Research & Commentary Results

On October, 16, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif set his country’s politics ablaze by offering a withering critique of the military establishment. Calling in from London via video conference, Sharif addressed a crowd of over 20,000 protestors at a rally in the Punjabi city of Gujranwalla organized by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PMD), a recently formed coalition that brings together all major opposition parties. Under the PMD’s banner, erstwhile rivals like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam–Fazlur (JUI-F) have joined forces to achieve two goals that they see as intertwined: unseating Prime Minister Imran Khan and regaining power from the military.

At a rally in Florida, Donald Trump stated that Iran will be the first country to call to him after his reelection because the Iranians are “dying for a deal.” National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien added that “it is very difficult for Iran to refuse to negotiate” because “Iran cannot sustain economic pain much longer and… we don’t think they can hang in there for another four years.”

There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has had serious negative impacts on Iran’s economy and that the country is experiencing a crisis. But, if the past is any indication, the sanctions or economic pressure will not be the main drivers of Tehran’s decision-making if it decides to compromise with the United States. To imagine that a deal is in the offing due to Iran’s dire economic straits seems simplistic.  

While most experts believe that the recent normalization of ties between Israel and the UAE will not lead to a significant change in the regional balance of power, there are indications that it has the potential to bring about such a change in the long run.

As the U.S. prepares to head to the polls to choose its next president, Iran finds itself at a dead end. Hit hard by American sanctions and its own mismanagement of the economy, Tehran needs to negotiate with Washington to get out of its current economic crisis and shore up its waning popular legitimacy. With an eye to addressing these issues and mindful of the steady erosion of support for the government, President Hassan Rouhani has obtained permission from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to negotiate with the U.S. While the news has not yet been made public, Rouhani has told Ayatollah Khamenei that he will begin talks to reach an agreement with the winner of the upcoming election — regardless of who it is — and the Iranian leader has given his initial consent.

Since May 2019, a series of Syrian loyalist offensives backed by the Russian air force has gradually encroached upon the country’s northwestern Idlib Province, home to the last major pocket of opposition-held territory. As the chief rebel group in control of Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has employed dozens of suicide car bombs as part of its continued defense of the area. Formally known as suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), these weapons have been a cornerstone of the group’s — and by extension, the entire opposition’s — military strategy since early stages of the war, when rebel forces began capturing and holding territory. In an attempt to further understand this strategy and how it has evolved over time, this case study seeks to compare and contrast HTS’s past and current use of SVBIEDs, with a heavy focus on the latter. It will also examine HTS’s evolving SVBIED design, paying particular attention to technical innovations such as environment-specific paint schemes, drone support teams, tablets with target coordinates, and live camera feeds, as well as upgraded main charges.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Jonathan M. Winer, Gonul Tol, Mohammed Soliman, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Elizabeth Dent, Mirette F. Mabrouk, and Robert S. Ford.

Ultimately, those set to suffer the most in this game of “poker” are Idlib’s enormous population of 3 million civilians.

Charles Lister and Jomana Qaddour join host Alistair Taylor in a discussion about the current situation in Syria, US policy under the Trump administration, and what lies ahead following the presidential election.

Last month, the Netherlands announced its intent to hold Syria responsible for gross human rights violations and torture under the U.N. Convention against Torture (CAT). With only one other case — Belgium v. Senegal — brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the CAT, the Netherlands is entering relatively uncharted waters. Indeed, it would be the first country to litigate the substance of Article 1 of the Convention. While it is unlikely that the Netherlands’ claims will reach the ICJ for another year or more, its announcement serves as an important step in the push for broader accountability in Syria.

As attacks by ISIS increase in both Iraq and Syria, the upcoming U.S. presidential election offers a turning point for how U.S. foreign policy will seek to address a potential ISIS resurgence. This paper lays out this growing problem and recommends policy, which will be constrained by the outcome of the November election.

With a presidential election looming in the United States, the continuing crisis in Syria is unlikely to make headlines. Aside from the COVID-19 pandemic, raging wildfires, and the occasional flare-up of violence in Idlib, Syria has been largely off the radar in the U.S. for quite some time. Yet dramatic new revelations suggest that Syria could be on the administration’s agenda more prominently as President Donald Trump makes a serious, if desperate, move to secure American hostages thought by U.S. officials to be held in Damascus.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Charles Lister, Ruba Husari, Marvin G. Weinbaum, and W. Robert Pearson.

In recent years Turkey has launched three incursions into Syria and become increasingly involved abroad.

On June 17, 2020, the U.S. State Department’s special envoy to Syria, Joel Rayburn, announced the beginning of the “summer of Caesar,” promising a wave of sanctions designations under the newly activated Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. Summer has come and gone, but there’s little to show for it.

The Caesar Civilian Protection Act sanctions on Syria, which were signed into law by U.S. President Donald Trump in December and took effect on June 17, have polarized the international community. Most European countries have supported the Caesar Act’s use of sanctions to punish Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for war crimes, but Russia and China have stridently criticized the legislation.