Research & Commentary Results

The Biden administration’s goals in climate policy, renewable energy infrastructure investment both domestically and globally (the Build Back Better World, or B3W, initiative), and its Middle East policy may be on the verge of a collision. While the administration would like to dial back its engagement in the Middle East at least militarily, the region will be essential to meeting U.S. foreign and domestic energy goals.

Russkyi Mir is an ideological construct and foreign policy concept defined in the first mandate of President Vladimir Putin. While not regulated through legislation or policy, the concept is popular among Russian political thinkers and ideologists as a way to shape Russia’s relationship with the world. It is also often referred to in speeches by the president, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and other key figures.

In the past few months, several articles have been written on the significant rise in the Saudi female labor force participation rate (LFPR) from 17.7% in Q2, 2016 to 33.2% in Q4, 2020. Interestingly, this increase in female LFPR was not coupled with a rise in unemployment, which often occurs when workforce participation rises for a particular group. In fact, the unemployment rate among female nationals declined to its lowest level in four years, at 24.4% in Q4, 2020. However, it still remains over twice as high as that for male nationals. Another positive labor market indicator, albeit one receiving little attention from analysts, is the significant change in the employment rate among Saudi women. In other words, Saudi women not only increased their share in the workforce, but were also able to gain jobs once they entered the labor force.

War does not end with the last bullet unloaded or agreement papers signed. Wars continue years after peace but in different ways: demining minefields, prosecuting criminals, fighting discrimination of minorities, and steering wartime narratives. Unfortunately, the longer a conflict goes on, the harder it is to achieve peace. This report provides an overview of the consequences (or ‘costs’) of the war in Donbas, Ukraine. It offers a concise overview of the key historical and economic developments surrounding the war, culminating in two major points. First, the main costs in the region arise because of a policy driven humanitarian crisis. Second, Ukrainian society is still polarized on critical issues.

Oil and gas have long dominated trade and investment flows between Singapore and the Gulf. In the wake of two new projects — one in Singapore and the other in the United Arab Emirates — unveiled last month, this article considers whether Singapore and the Gulf are on the cusp of a new level and type of economic relations.

The factor of Iranian oil, while important for the situation in the oil market, turned out to be somewhat overestimated in terms of its impact on OPEC+ decision-making.

It has been more than a decade since Georgia was promised eventual membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. At the time, NATO did not act decisively on granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP). A few months after the Summit, Russia invaded Georgia and continues to occupy Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (more commonly known as South Ossetia). After years of economic, governance, and military reforms, this partial occupation remains the primary roadblock to meaningful progress on Georgia’s NATO aspirations. Other NATO members do not want to risk a confrontation with Russia by inviting Georgia to join the Alliance.

Sunday was a festive day in Baghdad. The last time Iraqis had received an Egyptian president 30 years ago, the region was gearing up for war and uncertainty as the late President Hosni Mubarak shuttled between Baghdad and Gulf capitals prior to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The circumstances were quite different on June 27, when Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and King Abdullah II of Jordan were given the red-carpet treatment at a tripartite summit marking the fourth meeting between the leaders of the three countries aiming to form a new regional alliance.

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are caught in a dangerous deadlock over the Nile River and despite what the international community seems to think, the risk of military confrontation among the three nations is not at all far-fetched. Addis Ababa began the second phase of filling the reservoir behind its giant Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in early May without an agreement with the riparian nations — Egypt and Sudan. However, much has changed over the past year and the second filling has played out rather differently from the first last July. In the intervening months Egypt has ramped up its diplomatic outreach and emerged as an influential player in the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and East and Central Africa. Cairo succeeded in forging strategic alignment with Khartoum to exert diplomatic pressure on Addis Ababa, forming webs of alliances with different regional powers across East and Central Africa and the Horn of Africa to project power and influence, and exerting geopolitical forward pressure on Ethiopia in parallel with the diplomatic track to solve the GERD dispute. 

The Turkish government recently confirmed that the country has approved development plans to carve a new passage between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Cutting through forests and farmland, the new Canal Istanbul would run parallel to the Bosphorus for a total of 45 km (28 miles) with a depth of 20.75 meters (68 feet) and a width of 275-350 meters (900 to 1150 feet). Ground-breaking for the first bridge over the proposed canal is scheduled to take place on June 26. However, this will be a ceremony for domestic political consumption and by no means indicates that construction is really starting. Financing the massive project might prove impossible due to the environmental concerns and investment risks hanging over it.

Tbilisi and Washington have in recent years built a strong strategic partnership. Yet, a myriad of threats imposed by Russia on Georgia and the Black Sea region – including a continued “borderization” policy, modernization of the Black Sea Fleet, and attempts to transform the Black Sea into an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone – call for a review of U.S. policy toward Georgia and the wider Black Sea region.

Over the past year, intensifying political and economic conflicts between the Kurdistan Region’s two hegemonic parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have challenged the legal and institutional order in which the Kurdistan Regional Government operates. A new generation of leadership within the parties, a fraught relationship with the federal government, and a prolonged economic crisis have strained the relationship between the two parties to its breaking point.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed recently by Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine on enhanced cooperation toward European Union (EU) membership highlights both progress and overall shortcomings of the EU’s Eastern policy. Despite the Union enlarging to the East in 2004 and 2007 – and the fact that Russian aggression has long been felt on EU territory – the bloc’s Eastern policy still does not reflect realities on the ground. However, the recent buildup of Russian military in Ukraine, as well as the deployment of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Nagorno-Karabakh, has created momentum for an urgently needed rethink of the Union’s Eastern neighborhood policy.

Blessed with milder temperatures than its Gulf neighbors as well as abundant rain and snow fall, Iran is one of the last countries in the region to introduce a seawater transfer plan to fight unprecedented levels of drought. The plan, once fully implemented, could help build water corridors linking the shores of Iran’s southern Gulf to those of its northern Caspian Sea. Named the Hope Transfer Line, the plan promises prosperity for farmers and industrialists, and potable water for communities in some 10,000 villages and urban areas located in so-called Red Zones, a category that applies to regions coping with severe water scarcity. 

The Black Sea region is currently managing military pressure from Russia, the economic influence of China, and soft power efforts of the West, making it a stage for power competition. With COVID-19 exacerbating Ukraine’s political weaknesses and economic vulnerabilities, Russia and China are increasingly adopting a united front in the Black Sea. Such geopolitical changes in power distribution require more active presence and involvement of the U.S. in the Black Sea.