Analysis

Late last month, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opted to replace the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Shamkhani. The latter’s removal after 10 years spent in this key role has generated much speculation, misinformation, and outright disinformation.

Since Raisi’s election to the presidency, Iran is pursuing a two-tiered foreign policy: a vigorous and determined shift toward Russia and China on the one hand, while, on the other hand, making incremental concessions on its nuclear program to give the impression that another deal can be struck to replace the JCPOA. The former approach is being implemented with almost zero fanfare and the latter with extensive publicity.

The Middle East is experiencing a remarkable spate of diplomacy, de-escalation, and normalization. This is generally a positive development, as the region needs to take charge of its own destiny. But normalization and de-escalation does not always lead to meaningful conflict resolution; indeed, sometimes the reverse is true. What needs to be done so that this positive momentum can be the first phase of a more meaningful set of engagements to build a more lasting regional peace and integration?

The Middle East is undergoing a historic transformation with unprecedented opportunities to build new relationships, de-escalate tensions, and foster conditions for stronger integration. At the same time, the region remains on edge because of ongoing tensions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other conflict zones, a civil war that broke out recently in Sudan, along with the overarching challenges presented by fraught relations between Iran, Israel, and several Arab Gulf countries — with the longer-term implications of the still-fragile Iranian-Saudi rapprochement yet to be fully assessed.

An ongoing power struggle for the position of ambassador at the Afghan embassy in New Delhi underlines India’s diplomatic quandary about the nature of its engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Dynamics between Israel and the Arab world have taken a turn for the worse in the first few months of the new Israeli government. The positive momentum in Israel-Arab relations, which Prime Minister Netanyahu himself was key in generating through the signing of the Abraham Accords and which picked up pace during the Bennett-Lapid government that followed, has slowed down. Only limited progress may be feasible under the current government, but conditions for positive change do exist and include marginalizing Israeli extremists, avoiding a flare-up with the Palestinians, reducing the domestic turmoil in Israel, and ensuring the effective involvement of the U.S. and the EU.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has destabilized and distressed the entire Black Sea neighborhood. Yet despite the war, or perhaps because of it, strategically important foreign direct investments into Black Sea littoral countries, including from the Gulf, have endured or even grown.

To analyze the crossroads Turkey faces in the 2023 elections, it could prove useful to “look back from the alternative futures” and explore how the possible outcomes might play out. What could it look like if we look back from 2030 to another victory by Erdoğan? And how might have the last seven years played out had the opposition won?

Both Washington and Jerusalem welcome any reduction in regional tensions and prospects for a more stable, secure, and prosperous environment. However, there is a risk for U.S. and Israeli policy priorities, such as that regional de-escalation will reduce pressure on Tehran to negotiate on issues of concern, especially its nuclear weapons program.

With AI development disproportionate attention is given to the world’s technological heavyweights, the U.S. and China, as they seek an innovative edge in their great power competition. But Gulf states like the UAE are also moving rapidly to invest in and adopt AI, with significant implications for bilateral relations. The momentum in both the U.S. and the UAE can be leveraged by anchoring further ideas for political, diplomatic, and military cooperation in the technical evolution of AI.

Rather than addressing the critical gaps in Somalia’s security, President Hassan Sheikh has chosen to prioritize nation-building over state-building, diverting scarce resources needed to stabilize areas liberated from al-Shabaab. The Biden administration has enabled President Sheikh’s nation-building project through its partner-led, U.S.-enabled approach.

International leaders are struggling to manage a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan; they are torn between their commitment to alleviate Afghans’ suffering and their reluctance to legitimize a Taliban government that violates its people’s basic rights. Helping Afghans but not their new “de facto authorities” is a difficult balance for a diverse group of international actors with often divergent long-term interests.

In the past few years, Jordan’s public debt has become a major policy concern for the government, the international community, and key donors that support Amman. The public debt has risen significantly over the past 15 years, raising many questions about Jordan’s future macroeconomic stability, public debt sustainability, and the government’s ability to finance development projects.

The costs that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the State of Israel have been paying following the government’s first months in office have become more and more significant in recent weeks, and are they are not forgotten even as Israelis focus on coping with a cycle of warfare with Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.

In recent months, fervent anti-French sentiment has been on the rise in Burkina Faso and Mali. In February 2023, the Burkinabe army announced the end of the French Sabre Force in the West African country. This came three weeks after the transitional government withdrew from the 2018 defense agreements with France that had previously allowed 400 French troops to be stationed in a cantonment outside of the capital, Ouagadougou.