Research & Commentary Results

The USCGC Hamilton recently completed a visit around the Black Sea. This visit was notable for a couple of reasons. First, this was the first time the United States Coast Guard has operated in the Black Sea since 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia. Second, this U.S. deployment to the Black Sea came on the heels of a sizable Russian military buildup in the region.

The recent visit of Secretary Anthony Blinken and Under Secretary Victoria Nuland to Kiev demonstrated the urgency of Ukrainian security and Russian aggression. The visit, however, occurred on shaky grounds, with three main obstacles preventing Ukraine from making significant progress in its partnership with the U.S. First, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s limited progress on democratic reforms. Second, Western Europe’s lukewarm support for Ukraine and against Russian aggression. And third, Russia’s diversionary policy.

Russia’s key foreign policy dilemma is the tension between its aspirations of retaining its Soviet-era geopolitical clout and its lack of ideological and economic tools to achieve that goal. From a strategic standpoint, Russia’s campaign in Syria seems like an open-ended story that bears some resemblance to the situation in Ukraine. These similarities in Russia’s methods are not accidental. The Kremlin lacks the ability to impose its foreign policy blueprint on the West and can only leverage its power to stir up trouble in unstable regions.

President Joe Biden’s commitment to “stepping up” diplomacy to end the war in Yemen generated hope among peace practitioners and policy shapers. In February, the president appointed Tim Lenderking, a seasoned diplomat with solid experience in the region, as the U.S. special envoy to Yemen.

On Dec. 14, 2020, the Trump administration sanctioned Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), along with key individuals involved in the purchase of the Russian–made S-400 surface-to-air missile system. The sanctions were issued under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a law intended to punish Russia for a wide range of malign activities.

الرغم من مرور أكثر من عامين على تحرير مخيم الباغوز في محافظة ديرالزور، والذي كان آخر معاقل تنظيم “داعش” في سورية، ومحاولات التحالف الدولي وحليفته الإدارة الذاتية ارساء الاستقرار في مناطق شرق الفرات ومنع عودة التنظيم إلى واجهة الأحداث، إلا أن التنظيم لازال يمارس نشاطه وعملياته الأمنية في المنطقة، والتي تشهد تزايداً ملحوظاً مع مرور الزمن خاصة في العامين الأخيرين.

Although many policymakers and commentators in the West tend to see Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin as often working together, history shows us that the natural state of affairs between Russia and Turkey is one of competition, confrontation, and even conflict.
Recent geopolitical events remind us of this. However, there is another area to keep an eye on that serves as a historical and cultural fault line of Turkish and Russian geopolitical rivalry: the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia located in southern Moldova.

At the end of Joe Biden’s first 100 days as president of the United States, where do things stand when it comes to U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa? We asked experts and scholars from across MEI to weigh in with their thoughts on the changes we’ve seen so far, the new challenges that have emerged, and what we know about the administration’s key priorities for the region. 

A spotlight has been cast over the Black Sea region for the past two decades. Located at the geopolitical junction of Western Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, the Black Sea littoral states have partnered with Western powers on global counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism efforts. Simultaneously, the Black Sea region continues to face insecurities triggered by enduring great power competition. The importance of stability in the Black Sea region has long been recognized by the West.

There are three clear steps the Biden administration must take if it hopes to de-escalate the crisis with Russia in Eastern Europe without being drawn into conflict. First, recognize that the Normandy Format has failed. Second, take the lead on peace negotiations with Russia. And third, shape a strategy for the Black Sea region.

It’s easy to see why there’s an enduring attraction for a regional security dialogue in the Middle East. Countries in the region face shared and borderless challenges — including terrorism, insurgency, environmental safety, arms races, cybersecurity, maritime piracy, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — that can be dealt with more effectively through multilateral measures.

Up until late on Tuesday, April 13, Russia seemed poised to invade Ukraine. An eleventh hour phone call between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin – and a non-specific agreement between the two to hold a bilateral summit – seems to have halted Moscow’s military for now. But an expanding presence of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine in the Eastern Donbas region and Crimea continues. Concurrently, the Black Sea is turning into a Russian lake due to a buildup of Russian naval power. This has more than one observer asking just how soon a full-scale invasion of Ukraine could become reality – and what follows next from such a conflict.

“في حين أنه من المفهوم أن نرغب في عودة كافة قواتنا إلى الوطن، فلا ينبغي أن يكون ذلك على حساب خسارة ما حاربنا لكي نربحه”.

The response of the Russian government to the Arab uprisings that began in January 2011 has aimed primarily at protecting its interests in the Middle East, including security and economic objectives.[1] Nonetheless, it has pursued different approaches over time: an initial period of observation and political pressure between 2011 and 2015, followed by more active policies thereafter. This essay explains the reasons for this shift and argues that Russia’s policies since 2015 are likely to continue, despite domestic and external challenges.

The U.S.-Israel relationship is a close partnership founded on shared national security interests as well as democratic values. Washington’s commitment to the security and wellbeing of the state of Israel is exceptional, and bilateral ties remain strong despite the erosion of support for Israel among progressive and isolationist circles in the U.S. In spite of all this, the Iran issue presents many pitfalls for miscalculation that could derail even the most well-intended efforts at formulating a coordinated U.S.-Israel strategy.