East Med gas needs clean tech and regional integration to support investment case
The viability of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources has long been a source of debate for reasons including cost considerations, market demand, and regional geopolitical tensions. The past couple of years have further complicated the debate, introducing new questions about the role of these resources in supporting post-pandemic economic recovery or helping more advanced markets achieve net-zero policies by replacing coal and other fuel sources (a particularly relevant topic of debate given Europe and Asia are key export targets for East Med gas).
With Iran, American policymakers have often chased phantoms in search of solutions to problems they did not understand. This futile shadow-chase continues when “experts” argue that the U.S. should somehow encourage the break-up of Iran on ethnic or linguistic lines. This idea is simply wrong.
Baghdad, Beirut, and the politics of Lebanon’s power crisis
On July 24, Beirut and Baghdad signed a governmental framework agreement under which Iraq pledged 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to Lebanon over a full year.
Lebanon’s power crisis is on the agenda, as Arab Gas Pipeline quartet prepares to meet in Amman
These developments come against the backdrop of multiple U.S. hints that Washington is potentially willing to circumvent sanctioning the participating parties under the Caesar Act.
Iran’s President Raisi takes over a ruined country
On Aug. 25, Iran’s parliament voted on the cabinet of its new president, Ebrahim Raisi, approving 18 out of the 19 ministers put forward. Raisi’s government is full of revolutionaries likely to adopt a hardline approach to domestic and international affairs, leading to heightened geopolitical risk and potentially prolonging the country’s economic crisis.
Under President Ebrahim Raisi, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is poised to exert greater control over Iran’s national security agenda and economy. Several of his ministers and advisors were members of the IRGC or have connections to it.
Sectarianism and ideology: The cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia
Many analysts oversimplify the political conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia as one driven by sectarianism or Shi’a-Sunni tensions that has shaped the two states’ outlook and actions in the Middle East. However, their political differences are actually much more complex and deeper rooted.
The July 29 suicide drone attack on the Israeli oil tanker Mercer Street, which left two British and Romanian crewmembers dead in the Arabian Sea, was carried out by Iran and was intended to cause human casualties and physical damage, according to the investigative report from U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM). While Tehran denied any hand in the strike, the G7 directly blamed Iran and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised a “collective response.”
Iranian women campaign to stop the rise in “honor killings”
Every year 400-500 women are killed brutally in Iran to protect men’s “honor.” The killers are usually close relatives — often the victim’s father, husband, or brother. According to a report published in The Lancet in October 2020, at least 8,000 such killings were reported in Iran between 2010 and 2014. “The number of honor killing victims is greater than reported as in some cases women were driven to suicide or the cause of the death was not reported as murder but as illness,” according to Dr. Rezvan Moghadam, founder of the Iranian organization Stop Honor Killings. Dr. Moghadam has documented more than 1,200 cases of honor killings in the country. According to research, which will soon be published as a book and made available to the public, these kinds of violent killings of women and girls have been increasing for the last 20 years in different cities and villages in Iran.
At the dawn of the Biden era of American foreign policy, a more mature, realistic Saudi foreign policy is emerging to match the shifting signals from Washington. In some measure, the Saudis are readopting elements that traditionally characterized their policy preferences before the meteoric rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the kingdom’s de facto ruler.
Since 1979 U.S. policies toward Iran have alternatively ranged from some version of “maximum pressure” to appeasement and back again while maintaining the same assumptions and calculus: the clerics would ultimately fall when the elite and middle class had enough and were willing to pay the price for revolting. Today, however, the landscape is evolving. While Iran’s leaders appear to be adapting, U.S. thinking is rooted in the past.
Hezbollah, America, and the race to supply Lebanon with power
Amid typical governmental absenteeism, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced on Aug. 19 that the party had secured fuel shipments from Iran. He asserted that the first of many fuel tankers would set sail to Lebanon that same day. Hours later, U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea declared that the U.S. was working closely with Egypt, Jordan, and the World Bank to find solutions to Lebanon’s crippling fuel shortages. Shea’s comments imply a U.S. willingness to loosen Caesar Act restrictions that would otherwise prevent Lebanon from importing natural gas and electricity through Syria from Egypt and Jordan respectively. The two announcements have been in the making for weeks, but both come at a time when Lebanon’s physical and human infrastructure is crumbling in the absence of essential fuel supplies and energy sources.
