Monday Briefing: Iraq’s ongoing cycle of successes and disasters
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
On April 20, Chadian President Idriss Déby was killed by Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebels in the country’s northwestern Tibesti region. The sudden death of Déby, who seized power in Chad via a military coup in December 1990 and was re-elected on April 11 with 79.3% of the vote, risks plunging Chad into a state of prolonged instability.
Five months into his job as commander of regime forces in Deir ez-Zor, Maj. Gen. Nizar Khader appears to have skillfully gained control over the diverse tapestry of loyalist forces in the region. Khader’s return to power in the east quickly put an end to the deadly disputes that had plagued the governorate’s security forces for years. He then launched a nearly three-month campaign, coordinated between Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces, to push ISIS cells back into the province’s hinterlands, securing the crucial highway connecting Deir ez-Zor with Palmyra and Damascus to the west. His success, while impressive, will face its second major test soon as ISIS prepares for a potential Ramadan offensive.
Since the start of the current war, Bashar al-Assad, in power since 2000, has consistently sought to promote himself as the protector of Syria’s minorities — be they Christian, Alawi, Shi’i or Druze —from Islamist extremists. Many Western audiences have been seduced by his smart casual look and by his increasingly prominent, beautifully turned-out British wife, Asma. With presidential elections due to take place, under Russian auspices, in the coming months, in which Assad is widely expected to run, his claim demands close scrutiny. What has happened to minorities over the last 10 years of war and how does that compare to their treatment historically inside Syria?
Relations between the United States and Turkey have never been worse, but the two countries still must deal with each other, and so President Joe Biden and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may talk this week. Each will review his list of issues. Both will commit to better relations and to best efforts to reach peaceful solutions to global, regional, and bilateral issues — and very little will change.
Turkey initiated a strategy to engage Southeast Asian nations in the early 2000s that resulted in the opening of new embassies and branches of numerous state-sponsored institutions across the region. With the launching of the Asia Anew Initiative in late 2019, Ankara has redoubled efforts to forge closer ties with the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with ASEAN itself.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
“لا يمكن للمجتمع الدولي أن يسمح لروسيا والصين حليفتها في مجلس الأمن بإنهاء مهمة الأمم المتحدة لتقديم المساعدة عبر الحدود إلى سوريا”.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is the U.S. military’s name for the international intervention to defeat ISIS in Syria and Iraq starting in 2014. While OIR has been a success, it has necessarily been imperfect. Throughout the campaign, cost-benefit calculations made by policymakers led to missed opportunities and possibly a longer conflict. These decisions will have lasting repercussions that could undermine the hard-won victory against ISIS, as well as the ability to partner in future interventions. In particular, the United States mishandled its partner relationships in the war to defeat ISIS. Political considerations apparently won out against supporting and sustaining the SDF, our military partner forces.
The northern Syrian governorate of Raqqa came to the world’s attention when it fell under the control of ISIS in 2014. Scenes of tribal leaders pledging allegiance to the group, after their governorate fell into its hands, raised many questions about the complex tribal dynamics in the area. Previous analyses of these dynamics have often misunderstood the intricate tribal structure and drawn false links between terrorism and tribalism. This research tool aims to shed light on Raqqa’s tribal structure, making it accessible to everyone interested in understanding the current state of affairs in the governorate.
Ten years ago this week, at the American embassy in Damascus, we heard of the first anti-government protest through a quiet whisper in the diplomatic community. A few young kids had run through the historic Hamadiya market yelling “freedom,” as everyone else in the Syrian capital was glued to their television, watching the Arab Spring unfold in nearby states.
“من غير المرجح حدوث تقارب، ما لم ير المصريون تقدمًا فيما يتعلق بالقضايا التي يعتبرونها إشكالية، لا سيما ليبيا وشرق البحر المتوسط”.
As Syrians mark the 10-year anniversary of the 2011 uprising this week, it remains inescapably true that the country’s debilitating crisis is far from over. After a decade of conflict that was initiated and driven by an utterly ruthless regime and reinforced and diplomatically protected by its Russian and Iranian allies, Syria is broken.
It has been more than a month since the launch of military operations by Syrian regime forces and their allies, with air support from the Russian air force, in the Syrian Badia — the country’s expansive central desert region — in an attempt to eliminate ISIS cells deployed there. To date, however, these operations have not yielded any tangible results.