Rather than being visibly engaged, the military seems content with having the civilian authorities carry the responsibility for dealing with the crisis.
The country faces no letup in either political squabbling or insurgent attacks.
The Middle East is facing an unexpected turning point. The region will not look the same after COVID-19 as it did before it. The geoeconomics and geopolitics of the world are in free fall because of COVID-19, the oil price war, and a severe economic shutdown. For the Middle East and the Gulf monarchies in particular, the oil price war against Russia and U.S. shale and the shutdown of economies around the world have increased the pressure on the Gulf’s already-depleted financial resources, which usually act as a safety valve for the turbulent region.
11 scholars and experts from across MEI weigh in with the latest on how the coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Middle East.
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Michael Kugelman, and Marvin Weinbaum join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the recent US-Taliban agreement in Afghanistan, the political power struggle over the presidency, the challenges facing the intra-Afghan dialogue, and the effects of coronavirus.
From Morocco to Afghanistan, the scholars and experts at MEI take a closer look at how the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Middle East.
On March 9, Afghanistan’s sitting president, Ashraf Ghani, took the oath of office for a second term. However, on the same day the country’s chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, also declared himself president at a rival swearing-in ceremony. The controversy has plunged the country into further political uncertainty and potential chaos, dashing hopes of an immediate return to peace following the historic U.S.-Taliban deal on Feb. 29.
With intra-Afghan talks in question, the peace process appears in limbo.
It is a near truism that U.S. relations with Pakistan have been historically unstable, waxing and waning, climbing to heights of interdependence and sinking to mutual recrimination. Yet this is presently a period unmarked by either high promise or driven by crisis. Rather than a reason, however, for leaving the relationship untouched and unexamined, this can be a time of unusual opportunity to create a more deliberative approach to thinking about the bilateral relationship and for shaping fresh initiatives.
While President Ashraf Ghani’s regime refuses to give ground, the risk of nationwide disturbances is very real.
Whatever else it may do, the pending agreement is intended to provide the political cover for a U.S. departure from Afghanistan at an opportune time with this an election year.
The picture of how the two Pakistani Taliban leaders died is hazy and who killed them uncertain.
18 years after CIA and U.S. special operations elements touched down in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, ongoing, incremental troop reductions reveal the smoke and mirrors manner in which the U.S. is withdrawing from the conflict in lieu of a negotiated settlement.
The Taliban still apparently balk at an accord that makes any provision for the retention of an American counter-terrorism force.
Over the past five years, the focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategists has remained on the Middle East, especially after the emergence of ISIS in 2014, while Islamist terrorist organizations operating in South Asia have been considered a secondary threat. However, the fact remains that South Asia is home to more Islamist terrorist organizations than any other region of the world. Al-Qaeda was born there, in Afghanistan, and ISIS has roots in the region. But at the turn of the decade both global jihadist groups are now facing major challenges and the critical question is whether they will manage to survive this period of crisis amid a severe leadership vacuum following the death of ISIS’s supreme leader and caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the killing of al-Qaeda heir apparent Hamza bin Laden.