There are early signs that it may be possible to turn the page in the difficult relationship between Erbil and Baghdad
While regional tensions will complicate the task of promoting a centrist foreign policy, they will also create opportunities for a skilled mediator like al-Kadhimi
For now, Tehran’s bottom-line objective in Iraq is for the Americans to stop urging Baghdad to cut Iran loose.
The protests are a reminder to the new PM that anger is real and has not dissipated.
The big question is, what is Baghdad expected to concede in return for Trump’s investment?
Saying that Moscow is having a change of heart at this very moment, let alone is willing to publicly broadcast this to Damascus, may be a bit premature.
In recent weeks, a flurry of commentary from prominent voices and publications in Russia has seen a wave of criticism directed at Syria’s Assad regime. Accusations have been leveled against the regime of corruption, warlordism, and incompetence, as well as an obsession with achieving unrealistic military objectives at the expense of dwindling resources, reconstruction, and political and economic reforms.
In a series of videos posted on Facebook this week, Rami Makhlouf called out the upper echelons of Syria’s political establishment, of which he had been an integral part for over two decades. By making his feud public Makhlouf has created an unprecedented rift within loyalist ranks, transforming his dispute with Syria’s ruling elite from one that was tightly controlled and behind closed doors to an out in the open, nationwide row the likes of which haven’t been seen since Hafez al-Assad’s standoff with his brother Rifaat in 1984.
Officials in Damascus say reconstruction plans for what was once Syria’s largest Palestinian refugee community will pave the way for the return of large numbers of displaced residents “as soon as possible.” But with plans beset by delays and vague statements from those same officials, the available evidence suggests otherwise.
The fact that Makhlouf chose to go public heightens the stakes at play at the top of the regime and within the Alawite clan, arguably more than ever.
The arrival of COVID-19 into Iraq and the resulting reduction in frontline deployed forces has widened the scope for ISIS operations.
If Kadhimi’s opponents succeed in blocking his confirmation, Iraq’s government will sink deeper into lethargy at a time of building crisis.
The uncertain political circumstances this time around make these efforts worth watching.
With its territory under increasing pressure, its finances dwindling, and manpower more challenged than ever, HTS’s ability to balance its extremism with controlled uses of pragmatism is under strain. Internally, its leadership is bitterly divided over decisions of the past, present, and future and externally, its rivals and enemies all appear to be conspiring against it. In an attempt to protect internal cohesion, HTS has become determinedly self-assertive in recent weeks, pursuing unpopular policies such as trading with the regime and lashing out at those brave enough to express their dissatisfaction. In response to HTS aggressions, a wider array of opposition voices — both moderate and Islamist — are declaring loudly that HTS now represents a threat to their revolution.
Vish Sakthivel, Hafsa Halawa, and Nour El-Achi join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on protest movements in Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon. While each case is unique, all three movements are pushing for sweeping reforms of the corrupt political system, a change in the ruling elite, and improved state services.