Research & Commentary Results

As the Trump administration pushes to expand the Abraham Accords in the Middle East and into the Caucasus and Central Asia, it overlooks a dramatic shift in perception across the Arab and Muslim world. Where once Israel might have been viewed as David battling a Goliath-like Arab world, today the roles appear reversed. Israel, empowered by unchecked military might and unwavering US support, is increasingly seen not just as a regional power but as a US-backed regional hegemon. For Gulf Arab states, this transformation presents a dilemma: Can a Goliath be a partner in peace?

The Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, shattered Israel’s long-standing security paradigm, replacing limited deterrence with an ambitious campaign aimed at dismantling Hamas, confronting Hizballah and other Iranian proxies, and directly targeting Iran’s nuclear program with the support of the United States. In stark contrast, Saudi Arabia has prioritized regional stability and de-escalation, restoring relations with Iran, and focusing on its Vision 2030 economic transformation.

During June’s Israel-Iran war, a quieter but significant battle played out in cyberspace, highlighting how Tehran has refined its use of digital tools to shape the battlespace, control domestic narratives, and project influence abroad. While largely ineffective in operational terms, Iran’s cyber response marked a new phase in its strategic evolution.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first year in office has been defined by Iran’s familiar political structural constraints, external crises, and a moderate-reformist base forever frustrated with his cautious pragmatism and unfulfilled promises. His July 2024 election was undeniably a setback for hardliners. Yet one year later, the assessment is sobering: While Pezeshkian has in some ways perhaps helped in slowing the hardline march, he has not made any fundamental difference in how the Islamic Republic is run. Every decision requires second-guessing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s next move, and even as a president boxed in by the system with limited powers, he is constantly under the sword of Damocles.

As the dog days of August approach, we are pleased to share a curated summer reading list featuring some of VP for Policy Ken Pollack’s favorite books on the region. Covering a variety of timely and engaging topics, the list offers recommendations for anyone interested in deepening their understanding of the Middle East.

After almost two years of fighting in Gaza, and after the decimation of Hizballah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and the 12-day Israeli-American war on Iran, the Middle East is in new strategic and political territory. Two pathways lie ahead: the first is one in which the gains and changes brought about by war are turned, through intense diplomacy and negotiation, into new international and political arrangements that bring about a period of security and stability in the region; the second is one in which that corner is not turned, and the wars in Gaza, Iran, and potentially Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, continue indefinitely. The trajectory will depend on the choices of key actors — above all Iran, Israel, and the United States.

Probably few if any Middle East analysts had Israeli airstrikes targeting key government installations of the Syrian state on their summer 2025 bingo cards. And yet that is precisely what happened on Wednesday, as Israeli jets hit Syria’s military headquarters and an area near the presidential palace in Damascus.

MEI Senior Fellow Ross Harrison breaks down how this foreign policy approach can help mitigate conflict—and how both Washington and Tehran may have undermined their own ambiguity during the recent 12-day war, with potentially lasting consequences for regional stability.

As the Trump administration marks six months in office, it is pursuing a flurry of diplomatic initiatives across the Middle East — some publicly coordinated, others shaped behind closed doors. MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Mara Rudman joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to assess the administration’s broader regional strategy and its handling of key issues.

Last June’s Israel-Iran conflict became a revealing stress test for Beijing’s Middle East strategy, its role in global diplomacy, and the coherence of what some have described as an emergent “Axis of Upheaval” between China, Russia, and Iran.

US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the third time in his second term this week, shortly after securing a major victory for his domestic policy agenda in the budget bill passed by Congress.

When the Israel-Iran war broke out and the United States decided to assist the Israeli side by striking Iran’s nuclear program, both Tehran and Washington expected Islamabad to side with their respective positions. This situation placed the Pakistani government in a politically sensitive and diplomatically delicate position.

Domestic politics has taken center stage in the United States as Congress struggles to pass President Donald Trump’s proposed budget plan. But July is also shaping up as a pivotal month for Trump’s foreign policy in the Middle East and beyond.

On June 19, false reports of an Israeli strike on Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant sparked alarm across the Gulf. Though denied by Israeli officials, the claim traces back to a warning from Qatar’s prime minister of a potential catastrophe in the event of nuclear contamination — no water, no food, no life — due to the Gulf’s reliance on desalinated seawater. Gulf governments moved quickly to reassure the public that no radiation had been detected, but the episode underscored the region’s growing sense of vulnerability. A regional approach to water security could help to mitigate such risks.

The May 6 cease-fire between the United States and the Houthi militia in Yemen has had a consolidating effect on the balance of power inside the war-torn state and hardened the status quo of the country’s civil war. In turn, the outcome of Israel and Iran’s subsequent 12-day war has the potential to temporarily shake up this status quo once again; but Yemen’s fracturing anti-Houthi coalition is unlikely to be able to exploit that opportunity.