Defense Rapid Reaction: US and Israel strike Iran

جيسون هـ. كامبل

Senior Fellow, MEI

President Donald Trump’s February 28 statement centered on the obliteration of the Iranian nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and navy as the primary objectives of the campaign. His message to the Iranian population at the end of his remarks, however, makes clear there is another, broader goal — regime change. In this context, one cannot help but to harken back to Iraq in March 2003. One key difference though is that the United States is attacking Iran with a massive strike force as opposed to an invasion force. Such lack of significant ground forces may help avoid US casualties, but airpower alone has a poor track record of toppling governments or even extracting significant concessions from adversaries. Even if, in an optimal scenario, US and Israeli strikes are able to achieve regime decapitation, overthrowing the regime from the air will prove exceptionally challenging.

This approach also inherently assumes that any replacement to the current regime would be a net positive. A more likely scenario if the regime were to collapse is a power vacuum that leads to a period of widespread destabilization. This would invite not only the emergence of competing power centers from within but an array of actors from across the region and even around the world with interests in the eventual outcome. Thus, we are on a very slippery slope, and events could easily careen out of US control or even influence. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the State Department led an in-depth inter-agency planning process for post-Saddam governance called the “Future of Iraq” project. This was infamously ignored by the Pentagon in favor of more optimistic assessments of how the population would receive the US-led coalition. In the current case, no such planning effort occurred. Thus, whatever comes next will be determined without a US plan or forces and diplomats on the ground to implement.

Rather than try to build a broad coalition this time, the current campaign features the US and Israel “going it alone.” Unlike the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, there has been no appeal to the United Nations Security Council, no Congressional endorsement, and there is no “coalition of the willing” with over 40 nations. Moreover, key US partners in the Gulf and wider Arab world have for months voiced apprehensions about the prospects of follow-on strikes against Iran. Now, many of these partners have been the target of Iran’s rapid response. Given that most of these play host to US military assets in some fashion, they presumably must have been kept informed. Nevertheless, should the Iranian response be more fierce or drawn out than anticipated, the standing of the US in some or all of these places could be significantly tarnished.

Regardless of stated intent, this is indisputably a war of choice. While the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on nationwide protests in January appears to have been the catalyst for Trump’s decision to amass US forces in the region, there was no imminent threat to core US interests that this attack is thwarting. In his statement, Trump referred repeatedly to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and the destruction of its ballistic missile program, both allegedly “imminent threats” justifying the war. While these are indeed hazards, there have been no recent developments suggesting that the American population or US vital interests were in immediate danger had Saturday’s strikes not occurred. Indeed, the Iranian regime was still on its back foot in recovering from the damage caused by last June’s 12-day war.

Finally, other strategic concerns confronting the region, not least of which being the cease-fire in Gaza or the continued push to disarm Lebanese Hizballah, will inevitably receive less attention in the wake of the strikes. Especially at risk are the multinational efforts underway to implement key governance and security measures of President Trump’s 20-point plan from last fall. Focus on the consequences of the latest war with Iran will, for a time, inevitably push other such regional concerns to the backburner.

Jason H. Campbell is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, where he focuses on international security, geopolitics, and foreign policy.

كيفن دونيجان

Distinguished Military Fellow, MEI

The US strikes on Iran achieved tactical surprise, and their timing was likely determined by sensitive intelligence information about the whereabouts of key members of the Iranian leadership. These strikes targeting Iran’s top officials were likely paired with others on Iranian command and control and communications capabilities designed to blunt the Islamic Republic’s ability to retaliate.

The initial Iranian response, which has included hitting US regional bases and infrastructure as well as Israel, was expected and likely scripted. However, now that the Iranian regime knows it is the direct target of this military action, further Iranian retaliation could become more desperate, less discriminate, and include attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea.

A Distinguished Military Fellow at MEI, Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan, USN (ret.), served as commander of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and commander of the 32-Nation Combined Maritime Forces in the Middle East.

سكوت بنديكت

Distinguished Military Fellow, MEI

A discussion around deterrence often accompanies developments leading up to a potential conflict. This has certainly been true in recent years when it came to flare-ups and wars in the Middle East, and specifically in the context of the conflict between the US and Iran. Can deterrence be established? At what cost in resources? And how do we assess whether it is effective?

To deter an adversary and prevent it from taking actions inimical to your interests, you must credibly hold something it values at risk. This requires three elements: the capability (to hold at risk something the enemy values), the will (to use that capability), and communication (to the adversary that you can and will act).

In the run-up to the current war against Iran, multiple expert voices in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East — many of whom dealt with past escalated tensions surrounding Iran and its malign activities and nuclear ambitions — offered a wide variety of, at times, conflicting opinions about the likelihood of renewed strikes. Consequently, it’s not hard to imagine that Tehran may have misinterpreted whether Washington had the will, this time, to do what the Trump administration was clearly communicating for weeks. Iran should not have been under any such delusions.

There have been dramatic changes to the balance of power in the region as well as local actors’ strategic calculations since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the latter’s armed responses across multiple theaters. Over the ensuing two and a half years, Hizballah (Iran’s most effective regional proxy) has been largely dismantled; the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Iran’s facilitator of weapons trafficking to threaten Israel) has fallen in Syria; and the 12-day war last June (when Israeli jets were able to fly above Tehran in broad daylight, with US forces joining the effort later to strike Iran’s nuclear sites) delivered a serious blow to the Iranian nuclear program. Given the cumulative effect of these developments, the Iranian leadership’s incredulity at the direct communication it received from its American interlocutors — to dismantle its nuclear program and stop its malign activity in the region and elsewhere — represents a strategic failure. And there is a good chance that this strategic failure will ultimately prove existential to the regime.

Scott Benedict is a retired US Marine Corps Major General who last served as the Commanding General of Second Marine Aircraft Wing. He is also a Distinguished Military Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

تشارلز ليستر

Senior Fellow, MEI

So far, Iran’s network of proxies across the Middle East has stood by and watched as their patron suffered through a day of punishing American and Israeli strikes. In Lebanon, Hizballah has remained silent. In Iraq, Kataib Hizballah briefly issued a veiled threat against US military bases, before some of its own personnel were hit in a strike south of Baghdad. Tellingly, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Iran’s second most significant proxy in Iraq, then went on to distance itself from hostilities, calling on the Iraqi state to intervene instead.

It is from Yemen that we are most likely to see proxy attacks resume, as the Houthis look to re-assert themselves on the regional stage by targeting shipping in the Red Sea, adding to any Iranian effort to shutter the Straits of Hormuz. The Houthis have the capacity to significantly complicate the regional conflict dynamic, but they cannot impede what is already being directed at Iran itself.

The confirmed death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei may trigger an emotional lashing out by some of Iran’s proxies; but in all likelihood, the lesson has probably been learned by now that it is best to sit back. Syria’s fragile transitional government is taking no chances, however, deploying large numbers of military and special forces across its border with Iraq. In the meantime, the remains of fallen Israeli and American interceptors have proven more of a potential hazard to local populations than Iran’s once feared array of militia proxies.

Charles Lister is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute and heads MEI’s Syria Initiative.