The U.S.’s willingness to grant wide berth to the Taliban has effectively given them license to continue a campaign of violence.
To help prevent a U.S.-Iran war in their neighborhood, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have called for diplomacy. They have reached out to Iranian officials to de-escalate. And they have provided Tehran with humanitarian assistance to deal with the coronavirus pandemic.
Unfortunately, many distinguished Arab writers are unknown to the majority of Iranian readers and their works are not available in Persian. Arab literature has largely been neglected in the Iranian literary translation market.
Six scholars from across MEI take a closer look at the challenges facing Iraq’s new prime minister, from the protest movement and Baghdad-Erbil relations to the balancing act between Washington and Tehran.
Washington must decide if it will grant concessions that al-Kadhimi can use to convince Tehran to accept a sustained U.S. military presence.
For now, Tehran’s bottom-line objective in Iraq is for the Americans to stop urging Baghdad to cut Iran loose.
Iran’s once promising reformist movement is in a death spiral. It is not because the idea of reform has lost its appeal.
Rather than seeing the spreading virus as a common enemy, the Taliban seem to be viewing the health crisis as opening new military opportunities.
There is speculation in Tehran that a new round of dangerous retribution is just around the corner.
Rather than being visibly engaged, the military seems content with having the civilian authorities carry the responsibility for dealing with the crisis.
Initial data of Covid-19 mortality rates in the United States suggest that in several regions and cities, the virus hits minority communities harder than the general population. A similar trend has emerged in the Islamic Republic of Iran where published data indicates Iran’s ethnic minorities have higher Covid-19 fatality rates than the general Iranian population.
The United States and Iran are poised for a showdown. Understanding where we are today with this conflict and where we are likely to go in the future requires that we look at the conflicting strategic doctrines between the United States and Iran against a backdrop of a shifting Middle East.
COVID-19 presents a major threat to the global economy and the health of millions of people around the world, but its impact on Iran, one of the early epicenters of the outbreak, has been particularly severe.
The country faces no letup in either political squabbling or insurgent attacks.
The Islamic Republic’s unconventional alliance network reaches far and wide, and its workings have only intensified since the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani in early January 2020. The systematic effort to consolidate these alliances, indicated by the swift appointment of Gen. Esmail Qaani and his new deputy Gen. Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi to lead the Quds Force, is about much more than just retaliation and revenge against the United States. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, a calibrated response to the Trump administration’s reckless and escalatory changes to the established “rules of engagement” between Washington and Tehran.