Research & Commentary Results

منذ بداية الانتفاضة السورية مايو 2011 وحتى صيف العام 2015، فشلت الميليشيات الإيرانية إلى جانب الجيش السوري والميليشيات المحلية في إعادة السيطرة على البلاد، على الرغم من العدد الهائل لمجموع هذه القوات أمام المتمردين الذين كانت حركتهم فوضوية في مقابل أجهزة أمنية وقوات منظمة، حيث سيطرت هذه القوات المتمردة على النظام السوري مساحات واسعة من سوريا.

The Russian military intervention in Syria in late 2015 brought about a clear change in the balance of power in the military, political, and psychological spheres. The Russian military, especially its air force, dramatically tipped the scales in the conflict between the armed opposition, the regime, and the Iranian militias. Moscow’s intervention was also accompanied by a project to regain control over the security and military situation in Syria, but this effort proved far less successful.

The decision to withdraw the relatively small number of U.S. troops from a supporting role to our Afghan partners to preserve our hard-fought-for gains in Afghanistan was a mistake.

Even the most ardent supporters of President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan recognize the inherent tension in his policy. Biden promised Afghanistan’s top leaders in a recent meeting at the White House that he would maintain U.S. material support to the country. But ensuring a “sustained” partnership with a politically fragile Afghan government requires first and foremost an Afghan force that’s capable of defending that government, providing some security across the country, containing the Taliban, and preventing terrorists from once again setting up shop and plotting attacks worldwide like they did on 9/11. 

Russkyi Mir is an ideological construct and foreign policy concept defined in the first mandate of President Vladimir Putin. While not regulated through legislation or policy, the concept is popular among Russian political thinkers and ideologists as a way to shape Russia’s relationship with the world. It is also often referred to in speeches by the president, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and other key figures.

War does not end with the last bullet unloaded or agreement papers signed. Wars continue years after peace but in different ways: demining minefields, prosecuting criminals, fighting discrimination of minorities, and steering wartime narratives. Unfortunately, the longer a conflict goes on, the harder it is to achieve peace. This report provides an overview of the consequences (or ‘costs’) of the war in Donbas, Ukraine. It offers a concise overview of the key historical and economic developments surrounding the war, culminating in two major points. First, the main costs in the region arise because of a policy driven humanitarian crisis. Second, Ukrainian society is still polarized on critical issues.

The forces and agencies of Kurdistan’s Ministry of Interior and the Kurdistan Region Security Council, collectively referred to the Kurdistan Region Interior Forces, are now the region’s main security actors, but their role as instruments of partisan rivalry and enforcers of public loyalty to the political bureaus threatens the Kurdistan Region’s stability. This report makes the case that coalition security sector reform efforts should be refocused on them. Although Peshmerga reform is necessary to improve the Kurdistan Region’s ability to combat external threats, it is equally, if not more important to start the same reform within these internal forces and agencies to achieve durable stability.

It has been more than a decade since Georgia was promised eventual membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. At the time, NATO did not act decisively on granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP). A few months after the Summit, Russia invaded Georgia and continues to occupy Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (more commonly known as South Ossetia). After years of economic, governance, and military reforms, this partial occupation remains the primary roadblock to meaningful progress on Georgia’s NATO aspirations. Other NATO members do not want to risk a confrontation with Russia by inviting Georgia to join the Alliance.

مهما كانت شدة محاولات الحكومة العراقية لتوجيه البلاد بعيدًا عن الصراع الإيراني الأمريكي، فإن الميليشيات العراقية المدعومة من إيران ستظل تسحبها مجددًا لهذا الصراع

The Turkish government recently confirmed that the country has approved development plans to carve a new passage between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Cutting through forests and farmland, the new Canal Istanbul would run parallel to the Bosphorus for a total of 45 km (28 miles) with a depth of 20.75 meters (68 feet) and a width of 275-350 meters (900 to 1150 feet). Ground-breaking for the first bridge over the proposed canal is scheduled to take place on June 26. However, this will be a ceremony for domestic political consumption and by no means indicates that construction is really starting. Financing the massive project might prove impossible due to the environmental concerns and investment risks hanging over it.

According to reporting from The Washington Post, Russia is set to provide Iran with a high-tech satellite called Kanopus-V. Russia will launch the satellite from its territory and then hand over control to an Iranian crew that received essential training in Russia. Iran will control the satellite from a newly built facility in Alborz Province, near Tehran.

Tbilisi and Washington have in recent years built a strong strategic partnership. Yet, a myriad of threats imposed by Russia on Georgia and the Black Sea region – including a continued “borderization” policy, modernization of the Black Sea Fleet, and attempts to transform the Black Sea into an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone – call for a review of U.S. policy toward Georgia and the wider Black Sea region.

One of the first foreign policy decisions facing Israel’s new government will be if it wants to maintain or modify the policy spearheaded by Netanyahu to counter the United States’ determined effort to return to the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Moreover, the new government needs to assess how successful the maximalist approach Israel has embraced since the negotiations between Iran and the great powers began about two decades ago has been, and to what extent it has pushed the international community to refrain from making concessions and compromises vis à vis Iran.

The force is the United States’ best partner in the country, but should Washington pay up?

Over the course of two weeks in May and June, the Middle East Institute hosted its inaugural Lebanon policy conference in collaboration with the American Task Force on Lebanon (ATFL) and LIFE. This series of events brought together leading diplomats, policymakers, economists, development practitioners, and think tank professionals from the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and Lebanon to discuss the urgency and viable paths forward for the country’s political, financial, and humanitarian crises.