Debunking Five Myths of Washington’s Leverage in Egypt
This article was first published by Al-Monitor on April 28, 2013
Assertions and opinions in this publication are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
When Mohamed Morsi assumed the mantle of first democratically-elected, civilian president of Egypt, he both resigned from the Freedom and Justice Party‑‑the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood‑‑and declared himself “president of all Egyptians.” Now, only ten months later, the country’s Coptic Christians are undoubtedly sneering at the insincerity of Morsi’s initial gestures toward magnanimity.
The Egyptian judiciary is facing enormous challenges and hardships while striving to perform its essential role, not only as a judicial institution, but also as a constitutional authority standing alongside the executive and legislative branches. Its difficulties can be seen in a range of problems with which it has been struggling both before and since the outbreak of the revolution in January 2011.
The Case for Women’s Rights in Post-Uprising Egypt
When Egyptian women first gained the vote in 1956, a woman in the cabinet swiftly followed. Women likely thought that all would be clear sailing from that point on, but it hasn’t quite worked out that way. Almost 70 years later, only one woman is in the cabinet.
In March, Egypt’s public prosecutor announced the summoning of five members of the largely unknown group the Black Bloc.[1] The group, which takes its inspiration from “black blocs” the world round who wear black masks in order to protest anonymously, is known for such actions as halting public transportation and aiding people in distress.
The Predicament of the Obama Administration and the Muslim Brotherhood
Al-Ahram columnist Ahmed al-Beri wrote on 23 March that “while the United States has often been supportive of President Mohamed Morsi’s regime, Egypt’s security and economic deterioration may be forcing it to reevaluate this support.”[1] Such thoughts are not exclusively al-Beri’s; they are dominating intellectual circles inside Egypt. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as the new political warhorse in Egypt has complicated a delicate strategic relationship between Cairo and Washington.
Mohamed Yousry Salama passed away from stomach disease on 24 March 2013. The 39-year-old had been a spokesperson for the Salafi al-Nour Party immediately following Egypt’s revolution. After falling out with members of the party, he resigned in August 2011 and eventually co-founded the Dostour Party with such progressive political figures as Mohamed ElBaradei, George Ishaq, and Gamila Ismail.
The Egyptian Islamist Mohamed al-Zawahiri is most famous for being the brother of al-Qaeda front man Ayman, but his story is also a gripping one. Zawahiri was arrested in 1999 for his alleged participation in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.
For over 30 years Egypt’s foreign policy has stood on three key pillars: building strategic relations with the United States, maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, and promoting the security of Arab states in the Gulf. The presidency and the security apparatus, moreover, have often overshadowed and minimized the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the policymaking process. These pillars solidified under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, and as a result President Mohamed Morsi will not be able to uproot them anytime soon.
Since the most recent but now routine eruptions of violence between street protesters and Egypt’s state, speculation has swirled about the durability of the pact between the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s armed forces.
When President Mohamed Morsi granted himself sweeping new powers last November, he unwittingly accomplished something no one had yet achieved. He managed to bring Egypt’s fractious and disparate political factions together around a single cause: bitterly opposing him and his Muslim Brotherhood.
When I moved to Cairo in 1981 I discovered a courtly and safe city. The streets were alive with playful banter, expressions of the renowned Egyptian joie de vivre. Men who wished to attract the attention of lady passers-by sang bits of love songs or called them things like “minaret” and “gazelle.”
