One year after the massive June 30 demonstrations against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the July 3 ouster of President Mohammad Morsi by the military, the Egyptian MB is facing grave challenges that will shape the group’s future and that of political Islam.
The swift and violent rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continues to rattle the cages of power in Tehran. Overnight, Iran’s ally in Baghdad, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, is suddenly fighting for his political life and the country of Iraq, which he had largely inherited from the Americans. Maliki has been a solid friend of Iran, but rapidly shifting realities inside Iraq can turn him into an expendable ally, making him more into a liability than an asset.
Around the world, priceless monuments and artifacts are disintegrating due to exposure to pollution and hordes of visitors coupled with the sheer weight of age. The inexorable loss of cultural heritage concerns us all, but is especially troubling for decision-makers in places like Egypt that rely on cultural tourism-generated income to stay afloat. How to reconcile the need to make decaying treasures available to the public with the fact that public display is ruining them?
This op-ed first appeared in The New York Times on June 16, 2014. Click here to view the full article.
In a country of deteriorating economic conditions, young Egyptians are using social media to create opportunities and change the way business is done.
This week’s visit to Tehran by the Kuwaiti emir, Sheik Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, is about more than Iranian-Kuwaiti relations. It might even be a pivotal moment in the shaping of Iran’s ties with the Arab countries across the Gulf. Kuwait, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is acting as a conduit for the collective unease that the GCC’s six member states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have about Iran’s regional policies.
Allen Keiswetter is a scholar at the Middle East Institute and an analyst at the law firm of Dentons. This is an updated version of a paper originally published by Dentons-GPS.
Following the recent progress on the Iranian nuclear issue and the subsequent easing of sanctions, South Korean businesses are reengaging the Iranian market. A South Korean trade delegation visited Iran on March 9, 2014 to expand bilateral trade ties in the mining, industrial, and food sectors. On March 17, South Korea’s Finance Ministry lifted a ban, allowing South Korean auto, construction, pharmaceutical, and telecommunications industries to resume trade with Iran, though sanctions remained in the shipbuilding, shipping, and harbor sectors.
Egyptian presidential elections underdog Hamdeen Sabbahi achieved the impossible: he came in third in a two-horse race. The 60-year-old leftist politician and sole rival to the country’s ex-army chief Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi secured just under 757,000 votes in the preliminary count as opposed to Sisi’s more than 23 million votes—as well as to the votes of a last-minute unexpected entrant: the spoiled ballot.
Egyptians have headed to the polls to elect a president for the second time since the January 2011 revolution. Field Marshal Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi is expected to win by a wide margin over the only other contender, leftist politician Hamdeen Sabahi. The magnitude of that victory, however, will have an important impact on Sisi’s electoral mandate, and many questions remain about what he plans to do with it once in power.
Egypt’s new constitution grants the country’s generals greater autonomy and an increased formal political role. The draft authorizes military trials for civilians (Article 204) and ensures that the military’s budget be beyond civilian scrutiny. The most significant change is that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will have the final say in choosing or dismissing the defense minister for two presidential terms (Article 234).
Geography alone should make the Arab world Iran’s key foreign policy focus. Of Iran’s 13 immediate neighbors, seven are Arab countries.[1] But Tehran’s approach to the Arab world, with its 22 states extending from North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, varies widely in intensity, and Iran’s objectives are equally varied depending on the country in question.
The military, though it has been the most powerful and influential actor during Egypt’s transition since 2011, is not the great deus ex machina of the Egyptian system. Rather, it is an actor that, since the fall of Mubarak, has managed to maintain some organizational coherence and legitimacy and has served as the convener for various and changing forces that are the crux of a new ruling coalition. Consequently, civilianizing the Egyptian state will require that security sector reforms be embedded in a broader set of political reforms.
