Research & Commentary Results

The following article addresses the question of how the Middle East might develop in the coming decade. Long-term and detailed strategic predictions are a thankless task and are often doomed to failure. Therefore, this article refrains from attempts at prophecy but deals instead with “thinking about the future.” It opens with an analytical framework for scenario development, supplemented by “trends impact” and “horizon scanning.” The second section studies “the futures of the past,” in terms of what we might learn about the pitfalls of future projection and scenario-building from those outlining possible futures for 2020 from years past. Then, on the basis of the first two sections, four scenarios elaborate some distinctly different pathways that the Middle East might take to 2030. Finally, the article concludes with several key takeaways for Israeli decision makers.

There was little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. The new U.S. administration under President Joe Biden appears poised — based on staffing decisions and declared policies — to revert to a U.S. policy in the Middle East that more closely resembles that of Obama. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, who fought bitterly and publicly against Obama’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran nuclear issue, remains at the helm in Israel. The stage may be set for a sequel of the acrimonious relationship between Jerusalem and Washington.

On January 14, 2021, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted about Palestinian refugees, proclaiming “(less than) 200,000 Arabs displaced in 1948 are still alive and most others are not refugees by any rational criteria.” A month earlier, on December 11, a group of 22 Republican members of Congress sent a letter to President Trump requesting that he instruct the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to declassify a report on the approximate number of Palestinian refugees, with the intention of redefining and disenfranchising millions of Palestinian refugees of their refugee status. The intent behind the request is made evident by the letter, which states, “The issue of the so-called Palestinian ‘right of return’ of 5.3 million refugees to Israel as part of any ‘peace deal’ is an unrealistic demand, and we do not believe it accurately reflects the number of actual Palestinian refugees

“I have prepared the country for you for 20 years,” said Hafez al-Assad before his death in 2000, to his son Bashar. What did Hafez mean and what are the implications for the future of Syria, now that presidential elections loom once more?

More destabilization and human suffering is certain unless the Biden administration is ready to respond to Russian efforts that would impede aid flows and reinforce Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

For years pundits have argued that Palestinian elections cannot take place in the occupied territories until there is reconciliation between the warring factions of Fatah and Hamas. The conflict between them led to the creation of two parallel governments, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas in charge of Gaza. This situation produced parallel laws and, most importantly, parallel security forces. While these differences remain unresolved, elections, which were once considered impossible without reconciliation, are now being used to achieve reconciliation. On January 11, a Palestinian presidential decree announced legislative elections for May 22 to be followed by presidential elections on July 31.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

This report discusses the results of the 2020 Syrian parliamentary elections to illuminate shifts in the al-Assad regime’s strategy to restore and maintain control over the country. Using evidence gathered from a range of sources, it sheds light on recent changes in the ethnic, religious, political, commercial, and military networks through which Syria’s dictatorship is sustained, and the future directions these shifts imply.

MEI’s Paul Salem and Ross Harrison join host Alistair Taylor to discuss what the Biden Administration can do to reduce regional tensions and proxy conflicts in the Middle East.

From the U.S. and the U.K. to Iraq and Syria, the way countries are handling the repatriation and prosecution of accused ISIS members echoes the policies that drove their citizens to seek a utopian Islamic State in the first place. Not only are the policies that pushed people to start joining the group in 2013 continuing, but in many cases they have increased in both scale and scope. While the current repatriation and prosecution policies are arguably counterproductive, they may also be fueling future terrorist activity and support for radical anti-government groups. To reduce the chances of such negative consequences, foreign governments must switch gears and adopt an entirely different approach before it is too late.

Washington must acknowledge that it can’t build a state.

With the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco signing normalisation agreements with Israel last year, the road to Israel’s integration into Centcom was paved.

Should nothing change, the loss of cross-border aid access and the absence of cross-line mechanisms to northern Syria could potentially leave over 4.5 million civilians without assistance — a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions.

As the Biden administration takes office, it faces a host of challenges, both at home and abroad. Where does the Middle East fit into all of this and what should the new administration prioritize in its first 200 days? In the second part of a two-part series, we asked experts and scholars from across the region to weigh in with their thoughts.