Little hope for an end to Israel’s political turmoil
Neither Likud nor Kahol Lavan was able to break the political stalemate and clear the path to the immediate formation of a majority government.
Neither Likud nor Kahol Lavan was able to break the political stalemate and clear the path to the immediate formation of a majority government.
While attention in the third Israeli general elections in a year has focused on the performance of the caretaker prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, a powerful light must be shed as well on the successful performance of Israel’s Palestinian citizens, who again increased their representation in Israel’s parliament.
On March 1, the Iran-backed Houthis took control of the city of al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf Province, after weeks of fierce clashes with local tribes and Yemeni government forces. Incompetence, lack of unified leadership, and the absence of a military strategy by the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition have played into the hands of the Houthis.
The announcement of Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” was a rude shock, roundly condemned by almost everyone concerned with peace and justice between Israelis and Palestinians. But it also presents an urgent challenge for all those who reject it because they realize the dire implications of what it portends for the future of any peaceful negotiated solution. If a genuine two-state solution is truly dead, and an equitable one-state solution is even harder to achieve, then where does that leave us? What is, or should be, the agenda for the foreseeable future for those concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Both politicians and populace are sick of a pointless political process.
On Feb. 9, 2020, after five years of involvement in Yemen’s civil war as part of the Saudi-led coalition, the UAE’s leadership celebrated the completion of its phased military withdrawal from the country in a ceremony at Zayed Military City. Although the UAE’s withdrawal has provided an exit strategy from the stalemate in Yemen, it neither suspends Abu Dhabi’s role in the coalition nor curtails Emirati influence on the ground.
Now that all of the implementation deadlines have come and gone, where do things stand with the Riyadh Agreement, signed in late 2019 by Yemen’s Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council?
This year could mark a turning point in the European Union’s relations with the countries of the MENA region. If the EU is to realize the objectives laid out in its 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy and become a major world power, it has to be more proactive and creative, especially in the Middle East.
The main takeaway from the Saudi Aramco IPO in December 2019 is that the Saudi leadership is willing to fully support private investors.
The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.
Over the past 14 months, there have been moments when it seemed like progress was being made toward de-escalation in Yemen, but there have also been significant setbacks as well. Peace efforts thus far have been largely fragmented and frail, and two primary lessons from the past failures have become clear.
The April 2019 Israeli elections between incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his competitor Benny Gantz were fraught with tension even before external entities got involved. But when Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet, revealed that suspected Iranian cyber actors had accessed Gantz’s mobile phone, there was yet another issue to contend with, albeit one not specific only to Israeli elections: interference.
According to the latest poll published by the Pew Research Center, the Israeli public sees China in a favorable way. Only in Russia and Nigeria does China get a more sympathetic audience. This result seems surprising, when compared to China’s low level of favorability in other Western countries. However, the strong favorability rating registered in the Pew survey is less surprising than it seems, and in fact is a clear indication that the wide-ranging Chinese soft power efforts to appeal to the Israeli public opinion have paid off.
Since the death of its founder Ali Abdullah Saleh on Dec. 4, 2017, the General People’s Congress (GPC) — Yemen’s dominant political party for the past four decades — has faced a test in attempting to reunify its divided wings in Riyadh, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Sanaa amid a shifting strategic landscape. The GPC’s factions have competed over the party leadership, failed to elect a transitional leader, and exchanged accusations following the Saudi-brokered meeting in Jeddah in July 2019. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s attempts to revive Saleh’s damaged old political vehicle continue, both politically and militarily.
Jordan’s response to President Donald Trump’s so-called “deal of the century” has been quick and unequivocal. Less than an hour after the release of the peace plan at a White House ceremony on Jan. 28, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi issued a statement in which he reiterated Amman’s support for the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative (API) as the only path to a just and lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, without referring directly to the Trump proposal.