Research & Commentary Results

Japan’s Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu phoned his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, on Sept. 8, 2026, to express concern over the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It was reportedly the ninth such phone call between the pair since March.

I was a teenage Afghan refugee in Pakistan’s tribal areas when the Twin Towers fell. Almost nobody around us understood the politics of what had happened, but we knew that something had changed for good. Afghanistan, which until then had been our private tragedy and our first exile from Taliban rule, had suddenly become the world’s concern, with the United States leading the response.

Though it has fallen out of the headlines because of the Iran war, Syria has had a dramatically consequential summer. Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Charles Lister to take stock of recent developments: the dissolution of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Israeli strikes and the friction with Turkey they have exposed, the standoff in Sweida, as well as Damascus’s bid to turn Syria into a trade corridor between the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Is the transition consolidating or fragmenting nearly two years after the fall of the Assad regime?

Six months into the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, Southeast Asia’s exposure to a conflict thousands of miles away has proven durable rather than transient — and it is beginning to function as a genuine stress test of the region’s institutions, not just its energy bills.

Taiwan has proposed an 18% increase in its defense budget for 2027, pushing military spending above 3% of GDP as Chinese military and political pressure grows. The move comes as the United States remains engaged in its six-month war with Iran and has deployed its last aircraft carrier in the western Pacific to the Middle East, temporarily leaving the region without a US carrier presence.

Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Iran war has been defined by a sustained effort to avoid direct entanglement. That restraint was notable given Riyadh’s position as Iran’s principal Gulf rival, its close security relationship with Washington, and its exposure to regional escalation. The kingdom made clear that it would not permit its territory or airspace to be used by any party for military action against Iran, avoided rhetorical alignment with Israel, and preserved the diplomatic channels with Tehran that were restored in 2023.

President Donald Trump’s disdain for strategy extends to process: mass National Security Council firings and reliance on a tiny circle of advisors have left the interagency policy process dormant amid the Iran war. The result is improvised, damaging moves like the Strait of Hormuz toll scheme. Reviving a professional, deliberative policy process is essential.

The Iraqi Peshmerga, the military arm of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), remains one of the United States’ most important defense partners in the Middle East. This monograph provides an in-depth assessment of Peshmerga combat effectiveness, particularly considering its experience in the war against the Islamic State and its subsequent clash with the Iraqi Army and Iran-backed militias. Drawing on past research and more than two dozen interviews with Peshmerga officers, US military officers, and subject matter experts, this study includes detailed policy recommendations as well as a discussion of their implications.

The MENA Energy Recap is a quarterly review of key energy developments that took place in the region from April through June of 2026 and what they signal in the months ahead. The Recap views these developments through the lens of policy and strategy, energy security, and markets.

As the US-Israel-Iran war enters its sixth month, the conflict has taken a sharp turn. After a brief lull in the fighting, Iran launched a surprise ballistic missile attack on US forces on July 28, and the US and Saudi Arabia struck back at Iran-backed militias in Iraq, marking Riyadh’s entry into the war. MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka joins host Alistair Taylor to discuss the escalation, what may come next, and the state of talks over sharing the Strait of Hormuz.

United States Central Command (CENTCOM), one of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) six geographical combatant commands, is responsible for countering threats, responding to crises, and strengthening regional stability in the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia.

Something more consequential than another oil market disruption is underway. The Iran war has exposed and accelerated an institutional weakness within OPEC that had been building for years. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the UAE’s departure, Iraq’s brief flirtation with exit, and the continued rise of U.S. oil production all point to a deeper question about the cartel’s durability. The issue has shifted from OPEC’s ability to manage crises toward whether its model of collective discipline can withstand mounting structural strain.

Iran is transforming its Axis of Resistance into a decentralized, Yemen-centered network that leverages the Houthis to threaten both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, extending Tehran’s coercive reach over the world’s key maritime chokepoints and reshaping the post-war balance in the Middle East and Red Sea.

During the opening days of the 2025–2026 U.S.–Israel war with Iran, Kuwait’s military briefings highlighted intercepted Iranian missiles and drones while revealing little about strike locations or damage. The approach reflected a familiar wartime dilemma in which governments must reassure populations while limiting information that could aid adversaries or fuel uncertainty. Yet Kuwait’s response revealed a broader shift across the Gulf. Information was no longer simply a messaging tool; it had become part of the battlefield.