Research & Commentary Results

“Deeds matter most” was the official diplomatic response to Joe Biden’s election from the Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif. It came in the form of an early morning Tweet, an appropriate medium given the new political norm established in recent years. The statement read like one from a career diplomat urging “dignity, interest, and responsible diplomacy,” based not on empty rhetoric, but on actions — measurable steps that would demonstrate each side’s commitment to “multilateralism, cooperation, respect for law …” Yet the tweet’s author, Mr. Zarif, has a history of practicing the age-old political principle of “do as I say, not as I do.” Indeed, when it comes to U.S.-Iran relations, the month of November is the perfect time to assess each side’s deeds in this decades-old conflict. Bombastic rhetoric has been a hallmark of this rancorous relationship since Islamic revolutionaries stormed America’s embassy in Tehran in early November 41 years ago. Yet for all the regime’s bluster, including slogans like “Death to America,” its deeds, especially toward Iranians, speak much more loudly.

In recent years of the Syrian crisis, the reluctance of NATO states to take decisive action to secure their interests and protect Syrian lives has had drastic repercussions in both Syria and the wider region. Where NATO members have shown indecisiveness and a refusal to engage, their geopolitical rivals, Iran and Russia, have seized the moment and cemented their influence. However, as the regime is challenged by a crippling economic crisis, a new U.S. administration may offer an opening for the U.S. and its NATO allies to develop a collective approach in Syria that will secure their interests and bolster regional security.

Despite fresh comments from Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah that Joe Biden’s victory in the U.S. elections would not dramatically alter America’s pro-Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East, Hezbollah appears largely optimistic of its future under the new administration. The Party of God seems wary of the next few months, however, until President Donald Trump leaves the White House in January. While Hezbollah will certainly benefit from a reboot in diplomatic relations between the U.S and Iran, which could translate into much-needed liquidity for the organization and a strengthening of its internal position, it still faces numerous domestic challenges that money alone cannot solve.

Iranian military advisers and pro-Iran foreign proxy groups are present from Yemen and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Tens of thousands of armed men operating across the Middle East look to Tehran for guidance and patronage. This sort of sway has made Iran into a regional power broker — at least in the Arab world. But Tehran’s deep ideological and financial investments in Arab states have come at the expense of neglecting Iranian interests closer to home. 

Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to play a larger role in the Black Sea region. China has been wooing littoral states in hopes of securing new markets for its goods and investing in infrastructure projects. But some worry that there is more to Chinese actions in the region than meets the eye. The worry is that China will increase its political and diplomatic clout in a region that is considered vital for Russian interests and create tension between Moscow and Washington. Despite the uneasiness in the West about China’s increasing presence in the Black Sea, there is not enough focus on the issue in the scholarly debates in Western capitals. The MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative aims to contribute to the debate on the role of China in the Black Sea. We hope the articles in this report will help to address several important unaddressed questions.

In 2018, Assad’s Syrian government forces, with Russian support, managed to regain control of opposition-held areas in Daraa. Russia has emerged as the primary power broker by arranging agreements between the rebels and the regime, which, in turn, has allowed the rebels to keep some of their arms under the banner of the Russian-formed Eighth Brigade. Nevertheless, since 2018, the tight-knit tribal networks in Daraa have functioned as a nucleus for the continuation of the uprising against the Assad regime. The same tribal attributes that create interconnectedness among the people of Daraa, however, also render them susceptible to the regime’s strategy of pitting clans against each other and leveraging the resulting strife to justify the use of force with the goal of asserting full control.

Though the war in Afghanistan largely went unmentioned in the U.S. presidential race, the incoming Joe Biden administration must make a major decision in the coming weeks and months on whether to follow through on the U.S. commitment to withdraw all troops from the country by the end of April 2021.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Marvin G. Weinbaum, Hafsa Halawa, Robert S. Ford, and Thomas W. Lippman.

What does a Biden presidency mean for the economy of Iran? The short answer is: not much. While the Iranian public considers his election good news for the country, these sentiments are fleeting and will soon fade. The reason is simple: Even if Joe Biden decides to reengage with Iran or reenter the 2015 nuclear deal on his first day in office, a Biden presidency will not change many crippling realities for the Iranian economy.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Gonul Tol, Gerald Feierstein, Randa Slim, Khaled Elgindy, Charles Lister, Mirette F. Mabrouk, and Marvin G. Weinbaum.

When a Biden administration begins to settle into its offices in just a few months, Syria’s crisis will have reached a dreadful milestone, marking a decade in March 2021. Though many of President Biden’s senior team presided over U.S. policy throughout Syria’s most deadly years of 2011-16, it is clear that the tragedy that has befallen Syria and its extraordinary global ramifications are a source of sincere regret. Moreover, after four years of the Trump administration, during which American leverage has been repeatedly and illogically spurned and U.S. credibility eroded by repeatedly embarrassing flip-flops, there is a newfound determination to correct today’s trajectory and work determinedly toward the core objectives of defeating ISIS and pursuing a negotiated Syrian settlement.

As the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh rages between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey once again find themselves on opposite sides in a regional geopolitical war. With the reverberations from the fighting now spreading across the region, the fate of Idlib could be tied to battles elsewhere as Moscow potentially seeks to open up another front against Ankara.    

In areas under the control of both the Syrian regime and Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) in Deir ez-Zor Province, the governing bodies are failing to secure the loyalty and support of locals. The security structures built by the regime and the AANES have coopted and incorporated local tribes to a significant extent, but a lack of support from the central governing bodies amid increasing ISIS attacks threatens long-term stability in the province. These two regional dynamics are outlined and compared in this paper to illustrate the dual challenges both governance bodies face in appealing to locals and thwarting the resurgence of ISIS in the area.