اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
A version of this article was originally published on the Substack “Thinking Middle East.”
Prime Minister Sudani has been delicately balancing between maintaining bilateral relations with Washington and ensuring political support for his cabinet from pro-Iran hardliners in Baghdad. Both sides have conflicting expectations from the prime minister, and delivering on his promises will come down to his ability to convince each to compromise. But Sudani’s task has now become even more challenging as Iraq finds itself in the middle of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel.
The Iranian strike against Israel was a first of its kind. Its mere occurrence sets a precedent that will have a long-term impact and require Israel to weigh new considerations when planning future military operations against Iranian assets.
Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.
Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.
Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?
في 12 مارس، فرضت وزارة الخزانة الأمريكية عقوبات على أربعة أشخاص لدعمهم كتائب العشتار المرتبطة بإيران في البحرين. قد يوحي هذا الإعلان الأمريكي بأن العلاقات الإيرانية-البحرينية على وشك الانهيار. لكن في الواقع، من غير المرجح أن يحدث ذلك - على الأقل طالما استمرت الهدنة الإيرانية-السعودية.
The results of the March 1 election for Iran’s Assembly of Experts hold great importance for understanding how the regime is preparing for the selection of the next supreme leader. The major responsibility of this 88-member body is to designate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s successor, either after his death or if he becomes incapable of fulfilling his responsibilities.
In his new book, Steve Coll casts doubt on whether Iraqi intelligence had actually tried to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush in Kuwait in April 1993. If the Kuwait plot were a fabrication, it would fit yet another brick in the wall of many well documented falsehoods and misunderstandings that led to the US invasion. Unfortunately for that allegation, the plot was very likely to have been quite real.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
In discussions on Iran’s future in a post-Khamenei era, one crucial player in the transition to a new supreme leader is often overlooked: the inner circle surrounding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, primarily operating within the framework of the Office of the Supreme Leader.
This article breaks down five key takeaways from the February 2024 survey conducted by Stasis Consulting ahead of Iran’s upcoming March 1 parliamentary elections.
Findings from the latest survey on Iran from Stasis Consulting: Turnout in the March 1 parliamentary election is expected to be a record low of 34%, the majority of Iranians disapprove of President Raisi’s job performance as well as that of the parliament (65% and 61%, respectively), and in a hypothetical face-off between President Raisi and former FM Zarif, Mr. Raisi wins out 30% to 16%.