The killing of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh marks a major turning point in Yemen’s ongoing civil war. Nadwa Al-Dawsari (POMED) and Gerald Feierstein (MEI) join Paul Salem to discuss the immediate fallout and what lies ahead.
The war in Yemen is reshaping the armed forces of Arab Gulf states. It is the first time that Emirati and Saudi elite units are leading a war effort in their bid to counter Yemeni Houthi rebels and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well as a counterterrorism campaign against jihadi groups, mainly Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
November 13, 2017 – The crisis between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon and the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri appears to be largely about Yemen, says Paul Salem, Sr. Vice President for Policy Analysis, Research, and Programs at the Middle East Institute.
Last weekend’s arrests of prominent Saudi government officials and leading businessmen on charges of corruption has sent shockwaves through Saudi society as well as global center of finance and commerce. The developments also impacted Lebanon, with Prime Minister Saad Hariri announcing his resignation from the Saudi capital of Riyadh. MEI experts Gerald Feierstein, Jean-Francois Seznec, and Randa Slim join Paul Salem to discuss these developments.
Read the full op-ed on The New York Times.
For decades, Saudi Arabia was a stable and reliable economic and strategic partner of the United States. That country no longer exists.
Summary
Only several months after the Saudi-led military coalition waged its ongoing campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in March 2015, the United Nations began issuing warnings about famine. Today, millions of Yemenis are on the brink of famine, with about half a million suffering from a cholera outbreak. This paper analyzes the causes of Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe and offers the Trump administration recommendations for helping the impoverished Arab state avoid a famine.
Chinese leaders emphasize that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is focused on developing connectivity through inclusive cooperation. Yet, certain BRI projects have potential strategic outcomes that can affect regional power dynamics. Thus, States that might otherwise be inclined to cooperate with China on the BRI could perceive elements of the initiative to run counter to their interests. This essay shows that, in considering the BRI, the leaders of the Gulf Arab countries have to balance their increasingly important relationship with China against the ways this initiative empowers rivals or threatens their relations with important external powers.
The Trump administration has decided to lift most sanctions on Sudan, according to a report in the Washington Post, October 6. The move reflects a range of administration priorities, including a desire to isolate North Korea further as well as to use sanctions relief rather than the sanctions themselves to leverage additional Sudanese reforms.
Prime Minister Modi’s 2015 visit to the U.A.E. and subsequent events have seen India’s view of the region undergo a fundamental shift. This essay, the first of two parts, shows how New Delhi has come to regard the Gulf more as a source of investment and less as a source of energy and visas; and has begun to take a more strategic and military view of the region.
In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Paul Salem, Gerald Feierstein, Randa Slim, Bilal Y. Saab, and Jean-François Seznec provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including tensions between Washington and Cairo over Egypt’s excessive authoritarian crackdown, Russia’s attempt to help mediate the G.C.C. crisis, the likely postponement of the Kurdish independence referendum, the performance of the Lebanese Army in anti-ISIS operations, and the Iraqi oil minister’s trip to Moscow to discuss oil production cuts.
In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Paul Salem, Gonul Tol, Alex Vatanka, and Jonathan M. Winer provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic engagements in the region, Turkey’s consideration of military operations in northern Syria, Iranian President Rouhani’s centrist cabinet nominations, and Libyan leaders’ decision between greater cooperation or renewed confrontation.
The crisis which has engulfed the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) states since June 5, 2017, leading to an unprecedented diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar, has effectively split the Gulf into three camps, fracturing the uneasy yet much-lauded unity of an alliance which has long prided itself on stability and security. This essay offers a possible explanation for Bahrain’s contradictory position regarding the crisis, and considers whether Manama can maintain it.
The ongoing Saudi-led blockade of Qatar came as a surprise to the international community, including the European Union. When Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Egypt, and Bahrain cut ties with the Qatari monarchy, the E.U. found itself in a new and complex political reality. Though the intra-Gulf crisis had been simmering for quite a long time, it seems that the Europeans were not prepared for such a scenario. Ultimately, Europe must consider the severity of the current crisis’ potential diplomatic and economic consequences.
The ongoing Qatar crisis poses a major dilemma for Kuwait and Oman. Consistent with their “neutral” foreign policies, these two Arab Gulf states have maintained ties with Doha and seek to resolve the gravest internal Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) row since the organization’s establishment in 1981. Officials in Kuwait City and Muscat fear that failure to settle the Qatar crisis will break up the council, which would directly undermine vital Kuwaiti and Omani national interests given the potential for such a scenario to dramatically exacerbate regional geopolitical instability.