Research & Commentary Results

There are three clear steps the Biden administration must take if it hopes to de-escalate the crisis with Russia in Eastern Europe without being drawn into conflict. First, recognize that the Normandy Format has failed. Second, take the lead on peace negotiations with Russia. And third, shape a strategy for the Black Sea region.

Up until late on Tuesday, April 13, Russia seemed poised to invade Ukraine. An eleventh hour phone call between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin – and a non-specific agreement between the two to hold a bilateral summit – seems to have halted Moscow’s military for now. But an expanding presence of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine in the Eastern Donbas region and Crimea continues. Concurrently, the Black Sea is turning into a Russian lake due to a buildup of Russian naval power. This has more than one observer asking just how soon a full-scale invasion of Ukraine could become reality – and what follows next from such a conflict.

As a NATO and EU member, Bulgaria has consistently been a target of the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare. Moscow is pursuing a calculated and well-planned policy aimed at influencing domestic politics in Bulgaria, with a view of preventing the country from becoming a robust NATO regional security provider. This is especially important for the build-up of the Alliance’s presence in the Black Sea.

New strategic alliances are being forged across the Black Sea in an attempt to counterbalance Russian influence in the region. The Georgia-Ukraine strategic partnership is complex and multifaceted. Despite diplomatic obstacles and how relatively new it is, the relationship is already making a difference to Black Sea security. On trade, security, or Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia and Ukraine have realized they are louder when they speak with one voice. However, Russia’s military buildup on Ukraine’s border and in the Black Sea demonstrates that regional peace cannot be achieved without the support of the United States. Greater support is needed as Ukraine and Georgia continue to fight Russian hybrid warfare across the spectrum.

The aim of COP21 in Paris was to establish global consensus and a binding agreement for climate change mitigation. And it did so, setting a goal to limit global warming to “well below 2 degrees Celsius” compared to preindustrial levels while pursuing efforts to stay even within the 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold.

The foreign policy priorities of President Joe Biden suggest greater commitment to NATO Allies and decisive steps to counter Russian subversion in Europe.

Black Sea Connectivity in the South Caucasus is the latest report from MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative. Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, explores the potential for greater trade connectivity between Europe and wider Central Asia via the Black Sea and the South Caucasus.

While the security relationship between Russia and Turkey has seen ups and downs throughout the years, energy ties have remained stable. But Turkey has made strides toward reducing its dependence. Changes in global energy markets have tipped the power away from producers toward consumers like Turkey, which have greater room for maneuver. Turkish interests remain largely aligned with those of the West, even if Ankara sees itself as an independent player which has links to both Russia and the EU and the US.

Today, there are five conflicts that share similar features in the Black Sea. That is, they are protracted, separatist Russia-supported frozen and active conflicts in the former Soviet space. Deeply rooted in the history of Soviet territorial reorganization and ethnic mixing, conflicts in Transnistria (Moldova), Crimea and Donbas (Ukraine), and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) are the result of violations to state borders that were integrated into the Soviet system.

Relations between the U.S. and Black Sea countries are complex. The Western-oriented Georgia and Romania have shown unconditional support for greater U.S. involvement. Others, like Turkey and Russia, will continue to challenge Western involvement. And while relations between Black Sea countries reflect similarly complex cooperation and conflict patterns, common among them is a hope that the Biden Administration will bring a shift in U.S. policy in the region.

Frontier Europe Initiative’s new report, Alternative Futures for the Black Sea Region, is designed to inform the development of a U.S. strategy for the Black Sea region by considering a range of alternative future scenarios.

American support for Ukraine over the last four years has been unreliable and fluctuating. On the one hand, Ukraine was both an encumbrance and a political football for the Trump Administration. On the other, Congress and the regular U.S. Government continued to support Kyiv, and even began to send it lethal weapons.

For years, Georgia has played a vital role in East-West trade through the South Caucasus. With tensions high in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia was the only show in town when it came to stable, secure, and predictable transport linking Azerbaijan with Turkey. Therefore, it is not surprising that some in Georgia are concerned that new transit corridors passing through the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Armenia (Syunik province), and Azerbaijan might take away from Georgia’s strategic importance. However, this is unlikely to be the case.

President Joe Biden’s victory was cheered in Europe as the Transatlantic news of the year, given the strained Transatlantic ties during the Trump Administration. But just one month into the Biden Administration, (Western) Europe’s enthusiasm is waning. This Administration has indicated that while reinforcing Transatlantic ties will be a priority, Washington will maintain its heightened threat perception of both Russia and China. While the U.S. sees enhanced deterrence as necessary, the European Union’s major powers see this as provocative and counterproductively hawkish. If the EU indeed prioritizes a reinforced West, it will need to carefully develop its own balanced and realistic Eastern European security policy.

Earlier this week, Georgian law enforcement arrested United National Movement (UNM) party chairman Nika Melia on charges of inciting violence during anti-government demonstrations in 2019. The arrest has left many outraged and is the latest event to deepen political divisions in the country. There are valid arguments as to how the government could have handled Melia’s arrest better. But more important is what’s at stake for the future of Georgia – both domestically and as a member of the international community.

There have been some Iranian advances in building relations with Black Sea states over the last 30 years. However, Tehran’s wavering commitment to deeper ties with its northern neighbors, with the exception of Russia, has considerably reduced the potential footprint Iran could have otherwise had in the Black Sea region. Tehran’s ongoing standoff with the United States, its ideologically driven preoccupation to make advances in the Arab world, and a gradual but clear submission to Russian hegemony has meant that the Black Sea region is a policy matter of secondary importance to decision-makers in Tehran.