With intra-Afghan talks in question, the peace process appears in limbo.
It is a near truism that U.S. relations with Pakistan have been historically unstable, waxing and waning, climbing to heights of interdependence and sinking to mutual recrimination. Yet this is presently a period unmarked by either high promise or driven by crisis. Rather than a reason, however, for leaving the relationship untouched and unexamined, this can be a time of unusual opportunity to create a more deliberative approach to thinking about the bilateral relationship and for shaping fresh initiatives.
While President Ashraf Ghani’s regime refuses to give ground, the risk of nationwide disturbances is very real.
Whatever else it may do, the pending agreement is intended to provide the political cover for a U.S. departure from Afghanistan at an opportune time with this an election year.
The picture of how the two Pakistani Taliban leaders died is hazy and who killed them uncertain.
18 years after CIA and U.S. special operations elements touched down in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, ongoing, incremental troop reductions reveal the smoke and mirrors manner in which the U.S. is withdrawing from the conflict in lieu of a negotiated settlement.
The Taliban still apparently balk at an accord that makes any provision for the retention of an American counter-terrorism force.
Over the past five years, the focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategists has remained on the Middle East, especially after the emergence of ISIS in 2014, while Islamist terrorist organizations operating in South Asia have been considered a secondary threat. However, the fact remains that South Asia is home to more Islamist terrorist organizations than any other region of the world. Al-Qaeda was born there, in Afghanistan, and ISIS has roots in the region. But at the turn of the decade both global jihadist groups are now facing major challenges and the critical question is whether they will manage to survive this period of crisis amid a severe leadership vacuum following the death of ISIS’s supreme leader and caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the killing of al-Qaeda heir apparent Hamza bin Laden.
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.
The commitment by its foreign benefactors to underwrite the Afghan regime’s viability and ability to withstand Taliban insurgency is in serious doubt.
Afghan security forces, working in concert with U.S. airpower, have launched a series of successful attacks in eastern Afghanistan on ISIS forces, which operate locally under the banner of ISKP. Simultaneously, the Taliban has conducted its own military campaign against ISKP in the same region. These campaigns have significantly degraded ISKP’s position in eastern Afghanistan, a development that may well increase the likelihood of an eventual U.S.-Taliban peace deal.
In our annual year in review episode, MEI experts Paul Salem, Gonul Tol, Charles Lister, Alex Vatanka, Marvin Weinbaum, and Mirette Mabrouk sit with host Alistair Taylor to discuss the key events across the region in 2019, what surprised them, and where things stand as we head into 2020.
Since 2017 three separate blocs have emerged within the Gulf. Driven by the region’s divisions, rival power centers, and conflicting interests, the Gulf states are playing an ever-greater role in Palestinian affairs.
The steps the Saudis have taken in 2019 may help to ease international pressure on the kingdom’s leadership and restore its image as a constructive player in the world.
With the 2020 American presidential elections looming, the U.S. seems poised to accept virtually any withdrawal deal, even a bad one.