Research & Commentary Results

A senior Iraqi Shiite leader has rejected reports that he plans to visit Saudi Arabia, telling Iranian journalists that he will only visit the Kingdom if Saudi troops leave Bahrain and Yemen. “Saudi Arabia recently sent a message to me through a mediator asking if I would go to meet this country’s leaders if they invite me. I responded by saying that if their gift to me is leaving Bahrain and ending the killing of Yemen’s innocent people, I will certainly accept. Of course, this request was rejected by them.

With the fall of Mosul, Iranian-supported Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (P.M.F.) is preparing for post-Islamic State Iraq. The paramilitary forces have recently launched a professional public relations campaign on the Internet and social media aimed at justifying and legitimizing P.M.F.’s existence beyond the collapse of the Islamic State. Should the P.M.F. prevail in this effort, it will mark a victory for the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.), which has aided P.M.F. groups for years and sees them crucial for its influence in Iraq in the future.

Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, Tehran has encouraged and contributed to the formation of countless Shiite militia groups in Iraq. While most of these armed groups are now formally organized under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (P.M.F.), they have in reality remained independent entities and are not controlled by the civilian government in Baghdad.

But has Tehran committed a strategic blunder by fracturing the Iraqi Shiite armed groups or does the existence of competing Shiite Iraqi militias benefit the Islamic Republic?

Qais al-Khazali, the secretary-general of Iraq’s Asaib ahl al-Haq armed group, has accused the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey of supporting the Islamic State in Iraq and the broader region, according to Iran’s Fars News Agency. “The heroic forces of Hashd al-Shaabi [Popular Mobilization Forces] easily chop the heads of these forces,” he said while describing the Islamic State as the “special forces” of the United States and its allies.

Prominent Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s weekend visit to Saudi Arabia has raised concerns in Tehran. While the Iranian government and media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.) largely refrained from commenting on Sadr’s trip and his meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, some conservative newspapers and Iranian analysts cautioned that the Saudi government is attempting to court Iraqi Shiite leaders to influence Iraqi politics at the expense of Iran’s interests.

Leaning toward Riyadh?

In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Randa Slim, Paul Salem, and Marvin G. Weinbaum analyze new Saudi diplomatic engagement with Iraq, the escalating G.C.C. crisis, and the continuation of dynastic politics in Pakistan.

Saudi Reaches out to Iraqi Shiite Leaders
Randa Slim, Director of the Initiative for Track II Dialogues

The Saudi-led Arab Peace Initiative is losing its value in the wake of Egypt’s decision to return the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia, and the latter’s participation as a security guarantor of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

Last month, the Egyptian parliament, bucking widespread public and institutional opposition, acknowledged Saudi sovereignty over the islands.

Most attention has focused on the dispute over sovereignty, which has been under Egyptian administration for more than half a century. But the real significance of the deal lies elsewhere.

In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Eran Etzion, W. Robert Pearson, Charles Lister, Alex Vatanka, and Randa Slim weigh in on the implications of Israel-Palestinian violence for U.S. foreign policy, Turkish involvement in the Gulf crisis, al-Qaeda’s response to the U.S. decision to terminate support for a program arming anti-Assad Syrian rebels, confrontational U.S. policy towards the Iran nuclear deal, and a former Iraqi Prime Minister’s power play.

In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Charles Lister, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Yousef Munayyer, and Alex Vatanka provide analysis on recent events including the battle for Mosul, corruption in Pakistan, Mahmoud Abbas’s trip to China, and Rouhani’s difficult second presidential term.

Mosul Turning Ugly, Raqqa Front Slows
Charles Lister, Resident Fellow

This essay discusses the recent spate of attacks upon and heightened sense of insecurity felt by Egyptian Coptic Christians. The essay focuses on Copts’ growing frustration with state authorities’ responses to their grievances.

Iran’s Islamic Azad University (IAU) plans to open new branches in Lebanon and Iraq, according to Ali Akbar Velayati, the head of the university’s board of founders and an influential political figure in the Islamic Republic.

Jordan’s conspicuous silence over the unexpected trilateral rapprochement involving Hamas, Egypt, and former Fatah strongman Mohammad Dahlan does not mean that Amman is not keeping a close eye on recent developments. It is an unusual partnership that brings together once bitter foes, especially in the case of Dahlan and Hamas.

On Monday, the head of Iran’s Quds Force revealed that the country’s defense ministry worked over time in recent years to manufacture weapons to equip Iraq’s Army and the Hashd al-Shaabi – the Iraqi paramilitary forces also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces [P.M.F.] – in their fight against the Islam

A senior Iranian military official said on Tuesday that the liberation of the Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State sounded “the death knell for the divisive plots” of the United States and its regional allies, the Iranian media reported.

A commander of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (P.M.F.) – also known as Hashd al-Shaabi – has said that the paramilitary forces will not agree to the presence of American forces or foreign private security firms in post-Islamic State Iraq, particularly in regions near the Syrian border. “The central government has almost agreed to Blackwater controlling the borders. But Blackwater doesn’t have the authority and resources to control the borders or fight Daesh [Islamic State].