اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip. Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other.
A version of this article was originally published on the Substack “Thinking Middle East.”
The Iranian strike against Israel was a first of its kind. Its mere occurrence sets a precedent that will have a long-term impact and require Israel to weigh new considerations when planning future military operations against Iranian assets.
For the last few months, people around the world have been closely following the ongoing brutality of the war in Gaza. Pictures of Palestinians fleeing south and looking for relatives under the rubble, videos of children searching for food and water — these and more have been circulating on social media and news networks every day since October 7.
As the war in Gaza approaches its seventh month, the settler movement has been raging its own separate war against none other than the Israeli military itself. While Israeli society is still healing from the devastation of Oct. 7 and tens of thousands of Israelis are displaced from their homes near the Gaza Strip and the northern border, the settlers have launched campaigns against the Head of the Central Command, advocated for resettling Gaza, and escalated tensions with the Israeli military.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?
Public opinion polls indicate that a plurality of Israelis have lost faith in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and support early elections. Recently, this trend has been coupled with renewed demonstrations against the government and maneuvers by key politicians, indicating that the chances Israelis will go to the polls during 2024 are on the rise.
The Second War for Palestine has continued longer than any Israel-Palestinian conflict since Israel’s establishment. Neither Gamal Abdel Nasser’s army nor Hafez al-Assad’s tanks fought as long as the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades still battling in Gaza.
Over the past two decades, relations between Israel and China expanded significantly. Since then, however, there have been indications that the growth prospects for the bilateral relationship have diminished. China’s stance on the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack and on Israel’s conduct during the ensuing war in Gaza, in particular, has further cast doubt on the future trajectory of the relationship.
International funders have often called upon recipients to carry out reforms before any funding can be made available or the amount increased. But in many crisis-wracked countries, such as Lebanon, the prospect of reforms may be too distant, with intervention needed immediately. This is why greater emphasis must be placed on risk mitigation measures over which funders can exercise control.
The Gaza Strip faces a severe and worsening water crisis. With the death toll now above 31,000 and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis plaguing the strip, one of the most urgent challenges facing its residents is access to water.
The scale of rebuilding needed after the Gaza war, in addition to the difficult political questions involved, will require close international coordination as well as innovative, future-informed thinking.