The Pakistani General Running Washington’s Backchannel to Tehran
As Washington and Tehran edge closer to escalation, the most critical line of communication keeping the crisis from spiraling is being run not by polished diplomats, but by an unlikely figure: a Pakistani general. Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s powerful army chief, has quietly become the key intermediary in the U.S.-Iran standoff, managing what may be the most important backchannel between the two sides. The mediation has thrust Pakistan to the center of the crisis while exposing it to enormous risk.
Bonus Episode: Stalled Talks and Next Steps for the US and Iran
This bonus episode of Middle East Focus features a recent MEI Virtual Briefing. Director of Communications Zeina Al-Shaib is joined by MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellows Alan Eyre and Daniel Benaim to discuss the historic talks held in Pakistan last weekend between the United States and Iran. Tehran insists the US failed to gain its trust, while the US made its red lines clear and declared it would blockade Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. What happens next? Eyre and Benaim offer insights into what goes on behind the scenes at such negotiations; identify the core issues at play; explore potential incentives to end the war; analyze the weaponization of energy; as well as assess the role of other regional players in this conflict.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict: A strategic concern for the US
Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban has shifted from open sponsorship in the 1990s to a silent partnership following 2001 to alienation and belligerence since 2021. Their current conflict, which comes at great cost to both countries and seems to have no easy military or political resolution, also poses a threat to the stability and prosperity of neighboring states. Although American strategic interests in the region greatly diminished following the United States’ military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the region’s altered political dynamics have prompted a growing American engagement with Pakistan and tentatively with Afghanistan. At the same time, the US has become a factor in how both Islamabad and Kabul have come to form their national security strategies.
For years, the world tried to soften the Taliban’s extremist ideology by exposing them to modernity. As an insurgency they learned diplomacy and negotiation tactics, but their medieval thinking remained just as rigid. Now that the Taliban rule over Afghanistan, the international community continues to appease them, assuming it can convince them to form an inclusive government and ease their regressive policies while alleviating the country’s worsening humanitarian disaster. That is a naïve assumption that overlooks the root causes of the current crisis. Not only will the international community not get what it wants, but it also risks creating a much greater crisis: a Taliban theocracy that institutionalizes its repressive rule at a steep human and economic cost.
After a grueling 20-year campaign, America concluded its war in Afghanistan where it started: with the Taliban in charge. But this isn’t your father’s Taliban. In recognition of their need for a firmer ideological base and their desire to establish a purely Islamic system, the Taliban rulers are gradually putting together the framework for their new ideological state. They are enacting three closely intertwined ideological initiatives in order to solidify their rule: fleshing out a state religious ideology, burnishing their “originalist” religious credentials, and channeling Afghan nationalism into religious nationalism. These ongoing efforts, which revolve around the Taliban’s Islamism, provide a preview of how the new rulers intend to interact with temporal political realities by provoking religious reform in order to rule Afghanistan.
On Jan. 13, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressed alarm that millions of Afghans are on the “verge of death” thanks to a lethal brew of “freezing temperatures and frozen assets.” This was no idle warning. Notwithstanding the decline in fighting following the Taliban’s victory in August 2021, Afghanistan’s economy is in a deepening spiral of impoverishment and destitution.
As the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan grows increasingly dire, Pakistan has informed India that it will allow the transportation of wheat and life-saving medicines from India to Afghanistan through its territory, on the condition that only Afghan trucks are used to carry it. The Taliban regime has praised Pakistan for the move, but will it arrest the decline in India’s fortunes in Afghanistan?
Tajikistan’s evolving relations with the Taliban 2.0
While the international community has adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude toward the Afghan Taliban, Tajikistan has taken a sharply critical view. Rhetoric between Tajikistan and the Taliban is increasingly bitter, a symptom of a broader problem in their bilateral ties. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon has condemned the Taliban regime in Kabul for failing to form an inclusive government and for violating human rights in the Panjshir Valley. The Taliban have responded by warning Tajikistan not to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.
Since the hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August, refugees have flowed out of the country and its domestic problems have grown increasingly dire due to the lack of effective governance and much-needed funding. Neighboring countries Iran, Pakistan, and China, along with other regional states and the U.S., now all face a dilemma as to how to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating internal situation. Further efforts must be made to address the growing economic and humanitarian crisis, especially before the onset of winter, although the nature and scope of these efforts are likely to be shaped by the broader competition between Washington and Beijing.
Marvin Weinbaum and Javid Ahmad discuss conditions in Afghanistan since falling back under Taliban rule, including worsening economic and humanitarian crises, the security situation, the role of international and regional actors, and where things might be headed moving forward.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Slower may be better
In September, China and Pakistan convened the tenth session of their joint coordination committee that oversees the CPEC — the largest of the BRI corridors. The long-anticipated meeting ultimately yielded no major breakthroughs. The momentum of CPEC appears to be losing steam once again, but for Pakistan, slower may actually be better.
