Research & Commentary Results

The war in Ukraine has brought back to the forefront the conversation about the need for new investments in oil and gas for the foreseeable future. As the calls multiply for Gulf producers to step in and fill the gap in gas and oil supplies as Russia faces sanctions, producers now feel vindicated after being shunned, and even targeted, at the COP26 in Glasgow last year.

Seven years on from the launch of the Saudi-led coalition’s military campaign on March 26, 2015, the civil war in Yemen remains stalemated. The fundamental realities of the conflict have not changed substantially in over five years. Meanwhile, the conditions under which the majority of innocent Yemenis are living continue to deteriorate. It’s time to consider measures that can promote an end to the conflict and lay the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction.

When the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decline phone calls from the president of the United States, rebuff his requests to help lower oil prices, and shy away from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and when the U.A.E. hosts Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in Abu Dhabi, there is no doubt that a major crisis in U.S.-Arab Gulf relations is under way.

As both a candidate and as president, Ebrahim Raisi has repeated a basic mantra: that he will seek to quickly improve relations with Iran’s neighbors, and particularly the Arab Gulf states. But what are his motivations for this and what are the potential hurdles?

The Middle East is experiencing a seismic shift in its geopolitics: the dawn of the era of drones. From Syria to Libya and from Yemen to Iraq, UAVs have altered the dynamics on the battlefield. Agile and affordable, drones aren’t just a menace to remote conflict zones, but also to states far removed from theaters of war.

Although Western countries have managed to limit Moscow’s capacity to export oil, the Arab Gulf monarchies are unlikely to be able to benefit in the near term. This may change in the long run, however.

Through the vehicle of defense reform, the Biden administration has an opportunity to engage the Saudis on critical national security matters while safeguarding U.S. strategic interests and honoring American values.

The global LNG landscape is changing, and while Qatar will continue to be a major LNG exporter, it will briefly drop to third in the global rankings until planned expansion projects come on stream in the middle part of the decade. Strategically, Qatari suppliers may opt to change their market supply profile, which will have a knock-on effect on the global market, both LNG suppliers and buyers.

The U.S. is disengaging from the Middle East as it shifts its focus elsewhere, a move widely perceived within the region as a sign of a coming American departure. Many in Israel were concerned that this would strengthen Iran and its influence in the region. Instead, it is Israel that has emerged stronger.

With the recent announcement of the Jafurah Field, a massive unconventional, non-associated gas play, Saudi Arabia is looking to enter the global gas sector. The field’s estimated reserves, while substantial, are insufficient to meet current domestic needs and, in the future, displace dirty heavy fuel oil used in power generation and satisfy international export goals. The kingdom thus faces difficult decisions regarding the allocation of the Jafurah gas — to either domestic or international markets — and both options have significant challenges.

The Arab Gulf states appear to be following a common template in responding to the global transition toward an energy system in which renewables play an increasingly central role. They are publicizing renewable energy targets, decarbonizing upstream and downstream oil and gas operations, commissioning renewable energy projects, and improving energy efficiency, among other strategies. A closer look, however, reveals differences in how they have deployed solar and wind power capacity.

The U.S. request for Qatari assistance in ensuring the EU’s energy security in case of a Russian supply disruption should be perceived as a political gesture of support addressed to Western allies and a warning to Russia. In reality, however, the American request is just one factor in Qatar’s calculations as it considers increasing its energy exports to Europe, and Doha’s final decision will be determined by an intricate combination of long-term economic and political considerations. In this equation political reasons may not be dominant and economic drivers will not always be in the West’s favor.

في 24 يناير/كانون الأول، أصدرت القيادة المركزية الأمريكية (CENTCOM) بيانًا أكدت فيه أن “القوات الأمريكية في قاعدة الظفرة الجوية، بالقرب من أبو ظبي في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، اعترضت صاروخيين متجهين للداخل بالاستعانة بعدة صواريخ باتريوت اعتراضية بالتزامن مع جهود القوات المسلحة الإماراتية في الساعات الأولى من صباح 24 يناير 2022. نجحت الجهود المشتركة في منع كلا الصاروخين من إصابة القاعدة.

تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.

Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.