Research & Commentary Results

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, vital to the global supply of both oil and liquefied natural gas. The issue of freedom of navigation in the strait has long been a source of tension, but until recently any attempt by Iran to physically close it looked highly implausible, unless it resulted from either a major embargo or total blockade of Iranian ports by the West, or a large-scale military confrontation. However, the events of the past three years showed Iran can still ensure a major disruption of the flow of energy without a formal blockade and without an increased risk of military confrontation with the West. Iran has a variety of means at its disposal, especially through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval forces, and the Iranians make no secret of their desire to be recognized as the dominant military power in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Afghanistan’s economy is collapsing. The Taliban’s forceful seizure of power led to a curtailment of almost all foreign aid, a devastating development for a nation overwhelmingly dependent on international assistance. Widespread drought, pervasive corruption, the perennially inadequate use of the country’s human capital, and a population largely unvaccinated against COVID-19 have exacerbated this longstanding problem of foreign financial dependence.

Turkey’s official policy supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia, and it sells UAVs and ships to Ukraine. Yet, trade continues with the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and Crimea. By allowing this illegal trade, Turkey undermines both its own credibility and its trading partners’ security. Shipped goods not only help connect occupied zones to Russia, but trade also brings hard currency into these zones, which are outside the international banking system.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

The rapid collapse of the U.S.-supported Afghan government after the withdrawal of U.S. troops raised a number of questions about America’s credibility and reputation in the eyes of its allies, especially those who had participated in and contributed to the 20-year war. Analysts and commentators have focused on how NATO member states or the European Union now perceive the U.S., but it is also important to consider the perspective of non-state groups or individuals who served or could serve as local partners for the U.S. government and military.

Iran-Azerbaijan relations have been going through a rough patch recently; both sides have genuine concerns that they want addressed.

Conflicts are enormously destructive. They destroy lives and property, uproot communities, and reduce the economic potential for all involved. This devastation often has an unaccounted cost, both in terms of the obvious direct destruction of lives and assets, as well as the indirect costs that weigh on economies, often for years to come. This is true of all conflicts, and has certainly been true, and visible, during Russia’s unjustified and illegal invasions of its neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine.

This paper examines the prospects of jihadist expansion in the Sahel region and its implications for security actors and civilian populations alike. It investigates the role of propaganda and public discourse narratives in bolstering jihadist group legitimacy and advancing attempts by groups seeking to generate local embeddedness and mass support. It offers a nuanced perspective of inter-jihadist contestation, one that goes beyond mere focusing on security operations and clashes and delves more deeply into group framing and identity.

Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are high right now but both sides will very likely soon step down. Neither Tehran nor Baku can afford to let recent events lead to a full-fledged crisis or a military showdown between the two Shi’a Muslim-majority countries. On the surface, this latest spat is about Azerbaijan’s resentment toward Iran for providing an economic lifeline through trade and transit options to its landlocked arch nemesis, Armenia. In reality, the split that underpins the ongoing Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions is more about fundamental foreign policy choices that Tehran and Baku have each made and are unlikely to reverse.

For the second time in the past two decades, a large number of Afghans find themselves escaping chaos. Twenty years ago, it was the American invasion of Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that caused a large wave of refugees. More recently, the hasty American withdrawal from the country and the ensuing Taliban takeover have created another wave of refugees.

Iulia Sabina-Joja and Alex Vatanka join the program to discuss Iranian foreign policy and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Amid growing concerns about the regional repercussions of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the SCO met for its 20th anniversary summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 16th and 17th. Regional security cooperation and Iranian accession were at the top of the agenda, with Iran formally joining the organization as a full member on September 17th.

For Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco has been touted as confirmation that U.S. policy in the Islamic world is doomed to fail. The immediate geopolitical and ideological gains, however, could be overshadowed by the potential challenges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan may pose for Iran’s security and regional interests in the long run.

China’s recent multi-sectoral engagements in Turkey suggest that the Black Sea region’s significance is on the rise in Beijing, and under President Erdoğan, Turkey has consistently sought its favor and investment.

The images of desperate Afghan citizens trying to leave their country, beyond highlighting a massive human tragedy, may become a symbol of the so-called war on terror. Many of those Afghans already understand the feeling of abandoning their homes, because their families experienced it. They know what happens when foreign armies withdraw from their country and the tragedies that can ensue. The difference this time, however, was the deadline — only a few weeks.

It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?