Neither encryption nor hacking tools are new, but 2019 has seen pointed scrutiny and rancor over both.
Introduced in August and subsequently delayed due to the country’s political upheaval, the National Lebanese Strategy for Cybersecurity is composed of two main sections: 1) preparation of a cybersecurity strategy and 2) establishment of a national cybersecurity agency.
The three uprisings in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon represent the revolt of a new generation seeking to build a better future for itself. Since 2011, there have been 11 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. All 11 uprisings have similar drivers: the explosive dysfunction of high demographic growth, low levels of economic development and job creation, poor government performance and services, and high levels of corruption and inequality.
Since 2017 three separate blocs have emerged within the Gulf. Driven by the region’s divisions, rival power centers, and conflicting interests, the Gulf states are playing an ever-greater role in Palestinian affairs.
The main — perhaps only — issue in Israeli politics now is the future of Netanyahu.
Given their territorial proximity, the regional actors of the Middle East have always had an interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus as a window to Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to Georgia’s isolation, and in the years since the country has gradually started reclaiming its historical role as a cultural and economic crossroads between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Two months into the popular uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon, both countries are mired in a painful standoff.
Attempts by the indicted Israeli leader to railroad through a joint U.S.-Israel defense treaty in opposition to the Palestinians and other Arabs will be disastrous for America’s national interest.
While Hezbollah has largely remained immune to criticism, owing to its widely perceived role as an effective resistance movement against Israeli aggression, the powerful Iran-backed Shi’a militia and political party is now viewed by many demonstrators as part of the corrupt and morally bankrupt political establishment that must be replaced. Against this backdrop, supporters of Hezbollah and its Shi’a ally the Amal Movement have been quick to resort to violence.
Cities are commonly regarded as the primary places where class economies become layered and articulated; however, the debates on “urban humanitarianism” have neglected social class as a key factor that significantly marks the relationship between aid providers and recipients in settings of aid provision. The small city of Halba, in northern Lebanon, vividly illustrates how the class economy has tacitly been shaping humanitarian programming and how the very presence of humanitarian actors on the ground reinforced the pre-existing class-based inequality.
It is clear that the Israeli political system has reached a peak in terms of the challenges it faces: two elections campaigns to date this year have not led to conclusive results and a third round may be right around the corner.
The nationwide protests are the most significant domestic political development in Lebanon since the end of the civil war. It would be useful to examine both the short and long term political potential of this new awakening.
In the short term, the protests have already mobilized the power of the public to bring down a corrupt and ineffective government, and to gain great leverage on the rejection or acceptance of any new government. They have also raised urgent national demands and forced the ruling class to confront these demands.
On a recent trip to my native Lebanon I looked on its ongoing, unprecedented protests with both wonder and worry. The country is a month into widespread anti-government demonstrations. The protests’ scale ebbs and flows but the relative calm during my stay had a fleeting if not sinister quality to it. That calm is unraveling. However this chapter of Lebanon’s history unfolds, this complicated country has changed irreversibly.
It is not always recognized that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s Nov. 18 declaration that Israeli “settlements are not inconsistent with international law” was primarily political, not diplomatic, designed for domestic American consumption as part of the president’s reelection campaign. Secondarily, it was intended to strengthen Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hand in the current coalition negotiations and/or the likely upcoming Knesset election, if coalition negotiations fail. Third on the list, almost an afterthought, is the effect on the Palestinians, whose future state’s boundaries it purports to impact.
