Research & Commentary Results

The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip. Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other.

A version of this article was originally published on the Substack “Thinking Middle East.”

The Iranian strike against Israel was a first of its kind. Its mere occurrence sets a precedent that will have a long-term impact and require Israel to weigh new considerations when planning future military operations against Iranian assets.

Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.

Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.

Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?

Public opinion polls indicate that a plurality of Israelis have lost faith in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and support early elections. Recently, this trend has been coupled with renewed demonstrations against the government and maneuvers by key politicians, indicating that the chances Israelis will go to the polls during 2024 are on the rise.

On March 5-7, 2024, the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) hosted the annual Arab Forum for Sustainable Development (AFSD). The inclusion of a special session on “Collaborative Futures: Strategic Foresight for Sustainable Development in a World of Crisis” is another example of the growing attention to foresight-driven analysis and decision-making among leaders in the Arab world.

في 12 مارس، فرضت وزارة الخزانة الأمريكية عقوبات على أربعة أشخاص لدعمهم كتائب العشتار المرتبطة بإيران في البحرين. قد يوحي هذا الإعلان الأمريكي بأن العلاقات الإيرانية-البحرينية على وشك الانهيار. لكن في الواقع، من غير المرجح أن يحدث ذلك - على الأقل طالما استمرت الهدنة الإيرانية-السعودية.

The Middle East and North Africa region is one of the lowest recipients of climate finance compared to other areas of the globe, such as East Asia and the Pacific Islands, despite MENA’s exposure to extreme climate risks. The MENA region’s share of climate financing from the big three global climate funds — the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) — and their sub-funds made up only 6.6% of their cumulative global financing through 2023.

Over the past two decades, relations between Israel and China expanded significantly. Since then, however, there have been indications that the growth prospects for the bilateral relationship have diminished. China’s stance on the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack and on Israel’s conduct during the ensuing war in Gaza, in particular, has further cast doubt on the future trajectory of the relationship.

International funders have often called upon recipients to carry out reforms before any funding can be made available or the amount increased. But in many crisis-wracked countries, such as Lebanon, the prospect of reforms may be too distant, with intervention needed immediately. This is why greater emphasis must be placed on risk mitigation measures over which funders can exercise control.

The results of the March 1 election for Iran’s Assembly of Experts hold great importance for understanding how the regime is preparing for the selection of the next supreme leader. The major responsibility of this 88-member body is to designate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s successor, either after his death or if he becomes incapable of fulfilling his responsibilities.

The scale of rebuilding needed after the Gaza war, in addition to the difficult political questions involved, will require close international coordination as well as innovative, future-informed thinking.