Research & Commentary Results

In the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, a U.S. Military MQ-9 drone fired multiple air-to-ground missiles and killed the commander of the elite Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani. The targeted killing of Soleimani was carried out as he left the Baghdad International Airport under overt military authorities. Given that the strike was carried out under this authority, it was publicized globally shortly after it was completed. There were other options available to target Soleimani, however.

In the aftermath of the latest round of U.S. and Iranian brinksmanship, hawks and liberals are interpreting developments as validating their positions. Hawks are claiming victory for “maximum pressure,” arguing how the U.S. strike against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani frightened the now weakened ruling clerics into submission. Liberals argue that Iran took the high road, demonstrating a willingness to respond to incentives and negotiate.

It is increasingly the case that the Russian-Turkish decisions on Idlib or Syria need to be understood as part of a broader Russian-Turkish partnership.

The Iranian pattern of ‘strategic patience’ has evidently transferred to its cyber activity, justifying vigilance, but not panic.

While they’re there, the United States should refocus the partnership toward making the Iraqi Army more self-sufficient. Here’s how.

Over the past two decades, Israel has developed robust bilateral relationships with China, India, and Singapore. Israel has also succeeded in forging ties with Japan and South Korea. More recently, Israel has devoted considerable attention to strengthening its relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar. Military-security cooperation in the form of arms trade as well as technology transfer and licensed production has emerged as an important dimension of Israel’s relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Trump has taken such a forward-leaning and aggressive position now that he has set himself, and the U.S., in a conflict trap that he might not be able to defuse.

To the west, the rapidly evolving situation in Libya is causing a major governmental migraine.

Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.

While yesterday’s vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives on a decision to remove U.S. forces is not legally binding, it creates dynamics inside the U.S. and Iraq that make a U.S. decision to remove its forces all but inevitable.

Erdogan may want to hold early elections in 2020 to mitigate the fallout of a worsening economy and deny the new parties enough time to organize.

Delays in achieving a peace deal will have consequences throughout Yemen, especially if the Houthi’s power remains unchecked.

Tehran will do what it can to avenge Soleimani’s death, to save face at home and abroad, but it will not seek a direct military confrontation.

The commitment by its foreign benefactors to underwrite the Afghan regime’s viability and ability to withstand Taliban insurgency is in serious doubt.

The UK’s impending exit from the EU will present a new chapter for British interests in and posture toward the region. If the UK is to find a trade-off for loss of diplomatic and economic heft, it will need to re-prioritize its engagement efforts. Policy continuity toward Morocco and Tunisia appears inevitable; Algeria, in contrast, promises great opportunity for an evolving relationship.