Putting Diplomacy First in the Middle East: Creating Incentives for De-Escalation
The Middle East is undergoing a historic transformation with unprecedented opportunities to build new relationships, de-escalate tensions, and foster conditions for stronger integration. At the same time, the region remains on edge because of ongoing tensions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other conflict zones, a civil war that broke out recently in Sudan, along with the overarching challenges presented by fraught relations between Iran, Israel, and several Arab Gulf countries — with the longer-term implications of the still-fragile Iranian-Saudi rapprochement yet to be fully assessed.
In an era of Middle East détente, how should the US and Israel respond?
Both Washington and Jerusalem welcome any reduction in regional tensions and prospects for a more stable, secure, and prosperous environment. However, there is a risk for U.S. and Israeli policy priorities, such as that regional de-escalation will reduce pressure on Tehran to negotiate on issues of concern, especially its nuclear weapons program.
The IRGC’s enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is at its core an ideological army, not a national one, and its notorious enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history. But many Israelis to this day think Iran could be a natural partner as long as the country gave up its pursuit of ideologically driven regional dominance, disavow calls for the destruction of Israel, and were instead to again allow the regular army, the Artesh, to pursue Iranian national interests.
Lebanon is on the verge of complete collapse, and if Washington is serious about preventing not just another failed state but a growing normalization of unchecked authoritarianism in the Middle East, it must stop outsourcing leadership on Lebanon to France.
One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoys keeps visiting Iran. Igor Levitin, Putin’s advisor, has visited Tehran twice in 2023, totaling five visits in the last six months. During his latest visit, Levitin met with top Iranian figures, including Mohammad Mokhber, first vice president and top economic coordinator, and Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
تركزت جميع النزاعات التاريخية والحديثة في الشرق الأوسط حول الاعتبارات الإقليمية الكلاسيكية المتعلقة بفقدان الأراضي أو استعادتها. وللخروج من هذه الدوامة، كان من الضروري الابتعاد عن أحد الأسباب الجذرية الرئيسية للنزاع: الجغرافيا. وقد تكون التغيرات الحالية في المنطقة، التي تتميز بتوجه كبير نحو تخفيف حدة التوتر واستعداد متزايد للانفصال بشكل دوري عن الحلفاء التقليديين، مؤشرات على حدوث تحول جذري عميق نحو "السياسة الكمومية".
When Saudi Arabia suddenly announced in early April that it would reduce its oil production by 500,000 bpd, followed shortly thereafter by several other OPEC+ members, bringing the total cut to 1.1 million bpd, Japan was greatly concerned. In spite of Japan’s serious efforts to work toward a carbon-neutral society, the country is still heavily dependent on oil, the overwhelming majority of which comes from the Persian Gulf.
President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”1 Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.
Iran-Iraq competition in regional maritime and overland transit corridors
In recent years, Iraq has become one of the leading destinations for Chinese investments in the Middle East and a crucial link in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. To capitalize on its geostrategic location and central position within the Chinese BRI, Iraq is seeking to develop a sprawling new 54-square-kilometer port project, known as al-Faw Grand Port, which will reduce the country’s reliance on Arab Gulf ports and overland transit from Iran and Turkey. The project also underscores Iraq’s growing economic rivalry with neighboring Iran, as both countries seek to carve out a similar niche in handling regional transit traffic.
Iranian-Saudi detente and "Asianization" of the Persian Gulf: China fills the gap
After an intense round of secret negotiations between Iranian and Saudi representatives, facilitated by Chinese mediation, Tehran and Riyadh announced in mid-March that they would resume diplomatic relations. It is unclear if the Saudi-Iranian détente will last, but at least for now, China’s role in resolving this diplomatic stalemate seems to indicate the beginning of a multi-faceted de-Westernization process in the region.
China and the Saudi-Iran rapprochement: Implications for Yemen
The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.
The long Ukraine war: It’s time to transition to a more rational military assistance paradigm
Ukraine’s partners, led by the United States and spread over the globe, have increasingly responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022 with a dizzying array of financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners have provided military assistance over the last year — that is, by delivering a wide range of equipment, ammunition, and training — significantly undermines the longer-term objective of developing a sustainable system via which Ukraine can generate combat power in the coming years to overcome Russian aggression.
