في 24 يناير/كانون الأول، أصدرت القيادة المركزية الأمريكية (CENTCOM) بيانًا أكدت فيه أن “القوات الأمريكية في قاعدة الظفرة الجوية، بالقرب من أبو ظبي في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، اعترضت صاروخيين متجهين للداخل بالاستعانة بعدة صواريخ باتريوت اعتراضية بالتزامن مع جهود القوات المسلحة الإماراتية في الساعات الأولى من صباح 24 يناير 2022. نجحت الجهود المشتركة في منع كلا الصاروخين من إصابة القاعدة.
Confronting climate change, Turkey needs “green” leadership now more than ever
Turkey, like all other countries, is facing the harsh reality of climate change. Last year, it experienced one of the hottest summers on record. Blistering heat waves led to widespread wildfires in the country’s southwest, affecting five times more land than normal during the summer. Though Turkey usually has large water surpluses, some areas experienced shortages due to extreme drought. Others suffered heavy flooding, leaving scores dead.
How involved was Iran in the Houthi attack on the UAE?
Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?
يوم 17 يناير/كانون الثاني، نفذ الحوثيون هجومًا آخر استهدف منشأة نفطية إماراتية في أبوظبي، ما أدى إلى مقتل ثلاثة وافدين، وإلحاق أضرار بالبنية التحتية. ظاهريًا، يبدو أنهم يذكَّرون الإماراتيين بمدى ضعفهم وإمكانية الإضرار بهم إذا استمرت الهجمات ضد مصالح الحوثيين في اليمن. وبحسب ما ورد، كانت وسائل الهجوم عبارة عن طائرات مسيرة، وهي أداة بسيطة غير متماثلة متاحة للكثيرين واستخدمها الحوثيون على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة. لسوء الحظ فإن القصة هنا قد أصبحت مألوفة للغاية وتتطلب استجابة متسقة الآن. ففي نهاية المطاف، من المرجح أن يتم نسخ وتكرار ما أصبح روتينيًا في الخليج في مواقع أخرى.
As the Houthis expand their regional aggression, will the US double down on a failing strategy?
While a negotiated agreement by the parties to deescalate militarily and return to the negotiating table would be the preferred outcome, there’s little or no reason to believe that the Houthis, who have responded to their losses in Shabwa by escalating their attacks, are yet interested in talking. Rather, by issuing pleas for de-escalation, the international community risks sending the Houthis yet another message that their intransigence, which is the root cause of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Yemenis, will be rewarded by new pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to limit its response to Houthi aggression. In this regard, the Biden administration, with its international partners, risks repeating the failed strategy of 2021.
On Jan. 10, the governor of Shabwa announced its liberation from the Iran-backed Houthis. This victory followed a seemingly successful Houthi military campaign over the past couple of years to expand their influence around the city of Marib, weaken the internationally-backed government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and solidify their grasp on strategic northern areas. However, while significant, the victory in Shabwa is unlikely to be replicated in the rest of the country, given the very specific political and regional dynamics that helped to bring it about. Moreover, the Houthis’ drone attack on Abu Dhabi on Jan. 17 presents a further challenge to the advance of pro-UAE forces into Marib.
Strong Turkey-Ukraine ties are key to Black Sea security
On Jan. 6, 2019, the eve of Orthodox Christmas, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul awarded a decree of independence, known as a tomos, to the then-newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine — a milestone in the country’s history. The move reversed a 1686 decision that had transferred jurisdiction over Kyivan Orthodox churches to Moscow. After 333 years, however, it’s not only the faithful who have changed their direction from Moscow toward Istanbul. Ukraine and Turkey are strengthening their strategic partnership by deepening their cultural, political, military, and economic cooperation.
Competing over Islam: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the Balkans
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have been the main competitors in a struggle over who — and in what manner — should act as the patron of Muslims in the Balkans. These three countries are very different in terms of their historical footprint, economic and political presence, and local networks. What they share, however, is the use of Islam to exert soft power. This paper will discuss how they are seeking to wield influence, how regional actors respond to their overtures, and whether these three countries are meeting their objectives in the region.
عقب استقالة وزير المالية واستبداله بأحد الموالين للرئيس رجب طيب أردوغان في الثاني من ديسمبر/كانون الأول، واصلت الليرة التركية تراجعها المطرد أمام الدولار، لتصل خسائرها خلال العام إلى قرابة 50٪. من جديد تقع العملة التركية تحت وابل من المضاربات، على غرار الحلقات السابقة في يوليو/تموز 2018 وأكتوبر/تشرين
Following the resignation of the finance minister and his replacement by a loyalist on Dec. 2, the Turkish lira continued its steady decline against the dollar, bringing its losses for the year to nearly 50%. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s early cuts to the policy rate since September have resulted in an exodus of foreign capital and a rush in demand for foreign exchange among domestic investors.
The 3+3 format in the South Caucasus doesn’t add up
During his recent visit to Tbilisi, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin poured cold water on the idea of American support for a so-called “3+3 format” in the South Caucasus. When asked about the proposal, he said, “I would just say that Russia, which currently occupies 20% of Georgia’s territory, should focus on honoring its 2008 cease-fire commitments before promoting any new discussion platforms.”
