Research & Commentary Results

HTS launched multiple raids on SBS, forcing its factions to close their military bases and banning the formation of any new factions or operations rooms. In doing so, it has killed two birds with one stone: demarcating new redlines for its rivals and demonstrating its usefulness to its Turkish “partner” and the international community in their war on terrorism.

Multiple signs point to a crisis of confidence in Afghanistan. Ever since the publication of a sensational report alleging that a Russian military intelligence unit secretly offered bounties to the Taliban to kill American soldiers, there has been an intense debate about the possibility of peace in Afghanistan following the U.S. exit.

After the fall of ISIS in 2019, many relatives of fighters who were detained or killed, including 10,000 families of foreign fighters, were housed in camps like Roj and al-Hol in territory controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Like any closed society, the foreigners’ annex in al-Hol has its own dynamic and life there is much more complicated than is often portrayed.

Today’s landscape is dramatically different from that to which we awoke on Sept. 11, 2001. It’s a complex mix of foreign and domestic forces influenced by economic and social conditions that breed extremism which ebbs and flows across physical and cyber space often defined by great power competition. While terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have innovated and adapted, U.S. counterterrorism strategy has remained unchanged, fighting yesterday’s war while neglecting present day threats as well as those over the near horizon. America is long overdue to update its counterterrorism strategy and, perhaps more importantly, how we measure success.

It is in Syria where ISIS’s future appears most secure, and its insurgency has demonstrated particular strength in territory controlled by the regime.

The digitization of business in the Middle East has enormous implications for the future of regional economies, as well as for education, employment, and beyond. The way this digital transition shapes the region will be influenced by the degree to which policymakers consider this shift in its context and with an eye toward the future, as the opening session of the MEI Cyber Program’s recent conference explored.

From the growing impact of social media on popular movements and politics in the Middle East to the changing face of journalism and civil society online, the intersection of digital spaces with politics is one of the most critical emerging areas for examining the future of dissent, human rights, and democracy in the region. This issue was a central focus during the second panel of the MEI Cyber Program’s inaugural June conference, with experts highlighting several critical areas for consideration and examination in the years to come.

Despite the empowering and liberating potential of new communications technologies, the growing power and influence of autocrats is undermining pressure for human rights and good governance. Authoritarian regimes have embraced new technologies and influence campaigns have become one of the many ways in which they seek to reassert their control over the media and civilians. During the third panel of the MEI Cyber Program’s inaugural June conference, experts examined the development of online manipulation campaigns and discussed how governments conduct these operations, as well as the campaigns’ dangers, limits, and the best policies to encourage free speech online in the Middle East.  

The growing role of cyber conflict in the Middle East continues to raise questions about the future of regional relations, national security, and defense. A diverse group of experts provided a close-up perspective on the region’s cyber threat landscape and its major players and tools during the fourth panel of MEI’s Cyber Program conference, shedding light on how these threats are shaped by specific regional dynamics.

Counterterrorism strategies can be made more effective by incorporating deradicalization and rehabilitation measures. Deradicalization is a key element of Malaysia’s counterterrorism and violent extremism strategy. This article discusses the Malaysian Government’s multi-stage deradicalization process.

Steven Kenney and Ross Harrison join host Alistair Taylor to discuss their recent policy paper, “Conflict in the Middle East and COVID-19 — A View from 2025.” The COVID-19 crisis is disrupting the status quo on nearly everything, including regional conflict. How will that disruption worsen — or possibly improve — the trendlines of regional conflicts as we head toward 2025?

Conflict and instability have been constant features of the Middle East for decades. Over the most recent decade, four civil wars and fraught relationships between the major regional powers have been pushing the region toward a potentially perilous political and economic future. We know that the COVID-19 crisis is disrupting the status quo on nearly everything, including regional conflict. What we do not know is how that disruption today might worsen — or improve — the trendlines of those conflicts as we head toward 2025. In this MEI Strategic Foresight Initiative paper we employ a scenario-based methodology to explore this question.

Our ongoing analysis in MEI’s Strategic Foresight Initiative examines scenarios built around different combinations of drivers of change related to the COVID-19 pandemic. We used the scenarios to analyze what conflict in the region could look like in 2025, as we believe that how these drivers change the dynamics of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and the civil wars could be a primary determinant of what the region is like in that timeframe and beyond. Our study posited differences in the health response of governments, the economic response from governments, and the social dynamics of populations to the COVID-19 crisis. Rather than consider them as independent forces of change, our foresight analysis focuses on the interaction between these drivers.

Quickly attributing or blaming a country for a cyber incident without technical analysis, proof, and government officials willing to go on record only inflames an already tense situation.

It has been more than a year since the fall of Baghouz. Eleven Malaysians have returned from Syria under the Malaysian government’s offer, conditional upon compliance with checks and enforcement, and a one-month rehabilitation program. Since then, the authorities are optimistic that more will be able to return. However, the anticipation of more returnees raises questions about Malaysia’s readiness to receive incoming batches of Malaysia Islamic State (IS) fighters. Given Malaysia’s lack of experience dealing with battle-hardened terrorists and questions about the efficacy of existing deradicalization efforts, can these structures tackle issues that Malaysia has never faced?