Shahmahmood Miakhel

Over the past five years, the focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategists has remained on the Middle East, especially after the emergence of ISIS in 2014, while Islamist terrorist organizations operating in South Asia have been considered a secondary threat. However, the fact remains that South Asia is home to more Islamist terrorist organizations than any other region of the world. Al-Qaeda was born there, in Afghanistan, and ISIS has roots in the region. But at the turn of the decade both global jihadist groups are now facing major challenges and the critical question is whether they will manage to survive this period of crisis amid a severe leadership vacuum following the death of ISIS’s supreme leader and caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the killing of al-Qaeda heir apparent Hamza bin Laden. 

Since regaining its independence nearly three decades ago, European aspirations have been a central part of Georgia’s political agenda and identity. But the reality is more complicated and Georgia is, in a meaningful sense, part of both greater Europe and the greater Middle East.

Over the past two decades, Israel has developed robust bilateral relationships with China, India, and Singapore. Israel has also succeeded in forging ties with Japan and South Korea. More recently, Israel has devoted considerable attention to strengthening its relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar. Military-security cooperation in the form of arms trade as well as technology transfer and licensed production has emerged as an important dimension of Israel’s relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Fourteen MEI scholars weigh in on the key Middle East policy issues and developments for the year ahead.

Trump has taken such a forward-leaning and aggressive position now that he has set himself, and the U.S., in a conflict trap that he might not be able to defuse.

To the west, the rapidly evolving situation in Libya is causing a major governmental migraine.

Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.

While yesterday’s vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives on a decision to remove U.S. forces is not legally binding, it creates dynamics inside the U.S. and Iraq that make a U.S. decision to remove its forces all but inevitable.

Erdogan may want to hold early elections in 2020 to mitigate the fallout of a worsening economy and deny the new parties enough time to organize.

Delays in achieving a peace deal will have consequences throughout Yemen, especially if the Houthi’s power remains unchecked.

Tehran will do what it can to avenge Soleimani’s death, to save face at home and abroad, but it will not seek a direct military confrontation.

The commitment by its foreign benefactors to underwrite the Afghan regime’s viability and ability to withstand Taliban insurgency is in serious doubt.

The UK’s impending exit from the EU will present a new chapter for British interests in and posture toward the region. If the UK is to find a trade-off for loss of diplomatic and economic heft, it will need to re-prioritize its engagement efforts. Policy continuity toward Morocco and Tunisia appears inevitable; Algeria, in contrast, promises great opportunity for an evolving relationship.

Strong U.S. leadership could still make a difference to counter the threats arising from the ongoing proxy war, but the Trump White House appears mainly to have other things on its mind.

Militarily, the most concerning issue remains the fate of Idlib, where at least three million people remain crammed in a killing-zone that encompasses just 3.5 percent of Syria’s territory