Research & Commentary Results

Since Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement in September, Palestinian scholars, activists, and journalists have speculated over when, how, and if this latest reconciliation might actually go forward. Many observers, both inside and outside of Palestine, view the move as a response to the recent rapprochement of Arab countries with Israel, as well as to uncertainty over this week’s U.S. presidential elections.

The COVID-19 pandemic is impacting all communities in Israel, but it has hit some of them much harder than others. The plight of the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews) has been widely publicized, but the Bedouin of the Negev Desert are also being devastated by the pandemic and no one seems to care.

Next month’s election may be instrumental in salvaging what hope remains for a two-state solution.

Are the treaties with the UAE and Bahrain in any way comparable to previous genuine milestones, like the agreements with Egypt and Jordan? Can we realistically see them as helping to lead the way to a brighter future, at least as far as Israel’s conflicts with its neighbors are concerned? The answer is almost certainly “not really.”

Fourteen years after the Palestinian pro-Islamist group Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 2006, Palestinians may finally be returning to elections as a mechanism to resolve their differences and to present a unified legitimate national leadership. In a sign of progress toward reconciliation, Palestinian leaders met in person and over teleconference on September 3 and vowed to address threats to the Palestinian national movement. Most recently, President Abbas, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, declared that presidential elections would take place soon.The question now will be whether a unified Palestinian policy, means of accomplishing it, and a new leadership can be born in the coming six months.

Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have initiated a process that, if it comes to fruition, will bring about the normalization of relations between the two countries. The broader geostrategic challenges that the agreement could pose for Israel and the UAE have not been part of the public discourse, however, and any balanced treatment requires a discussion of those aspects as well.

In an Aug. 13 tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated the Israeli-Emirati accord to normalize relations as a “HUGE breakthrough.” Israel’s integration into the region has been a goal of U.S. and Israeli foreign policy for decades, and the mid-August announcement was the first major official step in that direction in over 25 years. But is this really a game changer for Israel’s strategy in the Middle East?

A March 2018 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research showed that satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmoud Abbas stood at 33 percent; 68 percent of the public wanted him to resign; and had elections been called, he would most likely have lost his presidency to a rival from Hamas.Nearly two and a half years later, however, and Abbas’s political fortunes have been restored, thanks in large part to the Trump administration and the United Arab Emirates

In a new briefing book released ahead of the U.S. elections in November, entitled Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East, MEI scholars lay out key issues across the region, highlight the U.S. interests at stake, and provide policy insights and recommendations for the path forward. 

On Aug. 14, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in exchange for a suspension of Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. International reactions to this historic deal were sharply polarized, but the two main strategic rivals of the United States, Russia and China, responded cautiously to the announcement.

The leaders of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have traditionally been known as masters at staying as neutral as possible, especially when it comes to inter-Arab relations. This was on clear display in Amman’s response to the recent UAE-Israel rapprochement.

The agreement signed yesterday by Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in which the two countries agreed to a “full normalization of relations” in return for Israel suspending moves to formally annex parts of the West Bank, has reminded the Palestinians that they cannot count on the Arab states to deliver their freedom or safeguard their rights.

Recognition of a Palestinian state is one of the potential responses European Union states are mulling in response to an Israeli annexation of territory in the West Bank, with the foreign minister of Luxembourg, for example, declaring such a move “inevitable” in the event of annexation.

In the Palestinian West Bank, a brutal second wave began over a month ago with a more than 20-fold increase in COVID-19 infections, putting an immense strain on the health care system. This strain, however, needs to be understood in the context of the ongoing violence of the Israeli settler colonial regime.

With the impending U.S.-supported annexation of West Bank territory, Palestinians living in these designated areas stand to lose not only their long-held aspirations for an independent state, but further eradication of their presence — a “spacio-cide” — in support of an Israeli-envisaged demographic and political vision.