Research & Commentary Results

عندما أعلن البيت الأبيض في عهد الرئيس جو بايدن أنه قد نجح في ضم العديد من الدول الرئيسية المستهلكة للنفط في محاولة لتنسيق عمليات الإفراج عن احتياطيات البترول الاستراتيجية (SPRs) حول العالم، بدا أن هذا سيكون العامل الرئيسي الوحيد في أسواق النفط التي ستناقشه أوبك بلس في

Following the resignation of the finance minister and his replacement by a loyalist on Dec. 2, the Turkish lira continued its steady decline against the dollar, bringing its losses for the year to nearly 50%. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s early cuts to the policy rate since September have resulted in an exodus of foreign capital and a rush in demand for foreign exchange among domestic investors.

While oil prices have rebounded before soaring since the depths of collapse in the spring of 2020 — with Brent crude prices skyrocketing from $19 per barrel in April 2020 to a three-year high of $86 per barrel in October 2021 — the prospects for a sustained high oil price for Gulf producers is unlikely.

If the Biden administration makes concessions to appease the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of the recently resumed Vienna nuclear talks, it will be a historic mistake. The Islamic Republic is facing a deep legitimacy crisis of its own making, as a series of disastrous decisions have hardened the people’s views against the regime. These days, anyone who is seen to be throwing the Islamic Republic a lifeline will be wildly unpopular among Iranians.

When President Joe Biden’s White House announced that it had successfully enlisted several major oil-consuming countries in an effort to coordinate releases from strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) around the world, it looked like this would be the only major factor in oil markets that OPEC+ would need to consider at its upcoming meeting on Dec. 2. Then came Omicron. The newly discovered variant of the COVID-19 virus sent benchmark oil prices plunging on Nov. 26 as uncertainty over its impact roiled global markets.

North Africa has entered a food security crisis. Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are witnessing food inflation levels not seen since the civil unrest of the Arab Spring a decade ago. Although the Maghreb’s current food crisis was precipitated by the local and global economic shocks brought on by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and its 2021 aftermath, the structural fragility of the food systems in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco is responsible for severity of the problem. At the core of this fragility is the failure to implement adequate measures to address the impact of increased water scarcity and debilitating climate change.

In September, China and Pakistan convened the tenth session of their joint coordination committee that oversees the CPEC — the largest of the BRI corridors. The long-anticipated meeting ultimately yielded no major breakthroughs. The momentum of CPEC appears to be losing steam once again, but for Pakistan, slower may actually be better.

Afghanistan’s economy is collapsing. The Taliban’s forceful seizure of power led to a curtailment of almost all foreign aid, a devastating development for a nation overwhelmingly dependent on international assistance. Widespread drought, pervasive corruption, the perennially inadequate use of the country’s human capital, and a population largely unvaccinated against COVID-19 have exacerbated this longstanding problem of foreign financial dependence.

During the National Day of Villages and Nomads in Iran on Oct. 6, President Ebrahim Raisi visited Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province and spoke about combatting rural deprivation, an issue that has become central to Raisi’s domestic agenda.

As the U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26) kicks off in Glasgow, climate change is front and center on the global agenda. Few regions of the world have more at stake than the Middle East and North Africa, given the current environmental and sustainability challenges and potential future scenarios. Experts from across MEI weigh in with their thoughts on what should be the key outcomes from COP26.

Turkey’s official policy supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia, and it sells UAVs and ships to Ukraine. Yet, trade continues with the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and Crimea. By allowing this illegal trade, Turkey undermines both its own credibility and its trading partners’ security. Shipped goods not only help connect occupied zones to Russia, but trade also brings hard currency into these zones, which are outside the international banking system.

Next week, tens of thousands of world leaders, negotiators, scientists, business executives, activists, and observers from all over will gather in Glasgow, Scotland for the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference, which will run from Oct. 31 to Nov. 12. Also known as the Conference of the Parties (COP), this distinguished body meets annually to make decisions regarding the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which aims to “prevent anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”

After 13 months of political gridlock, economic collapse, and civil unrest, Lebanese politicians formed a new government on Sept. 10. Three-time Prime Minister Najib Mikati heads a new cabinet, the first since the previous one resigned in the wake of Beirut’s devastating port blast in August 2020. Though the formation of a new government provides a way forward to address the myriad crises facing the country, it falls far short of the near-revolutionary changes demanded by Lebanese citizens protesting in the streets. Instead of non-partisan specialists forming a new unity government, Lebanon’s notorious sectarian elites have handpicked a government of technocrats close to them to handle the current situation, the most brazen of which are the new ministers of finance and public works.

The kingdom is unlikely to achieve net zero emissions soon, but the ambition to do so, and the plan, is an impactful step in the right direction, write Jim Krane and Karen E. Young in their new piece for Al-Monitor.

A decade has passed since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan landed in Mogadishu at the height of one of Somalia’s worst famines, announcing grandiose projects like the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to the Somali capital, the remodeling of a hospital, and the opening of the biggest embassy in Africa, all designed to show that Turkey’s mission goes well beyond aid and that Ankara is an alternative to Somalia’s traditional donors. Erdoğan’s historic visit earned him high praise throughout Somalia. Although his trip appeared to be a heartfelt humanitarian mission, in reality it was part of a long-term, strategically planned effort. A decade on, Somalis are starting to realize that Turkey has evolved from friend to foe, trade partner to trade protectionist, state builder to outright spoiler.