Paul Goble, Gonul Tol, and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the role of Russia, Turkey, and Iran in the South Caucasus.
Amidst the pandemic and global economic hardships, Georgia has had an eventful beginning to the year, scoring a long-awaited victory against Russia. On 21 Jan., 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced its verdict on the interstate case brought by Georgia against Russia, holding Moscow responsible for breaching six articles of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Iran was caught off guard by the July 2020 round of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tehran was even more alarmed by the proactive role Moscow and Ankara played during and in the aftermath of the six-week war that ended with the Russian-brokered ceasefire on November 10. In fear of being kept on the sidelines, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif embarked on a regional tour last month to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Georgia and Turkey.
Following a tumultuous period in Washington, during which the Capitol was stormed by rioters and Donald Trump became the first president to be impeached twice, many in the United States and around the world were left feeling concerned and unsettled.As a Georgian who has seen the U.S. play a transformative role in building my country’s young democracy, the attack on Capitol Hill was something I could never have anticipated. My fear stemmed not from feeling unsafe in downtown DC, but rather from the consequences of U.S. instability and fragility on those countries that rely on its support to build democratic institutions and adopt western values.
The Biden Administration has a firm foundation upon which to build in Eastern Europe. As part of its focus on great power competition in the region, the Trump Administration sharply increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), covering costs for U.S. troops in Europe and security support for strategic allies, while repositioning some U.S. forces in Europe to the eastern flank. We have made important steps to support our strategic allies in Eastern Europe, but this administration needs to stay the course and increase its focus and commitment to the Black Sea region. Russia must understand the costs of their adventurism in order to prevent further reckless behavior.
In the aftermath of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, bolstered by Turkey’s growing influence in the South Caucasus, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed the controversial idea of establishing a six-country regional cooperation platform. Speaking from the Azerbaijani capital Baku, where he was attending victory celebrations, Erdogan noted that new opportunities for regional cooperation are possible for the Caucasus region. Turkey’s leader envisages a platform that would bring Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia together. In his words, it would provide a win-win opportunity for all sides, including Armenia, which could use the platform as a first positive step toward establishing bilateral relations with Turkey.
Georgia’s Western future became a central part of U.S. foreign policy last week. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated that Georgia should join NATO as soon as it meets the criteria. Blinken’s remarks are timely. Georgia faces increasing Russian political pressure and military presence, exacerbated by the recent second Nagorno Karabakh war. At the same time, and following a decade of stalemate, there have been significant breakthroughs in the cases brought by Georgia against Russia in front of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). With Georgia’s Western path resurfacing on the international agenda, Eastern European countries will be watching to see if the Biden Administration’s foreign policy can make a difference to regional security.
In 1906, the South Caucasus’ first energy pipeline was completed, connecting Baku on the Caspian Sea with Batumi on the Black Sea. More than 115 years later, this pipeline, measuring a mere eight inches in diameter and transporting kerosene, has been replaced with a modern network of natural gas and oil pipelines connecting the heart of Asia with Europe. With proper investment and the correct policies, even more oil, gas, and other goods will be flowing from the Caspian region to Europe and global markets.
The strategic balance in the Black Sea region has shifted dramatically in Russia’s favor in the past decade. Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in Crimea, and the ongoing modernization of its Black Sea Fleet, enable Russia to threaten its neighbors’access to sea lanes and economic resources and apply coercive pressure via conventional power projection. Littoral states should prioritize addressing the military imbalance to deter Russian coercive actions. Rather than rely on increased U.S. presence, Black Sea states should create a flexible network within NATO or the EU to build their own A2/AD capabilities.
In April 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed an independent Reflection Group with the aim of defining the future of the Alliance. The group recently published an extensive report entitled NATO 2030: United for a New Era.” However, NATO 2030: United for a New Era does not provide further detail or recommendations on how these partnerships should be strengthened and expanded. The Alliance must strengthen and consolidate its partnership with Georgia to ensure its sovereignty and independence and mitigate the risks of further Russia aggression imposed.
Many Americans find the whole swath of territory in eastern Europe, near Russia, very far away and hard to conceptualize. This part of the world involves a number of countries, small and large, that are generally not the most frequently discussed in American news nor frequented by American tourists. To make sense of much of this remote region, it can be helpful to take a perspective that centers on the Black Sea and views that body of water as the key point of reference for much of the region. Doing so not only helps clarify what Russia is up to in its near-abroad, but also shines a spotlight on Chinese activity, and what is required of America in response.
There is a lot riding on the success of the recent cease-fire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. NATO’s energy security is now intertwined with the fragile deal. Fueled by Russian arms and military training, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict threatens to shake confidence in Europe’s drive to reduce its energy reliance on Moscow.
Therefore, this holiday season – dear reader – might I suggest a return to the essentials? The greater Middle East is the birthplace of Christianity, Judaism, and wine. This year, why not return to basics with some Georgian wine at the holiday table? Wine is central to Judeo-Christian rituals. It is a requirement for the Eucharist – as well as for Shabbat and Passover. A more secular property of wine is its ability to encapsulate a sense of place and epitomize the traditions of a culture.
Less widely reported are other offshore discoveries in the Black Sea being made by various regional players, some more overtly than others. Given the not insignificant hurdles posed by limitations of technical capacity, a bounty of market supply, and unresolved conflicts leaving borders and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in question, many are asking who’s campaigning for new Black Sea gas, and why? And just as importantly, whose national security interests stand best to gain?
We are moving toward a new status-quo in the South Caucasus, with different actors facing different challenges as well as opportunities. Georgia will be impacted by the outcome of the war in multiple ways, and the country will need a strategy to adapt to the new realities, taking into consideration gains and losses of the parties actively involved in the conflict, as well as post-conflict development.