Research & Commentary Results

Almost immediately after the start of the conflict in Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his governing coalition began a concerted effort to persuade first the European Union and then the United States to pressure Egypt to accept Palestinian refugees. Egypt refused and continues to do so. Capitulating is not in Cairo’s national interest and bullying it will only backfire.

تقوم إيران بتخزين ما يكفي من اليورانيوم المخصب القريب من الدرجة العسكرية لصنع سلاح نووي في غضون أسابيع أو أشهر، وليس سنوات. والرئيس دونالد ترامب، الذي انسحب في عام 2018 من الاتفاق النووي الذي كان من شأنه تأجيل هذه الإمكانية، يناشد الآن إجراء مفاوضات مع طهران. لكن في الشرق الأوسط، لا تقتصر المسألة النووية على إيران وحدها.

The work of the Syria Strategy Project and the considerable policy recommendations found in this report present a realistic and holistic vision for Syria’s recovery and reintegration into the international system.

While most media attention was focused on its global economic policy moves, the Trump administration continued to keep the Middle East high on its agenda this past week, with the president sending a letter to Iran’s supreme leader and his team directly engaging with the Palestinian group Hamas. This continued engagement on the region’s top two strategic questions, Iran and Arab-Israel affairs, contrasted with America’s hands-off approach to Syria, which saw some troubling violence.

Syria’s national dialogue, held in Damascus at the end of February, was intended to chart the country’s future, one that would have been unthinkable just three months earlier. However, the process and outcomes of the dialogue were flawed, left critical questions unanswered, and raised new concerns.

سيكون من الصعب للغاية على موسكو الحفاظ على قواعدها العسكرية في سوريا أو إيجاد موقع بديل في البحر الأبيض المتوسط. وجزء من المشكلة في السعي وراء الخيار الأخير، خاصة إذا كان في ليبيا، هو أنه سيتطلب تحولاً كاملاً في نموذج الوجود العسكري الروسي — من قواعد أكثر تقليدية مصممة لفرض الردع من خلال إظهار العلم في المنطقة إلى بناء عملية عسكرية ولوجستية داخل "منطقة رمادية" أمنية.

في ولايته الثانية، يواجه الرئيس دونالد ترامب منطقة الشرق الأوسط التي تشهد اضطرابات متعددة الأوجه وجمهورية إيران الإسلامية التي تمر حالياً بأضعف وأكثر مواقفها عزلة منذ تأسيس النظام في عام 1979. ومع ذلك، وبعيداً عن الخضوع الدائم، تواصل طهران الاقتراب من بناء سلاح نووي، وتحاول الحفاظ على شبكتها الإقليمية من الوكلاء والحلفاء غير الحكوميين. يواجه ترامب الآن خيارًا استراتيجيًا مهمًا بشأن سياسة إيران. يحلل هذا التقرير ثلاث ديناميات شاملة: التغيرات الاستراتيجية في الشرق الأوسط في 2023-2024؛ وتأثير هذه التغيرات على إيران وشبكة محور المقاومة؛ وموقف إيران الحالي ومكانتها في الداخل وفي المنطقة. ويختتم التقرير بسلسلة من التوصيات الاستراتيجية للإدارة الجديدة.

It is becoming apparent that negotiations between the new leadership in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face significant obstacles due to disagreements over military structure and administrative demands. These issues reflect the difficulty of reaching a mutual understanding between the two parties. As these challenges persist, there is growing talk of a potential military escalation in eastern Syria, amid residents’ fears and international mediation efforts to contain the crisis and achieve progress in the negotiations.

Syria’s first post-Assad protests broke out on Dec. 25 after a video claiming to show the destruction of an Alawite shrine spread rapidly across Facebook. The video was quickly debunked as several weeks old, the shrine only partially damaged, and the damage occurring during the capture of Aleppo city rather than in an act of sectarian vandalism. But those first hours were enough to stir up the widespread fears lingering just below the surface among Syria’s Alawite minority, bringing many Alawites (as well as Sunnis) to the streets to denounce sectarianism.

A very different Middle East will greet President-elect Trump this month compared to the region he experienced during his first term. However, there are opportunities to advance American interests for a more stable and less conflictual Middle East, which might not require the kind of intense US commitment we have seen over the last quarter-century.

Under former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Syrian security sector kept meticulous records of their crimes. The international community must now step up to help Syria’s new authorities secure and protect the documents, provide information to the loved ones of those who suffered in Assad’s prisons, and pursue justice.

On Dec. 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell. This is a fact, but it woefully understates the enormity, speed, and consequences of what has transpired. The brutal dictatorship that ruled Syria for more than 50 years disintegrated in fewer than 10 days. Celebrations erupted across public squares, thousands of Syrian refugees lined up at the borders of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon eager to return, and the release of political prisoners fueled hope for a new era after decades of despotism and conflict. However, concerns about Syria’s political future and territorial integrity quickly surfaced.

Half a century of rule by the Assad family in Syria collapsed astonishingly quickly after insurgents burst out of a rebel-held enclave and took Damascus in a matter of days. For Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, it was not fast enough. He has been waiting for this moment since the Syrian uprising in 2011 and is determined to reap the benefits of Bashar al-Assad’s ousting ahead of Turkey’s 2028 elections.

For nearly 14 years, Bashar al-Assad’s regime pursued a maniacal campaign of brutality against its own people, in order to suppress opposition through terror and mass killing. Beginning very early on, Assad’s military and security apparatus embraced what they called an “Assad or we burn the country” approach – but in truth, it was more Assad and we burn the country.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.