Research & Commentary Results

The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.

Damascus’ position is marginally stronger, and it is unlikely to concede anything of substance in Geneva despite continued American control of Deir ez-Zor’s oilfields.

Russia is clear in its policy toward northeastern Syria: The future of the region will be determined through talks between the representatives of the Kurds, who traditionally live in the area, and Damascus.

Egypt and Ethiopia remain at odds over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Currently almost 70 percent complete, the giant upstream dam, which can hold the entire annual rainfall of the Nile, has the capacity to essentially turn the taps off on Egypt, depriving the country of the river water that supplies a mind-numbing 90 percent of its fresh water.

While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.

Reports of a secret war being waged by Hamas against Salafi-jihadist groups in the Gaza Strip are indicative of increasing challenges to the former’s security control within the enclave. Hamas’ current approach to violent Salafist cells in Gaza is equally demonstrative of an ongoing warming of relations between Cairo and Hamas, and one that has afforded Hamas international legitimacy and an ease in border restrictions.

That some in Washington think another about-turn in policy allowing us to stay in negligible numbers, in a smaller piece of territory, would somehow enable us to sustain an anti-ISIS campaign and control Syria’s oil fields is nothing short of a fantasy.

To make his case for an expansive safe zone in northern Syria stretching to Iraqi border, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. Putin might accept a limited Turkish presence in the area for now, but he is unlikely to agree to Turkey’s current plans.

Both Mr. Trump and Mr. Erdogan, each under mounting pressure at home, are trying to solve domestic challenges with a tragedy that will have long-term and unpredictable effects — none of them beneficial for the United States and any friends that remain.

While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.

Turkey’s cross-border incursion into northeastern Syria has stirred up a hornet’s nest of instability and threats. If left unchecked, this latest “war within a war” will have deeply destabilizing consequences for many years.

In one fell swoop, the U.S. has found itself evacuating a third of the country; breaking away from a 100,000-strong partner we trained and equipped; and watching it surrender to the regime that we have stood against from day one. In the chaos that has ensued, ISIS prisoners have been let loose, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and a once relatively stable northeastern Syria has been thrown into a potentially intractable pit of ethnic, sectarian, and political conflict. The consequences of America’s self-destruction in Syria will be felt for many, many years to come.

The biggest losers from President Trump’s arbitrary decision to allow Turkish forces to enter Syria may end up being pro-revolution Syrians and civilians living in Idlib.

On August 5, 2019 Turkey’s Foreign Ministry launched the Asia Anew initiative, whose declared aim is to give greater weight to cooperation with Asian countries in four substantive areas. This article shows that, although few details have emerged regarding how Ankara intends to implement this initiative, there is nonetheless sufficient reason to question whether it is viable or sustainable.

In a stunning announcement on Sunday, the Trump administration gave the nod to a Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria, an operation that would entail clashes with Washington’s Kurdish allies in the area. The U.S. military, which has around 1,000 troops in Syria, would not “support or be involved in the operation.” But the White House said it would pull back U.S. forces stationed near the Syrian-Turkish border to clear the way for Ankara’s troops.