Washington says it doesn’t know who runs Iran. Tehran insists its leadership is united. MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to sort out where the truth lies. They look at the small circle of political and military figures now steering the war effort in Tehran: who they are, how they make decisions, and how unified they really are. They also discuss the current state of US-Iran negotiations, the role of the upcoming midterm elections in the United States, and how the Islamic Republic is preparing for a potential renewal of conflict afterward.
Crude oil is flowing out of the Gulf again, but the market is no better prepared for another disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. It has assembled a temporary system for managing one. Crude exports from the Gulf, excluding Iran, returned to pre-war levels in September, while total Gulf shipments reached 15.5 million barrels a day, more than 80% of the pre-conflict volume.
Many of the immediate consequences of the Israeli-American war with Iran are already clear. The further emergence of drones and missiles as dominant weapons of war; the danger to the global economy from the threats to vital chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb; and the inadequacy of US weapons procurement, among other issues, have garnered widespread and entirely merited attention.
Followers of Iraqi Shi’a cleric and political leader Muqtada al-Sadr and those of the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework clashed in downtown Baghdad on Aug. 29. Iraqis spent that evening wondering whether the country was descending into an intra-Shi’a civil war.
The renewal of the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program does not undermine Israeli national security per se but rather a longstanding tenet of Israel’s strategic thinking: that it must be able to fully eradicate any challenge to its military superiority deep inside enemy territory.
What Iran’s emerging demographic “tsunami” means for Tehran
Officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been warning about an emerging demographic “tsunami” as local and international forecasts suggest the country could have one of the five largest elderly populations by 2050. Nearly 11% of Iranians are now over 60 years old, and this figure could significantly increase going forward.
The diplomatic ice is breaking in the Gulf. What does that mean for the region?
The announcements in mid-August that both the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait will be returning their ambassadors to Tehran after six years provided the latest indication that the diplomatic ice has started to break in the Gulf region.
Syrian foreign policy in the Caucasus and Ukraine: An unbalanced, Russia-centered approach
The embattled Syrian regime’s need to preserve Russian military and political support has compelled Damascus to adopt the Kremlin line in its foreign policy positions toward the former Soviet space.
Trump Didn’t Kill the Carter Doctrine—It Was Born Dead
The United States and its Gulf Arab partners need a new security arrangement that effectively shares the burden of defending against Iranian hostility and goes beyond deterrence.
Iran-Venezuela relations: Presidents, postures, and pressures
In June, Iran and Venezuela signed a 20-year road map on cooperation. As much as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has wanted to differentiate himself from his predecessor, his Venezuela policy has so far closely resembled that of Hassan Rouhani during the latter’s second term.
Europe's efforts to hold Iranian officials accountable for their crimes
There is currently an ongoing conversation in Europe around how to hold the Iranian government accountable for its crimes. While efforts to bring justice to the regime’s victims continue, the road ahead will be difficult and as the recent Swedish and Belgian cases make clear, sometimes it will be one step forward and one step back.
Despite official hype of a “strategic partnership,” Iranian public is skeptical of Russia
The Iranian government has invested heavily in trying to sway public attitudes to embrace closer relations with Russia; but a plurality of Iranians would like to see balanced ties with all nations and for Tehran to pursue a mature, pragmatic overseas agenda.
In July 1987, Iran lost the opportunity to end the Iran-Iraq war as part of a U.N. deal by imposing two preconditions, one of which was impossible to meet. In 2022, Iran is likely to lose another opportunity, this time to return to the 2015 nuclear deal, once again by imposing two preconditions, one of which is also impossible to meet.
Why the Russian ambassador is such a controversial figure in Tehran
Despite Russia and Iran’s apparently tightening relationship, Russian Ambassador Levan Dzhagaryan has come under withering criticism in Tehran, becoming a reminder of the interventionist and imperialist policies that Russia had practiced toward its southern neighbor over the past two and a half centuries.
The oldest peer-reviewed publication dedicated to the study of the modern Middle East, MEI’s flagship journal covers politics, society, and culture in the region.
