Research & Commentary Results

In one of the interesting turnarounds in recent years, travel flows between the Black Sea region and the Middle East have undergone a silent change. During the past decade, this southward flow of shuttle migrants was replaced by Middle Easterners heading northwards in search of promising business opportunities and alternative holiday destinations.

Tom de Waal, Nicole Grajewski, and Theodore Karasik join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the recent border hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the role that Russia, Turkey, and Iran are playing in the geostrategically important South Caucasus.

In recent weeks, reports of a potential 25-year, $400-billion deal between Iran and China have dominated the conversation about Tehran’s options for freeing itself from the punishing U.S.-imposed sanctions regime on the country. But China is not alone in seeing an embattled Iran as a major geopolitical and commercial opportunity — Russia too has ambitions of strengthening ties with Iran.

For those who study the countries and regions that surround it, the Black Sea is many things — a global trade thoroughfare, a zone of contestation, a cradle of civilizations, and a dying ecosystem. But, curiously, one of the more opaque factors is whether the Black Sea region — the states and polities on its littoral and immediate hinterland — is a region at all.

This week marks the 12th anniversary of Russia’s wonton invasion of Georgia. While the world was fixated on the Summer Olympics in Beijing, an invasion force comprised of hundreds of Russian tanks and armored vehicles passed through the Roki tunnel on the Russian–Georgian border.

The annual Conference of the Parties (COP) was initiated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1995 to assess progress made by UN members in dealing with climate change. Some meetings have had practical and measurable outcomes, such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. But arguably the most well-known meeting is the 2015 COP21 in Paris, also known as the Paris Agreement.

As Russia partially reopens international travel amidst the ongoing pandemic, Turkey is in the top three countries for resumed Russian flights. Moscow also touts possible space cooperation with Turkey amidst tensions with the US on this issue. Despite disagreements between Moscow and Ankara over Syria, Libya, and the broader Black Sea region, Russia and Turkey remain determined to cooperate. But the relationship remains unequal.

In October, the United Nations embargo on arms sales to Iran is scheduled to expire.  This was a deadline specified in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal concluded by the Obama Administration.  The Trump administration stridently opposes the lifting of this restriction and is lobbying within the UN Security Council to have the embargo extended indefinitely. 

Until recently, Russia’s dominance in the natural gas markets southwest of its borders appeared unassailable. These days, that is less and less the case. Largely unnoticed yet dramatic changes are taking place in Turkey – Moscow’s top gas customer outside of Germany. 

On July 12, the Armenian and the Azerbaijani armed forces started a border skirmish. Fighting went on for several days, leaving at least 16 dead in its wake. Remarkably enough, the two sides are facing off outside the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the usual flashpoint. This time around the flare-up took place well to the north, where Armenia’s Tavush region meets Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district. It is little wonder then that the crisis caught Turkey’s attention.

On July 12, military clashes broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, quickly escalating into the single deadliest incident since the “four-day war” of April 2016. While violent outbreaks between the two sides are common, they usually occur on the Line of Contact around Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories. This time, however, fighting erupted along the internationally recognized Armenia-Azerbaijan border, far away from the actual conflict zone. With heavy use of artillery, drones, cyberattacks and disinformation – causing at least 17 combined casualties, including a well-known Azerbaijani army general – the violence risked spiraling into a major war.

For many policymakers the Black Sea is a secondary consideration when it comes to transatlantic security. A lack of resources by NATO members meant that initiatives taken to bolster territorial defense were limited geographically after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the time, Baltics were seen as the most pressing priority. Instead of bolstering NATO’s frontline from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the alliance instead focused most of its energy and resources on northeastern Europe.

There are two countries in Europe which have been at war with one other for three decades. Last week Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting again. At least fifteen soldiers, including an Azerbaijani general and one civilian, were killed in clashes across their northern border between the towns of Tavush and Tovuz. After a brief lull, firing from heavy weapons resumed on July 16.

Where most of the international community sees R2P as a mechanism for protecting human rights when a state cannot or will not ensure them, Russia’s take on the same concept focuses on the protection of national sovereignty at any cost. However, Moscow’s commitment to the notion of sovereignty has been selectively applied to the states of the Middle East and the Black Sea.

Name any category of weapons system and then check which countries are working on a design of that kind of weapon and one will make an interesting discovery: the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have more different types and designs of that weapon in development than the rest of the world’s arms producers combined.