اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
For years pundits have argued that Palestinian elections cannot take place in the occupied territories until there is reconciliation between the warring factions of Fatah and Hamas. The conflict between them led to the creation of two parallel governments, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas in charge of Gaza. This situation produced parallel laws and, most importantly, parallel security forces. While these differences remain unresolved, elections, which were once considered impossible without reconciliation, are now being used to achieve reconciliation. On January 11, a Palestinian presidential decree announced legislative elections for May 22 to be followed by presidential elections on July 31.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
In the 1950s, at the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan and Turkey were part of the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO, a pro-Western bloc of Muslim-majority states. Today, the two countries — both with troubled relations with the United States — are Muslim middle powers with a growing entente in a multipolar Eurasia. In recent years, cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey has strengthened not just in the defense, diplomatic, and economic realms, but also in the cultural space, causing geopolitical ripple effects in the Himalayas, the Arabian Peninsula, and the South Caucasus.
In mid-January the press reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will soon participate in a joint military exercise with the United States, Canada, Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus, and Israel. While Israel’s inclusion is certainly newsworthy, it is also quite significant that the drill will take place in and be coordinated by Greece. This is just the latest step in a long process of engagement between Athens and Abu Dhabi.
Turkey’s efforts to strike a different tone were apparent on Jan. 25 in Istanbul, when Greek and Turkish officials resumed talks after a five-year gap to calm tensions in the Aegean and Mediterranean. The fact that the parties met is welcome news after the two came to the brink of war recently over offshore energy exploitation rights, but no one expected a breakthrough. The tensions between the two countries have a long history and the issues dividing Athens and Ankara are too deep to bridge.
As the Biden administration takes office, it faces a host of challenges, both at home and abroad. Where does the Middle East fit into all of this and what should the new administration prioritize in its first 200 days? In the second part of a two-part series, we asked experts and scholars from across the region to weigh in with their thoughts.
المحتويات:
Paul Salem
President
MEI experts Gerald Feierstein, Alex Vatanka, Gonul Tol, and Charles Lister join host Alistair Taylor to survey what lies ahead for the region in the year ahead, with particular attention to Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continues to pursue a policy of polarization as he loses ground amid growing economic pressure in the country.
This calendar lists key dates in the MENA region in 2021, broken down by month. It is subject to change and will be updated over the course of the year.
Turkey and Mongolia — unlikely partners? Mongolia’s outreach to Turkey as a potential “third neighbor” has converged with the reorientation of Ankara’s efforts under the Islamist Justice and Development (AK) Party to expand trade links and enhanced relations with countries that were either part of the former Ottoman Empire or have shared ethnic background or cultural histories.
Turkey lies at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Fueled by a dynamic economy, Turkey has emerged in recent years as an important geopolitical actor not just within the surrounding region but in the global arena as well. Turkey’s foreign and economic policy horizons today extend to the Far East. These essays explore the development of cultural, political, and economic links between Turkey and Asia.
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the most important figure in Iran’s nuclear program, in late November 2020 is a major failure for Iran’s intelligence services. Despite all the secrecy and the emphasis on protecting Fakhrizadeh, however, he was still assassinated in the Absard area, about 70 km from Tehran, on Nov. 27. Why was he killed despite such a high level of protection, and what effect will his death have on the Iranian regime’s intelligence and security structures?