التحليل

In early December 2020, at least eight people were killed and hundreds of others were injured during violent protests in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) sparked by deteriorating economic conditions and the government’s failure to pay public sector salaries. Stories like this rarely break out beyond the local press, and analysis about the KRI is all too often driven by elite-centered narratives that do not properly account for the opinions and social realities of the broader population. This does a disservice not only to the ostensible subjects of reporting and analysis about the Kurdistan Region but also reinforces misperceptions about Kurdistan that have major policy implications.

Beijing’s economic presence across the Maghreb has grown in recent years. The new global power has forged a close partnership with Algeria and Morocco, while also continuing to develop relationships with other countries in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated the depth of Sino-Maghreb relations.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region plays a central role in the global oil and natural gas markets. The region is home to more than 52 and 42 percent of global crude oil and natural gas proven reserves, respectively. In the past decade, the region generated 36 and 22 percent of global crude oil and natural gas, respectively. The abundance of hydrocarbons has sometimes been a mixed blessing for the economies of MENA countries, which have been reluctant to promote energy efficiency or sector diversification. Around the globe, energy intensity —energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per $1,000 GDP— became 15% more efficient between 2001 and 2018. In contrast, MENA became 8% less energy efficient according to the same measure during that period.

Iran’s attempts to achieve cyber dominance both within the MENA region and around the world have been well documented, particularly its efforts to spread pro-Iranian messaging and “tell Iran’s story.” This strategy is shaped by the challenging international context facing Tehran, which is suffering economically under U.S. sanctions and largely constrained from purchasing weapons under a recently expired U.N. arms embargo.

There was little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. The new U.S. administration under President Joe Biden appears poised — based on staffing decisions and declared policies — to revert to a U.S. policy in the Middle East that more closely resembles that of Obama. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, who fought bitterly and publicly against Obama’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran nuclear issue, remains at the helm in Israel. The stage may be set for a sequel of the acrimonious relationship between Jerusalem and Washington.

On January 14, 2021, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted about Palestinian refugees, proclaiming “(less than) 200,000 Arabs displaced in 1948 are still alive and most others are not refugees by any rational criteria.” A month earlier, on December 11, a group of 22 Republican members of Congress sent a letter to President Trump requesting that he instruct the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to declassify a report on the approximate number of Palestinian refugees, with the intention of redefining and disenfranchising millions of Palestinian refugees of their refugee status. The intent behind the request is made evident by the letter, which states, “The issue of the so-called Palestinian ‘right of return’ of 5.3 million refugees to Israel as part of any ‘peace deal’ is an unrealistic demand, and we do not believe it accurately reflects the number of actual Palestinian refugees

Iran announced last week it had developed one of the world’s most promising COVID-19 vaccines. The news appeared to be part of Tehran’s efforts to satisfy domestic demands for a safe vaccine and to show the country is launching its vaccine rollout independently, despite the crippling economic sanctions imposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump.

With the increasingly heavy burdens of everyday life, May 2022 may feel like an eternity away in Lebanon. Next spring, however, marks a high-stakes milestone and reality check for the country’s domestic politics. Absent any major surprises, eligible Lebanese citizens at home and in the diaspora will cast their votes in the first general elections since the October 2019 uprising, the financial collapse, and the Beirut port explosion. In fact, the process has already started with the issuance of electoral rolls. But there’s a catch — Lebanese politics are full of surprises.

Background – China and Russia relations

On Feb. 3, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hosted his Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi in Moscow. After their meeting, Lavrov emphasized Russia and Jordan’s shared positions on Syria, Gulf security, and Israel-Palestine.

For years, Lebanon has suffered from chronic electricity shortages, and repeated attempts to resolve the crisis have failed. None have been able to surmount the political impasse that blocks every reform effort in the country.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s rise to the presidency was supposed to bring a degree of predictability to Algeria’s military rulers. But since he was pronounced the winner of the presidential election in December 2019, the regime has entered a new phase of uncertainty. The COVID-19 pandemic, continued dissent, political volatility, and deepening economic malaise have affected the ruling oligarchy’s calculations. Two years after the start of Algeria’s popular uprising, known as the Hirak movement, the country is stuck in the same impasse it has faced since 2019.

The tiny Persian Gulf country of Qatar has chosen a herculean task for itself: to mediate between the United States and Iran. As Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani put it on Feb. 10, Doha “is working on de-escalation through a political and diplomatic process.” To this end, al-Thani recently spoke to U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and U.S. Special Representative for Iran Robert Malley. 

Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen are expected to continue to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2021. However, technology will likely add another layer of complexity to these conflicts and reshape the region throughout the 2020s. When the Arab Spring began a decade ago, the biggest challenge facing long-standing Arab autocrats was grappling with the power of social media and the rise of online political opposition by tech-savvy millennial activists. In the 2020s, however, regional governments are now facing a new set of emerging technologies that will shape not only domestic politics but also regional geopolitical dynamics. These advancing technologies include: drone, cyber, and space technologies.

Five years ago, President Barack Obama characterized the failure “to plan for the day after” the U.S. intervention in Libya as his worst foreign policy mistake. Certainly, the aftermath of the decision to provide support for the Feb. 17, 2011 uprising, which ended 42 years of Moammar Gadhafi’s erratic and dictatorial rule, hasn’t been happy. Libya’s past decade has featured recurrent civil war, state collapse, terrorism, militias, and warlords, together with competing foreign interventions despite the continuing U.N. arms embargo.