Research & Commentary Results

The collection of political documents held by the Oman Library reflects a watershed moment in Yemeni history, at a time when Yemen underwent substantial social and political reform as a result of Yemeni unification in May 1990, which merged North and South Yemen.

The global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused new attention on friction between the United States and its traditional partners in the Gulf and reinforced skepticism regarding the United States’ status as the dominant international partner in the region. It’s time for both sides to identify a realistic way forward that sheds outdated notions of mutual obligation without becoming merely transactional.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

Seven years on from the launch of the Saudi-led coalition’s military campaign on March 26, 2015, the civil war in Yemen remains stalemated. The fundamental realities of the conflict have not changed substantially in over five years. Meanwhile, the conditions under which the majority of innocent Yemenis are living continue to deteriorate. It’s time to consider measures that can promote an end to the conflict and lay the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction.

This policy brief provides a deep dive into the far-reaching and interrelated policies imposed by the government to reduce the country’s deficits, debts, and reliance on hydrocarbons.

The civil war in Yemen is well into its eighth year with no end in sight. It is imperative that the United Nations, with the United States and other key powers in support, do more to end the suffering and begin the long process of rebuilding and reconstructing Yemen. But that work cannot begin until there is a common understanding of what the obstacles are to achieving a peaceful resolution. In particular, what tools can and should the United States use to pressure the Houthis and overcome their resistance to negotiations?

The Arab Gulf states appear to be following a common template in responding to the global transition toward an energy system in which renewables play an increasingly central role. They are publicizing renewable energy targets, decarbonizing upstream and downstream oil and gas operations, commissioning renewable energy projects, and improving energy efficiency, among other strategies. A closer look, however, reveals differences in how they have deployed solar and wind power capacity.

في 24 يناير/كانون الأول، أصدرت القيادة المركزية الأمريكية (CENTCOM) بيانًا أكدت فيه أن “القوات الأمريكية في قاعدة الظفرة الجوية، بالقرب من أبو ظبي في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، اعترضت صاروخيين متجهين للداخل بالاستعانة بعدة صواريخ باتريوت اعتراضية بالتزامن مع جهود القوات المسلحة الإماراتية في الساعات الأولى من صباح 24 يناير 2022. نجحت الجهود المشتركة في منع كلا الصاروخين من إصابة القاعدة.

Why have authors revisited it over the decades through literary works, and what makes it appealing to international readers?

Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?

يوم 17 يناير/كانون الثاني، نفذ الحوثيون هجومًا آخر استهدف منشأة نفطية إماراتية في أبوظبي، ما أدى إلى مقتل ثلاثة وافدين، وإلحاق أضرار بالبنية التحتية. ظاهريًا، يبدو أنهم يذكَّرون الإماراتيين بمدى ضعفهم وإمكانية الإضرار بهم إذا استمرت الهجمات ضد مصالح الحوثيين في اليمن. وبحسب ما ورد، كانت وسائل الهجوم عبارة عن طائرات مسيرة، وهي أداة بسيطة غير متماثلة متاحة للكثيرين واستخدمها الحوثيون على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة. لسوء الحظ فإن القصة هنا قد أصبحت مألوفة للغاية وتتطلب استجابة متسقة الآن. ففي نهاية المطاف، من المرجح أن يتم نسخ وتكرار ما أصبح روتينيًا في الخليج في مواقع أخرى.

While a negotiated agreement by the parties to deescalate militarily and return to the negotiating table would be the preferred outcome, there’s little or no reason to believe that the Houthis, who have responded to their losses in Shabwa by escalating their attacks, are yet interested in talking. Rather, by issuing pleas for de-escalation, the international community risks sending the Houthis yet another message that their intransigence, which is the root cause of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Yemenis, will be rewarded by new pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to limit its response to Houthi aggression. In this regard, the Biden administration, with its international partners, risks repeating the failed strategy of 2021.

On Jan. 10, the governor of Shabwa announced its liberation from the Iran-backed Houthis. This victory followed a seemingly successful Houthi military campaign over the past couple of years to expand their influence around the city of Marib, weaken the internationally-backed government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and solidify their grasp on strategic northern areas. However, while significant, the victory in Shabwa is unlikely to be replicated in the rest of the country, given the very specific political and regional dynamics that helped to bring it about. Moreover, the Houthis’ drone attack on Abu Dhabi on Jan. 17 presents a further challenge to the advance of pro-UAE forces into Marib.

As the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) work to transform from hydrocarbons-driven to data-driven economies, they will need to make significant and well-planned invest-ments in digital infrastructure, particularly when it comes to the complex issue of data govern-ance. They must take the lead in establishing regulatory and legal frameworks aligned with international standards in terms of data gathering, processing, and storing procedures. This report highlights the existing laws and regulations that govern data protection in the GCC while addressing their potential and limitations, along with the similarities and differences between the GCC’s legislative frameworks and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and the impact of the GCC’s current data protection laws on individuals, the private sector, regulators, and governments.

While oil prices have rebounded before soaring since the depths of collapse in the spring of 2020 — with Brent crude prices skyrocketing from $19 per barrel in April 2020 to a three-year high of $86 per barrel in October 2021 — the prospects for a sustained high oil price for Gulf producers is unlikely.