran is viewed as an existential threat in the Kingdom. Security problems aside, Saudi Arabia has tied itself to the dollar, American stability, and the globalized economy—and now the Tea Party faction in Congress threatens all three.

It would be surprising if the Kingdom were not recalibrating relations with the United States. Strategic interests remain, but U.S. policy makers should consider that Saudi Arabia, the oldest ally of the United States in the Middle East and in objective terms the most important, has significant reasons to reconsider the scope and nature of its cooperation with Washington.

Also Read:
The Saudis Aren't Going Anywhere, by Thomas Lippman
Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Brotherhood, by Raphaël Lefèvre